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This thesis considers the place of Facebook within the public sphere by 
focusing on whether the social network provides new, distinct spaces for political 
discussion. In doing so, the study makes an original contribution to knowledge by 
assessing the role of Facebook in enabling or limiting political debate. It considers 
whether the corporate cultural development of Facebook’s architecture influences 
such debate, set against broader interpersonal political communication and social 
capital theory. 
While other studies have considered Facebook’s contribution to the public 
sphere by studying the role of the internet generally or of social media more broadly, 
this research focuses on Facebook itself, arguing that the scale, reach and corporate 
ecology of Facebook necessitates studying it as a political actor in its own right.  
The research hypothesised that Facebook’s corporate ambition and its global 
scale and dominance of online social debate potentially created a new form of social 
public sphere - one that is the product of today’s more horizontal networked society 
(Castells, 2010). The thesis argues that it is this social aspect of using Facebook, 
coupled to the company’s commercial focus on what an individual may be (or should 
be) interested in, that has the potential to affect public opinion and thus political 
actions. 
The study used data collected during the 2015 UK General Election, 
supplemented by additional material gathered during 2017’s “snap” UK General 
Election, to look at how citizens engage in political talk on Facebook. The mixed 
methods research includes quantitative surveys alongside qualitative online 




By focusing on particular online spaces (political candidates’ public Facebook 
pages) and a particular time period (the month preceding a general election) when 
political debate might be expected to happen, this research assesses whether 
Facebook’s architecture encourages or discourages such debate. The thesis explores 
whether these online spaces – political candidate’s public Facebook pages - offer a 
21st century version of Habermas’s 18th century coffee houses and salons as a place 
where debate among peers is expected and encouraged. 
However, the study finds that, even in these favourable circumstances, debate is 
less likely to happen, with Facebook’s architecture having a chilling effect on 
political talk. Users are more likely to avoid debate than to engage in it via Facebook 
and, while the scale and connectedness of Facebook has enabled protest or para-
political movements from Occupy to The 48% group to quickly gather momentum, 
the commercial ecology of its architecture is not able to sustain debate leading to 
broader civic action, within the context of a Habermasian public sphere. 
Further, Facebook’s architecture may undermine the public or civic sphere, not 
only by discouraging reasoned debate but by making it less likely that users will be 
exposed to opposing views or new ideas with which they might want to engage.  
None-the-less, the thesis hypothesises that the presence of particular users on a 
candidate’s page (the “right” people - defined as visible leaders, supportive policers, 
aware producers and engaged openers) can counter the negative effects of 
Facebook’s architecture to enable political talk, albeit within limited parameters. 
Finally, the thesis concludes that Facebook is not part of the Habermasian 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Why Facebook? 
On February 1, 2012, Facebook announced its initial public offering of shares 
(IPO). Founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg set out his company’s global 
communication aspirations in a letter to investors: 
At Facebook, we’re inspired by technologies that have revolutionized how 
people spread and consume information. We often talk about inventions like 
the printing press and the television – by simply making communication more 
efficient, they led to a complete transformation of many important parts of 
society. They gave more people a voice. They encouraged progress. They 
changed the way society was organized. They brought us closer 
together…There is a huge need and a huge opportunity to get everyone in the 
world connected, to give everyone a voice and to help transform society for 
the future. (Zuckerberg, 2012) 
Leaving aside the question of whether mass communications media have 
“brought people together” or instead created societies obsessed with amusements and 
distractions (Postman, 1985)1, that statement reflects the ecology and ambition of a 
company and its founder who believes that what he has built in Facebook2, is not 
 
1 Postman argued that television had turned the dissemination of all civic and public affairs – from 
politics to news – into entertainment, as “congenial adjuncts of showbusiness.” With society “a people 
on the verge of amusing ourselves to death” (1985: 4). That reliance on media as amusement and 
distraction may be seen as particularly prevalent in social media which, as discussed further on page 
13, may be the ultimate time-passer.    
2 Zuckerberg recounted, in an interview in 2016, how he and his roommates at Harvard did not set out 
to build a company in designing Facebook but “kind of followed what people wanted”, i.e. a directory 
which enabled people to connect with each other and find out about each other: “at some point…we 
decided to turn it into a company and go for this mission of connecting the world. But that’s not where 




simply a popular communications tool but a transformational communications 
medium. Facebook, according to Zuckerberg, is helping to change how society is 
organised by giving people, globally, a voice and connecting those voices with each 
other.  
But a voice to do what, and to be heard by whom? And, on being heard, to 
transform whose societies and in what ways? Does Facebook represent a unique 
opportunity to rail against power and hegemony, or would the company’s business 
practices and culture always limit the effectiveness of debate?  
Focusing on one societal reorganisation opportunity - the General Election in the 
UK - this thesis considers how and if Facebook provides that transformational 
communications medium, and whether it is being used to engage in politics and 
change the civic sphere. The research considers whether Facebook – as uniquely 
large and socially embedded communications media – enables or discourages 
political talk within the democratic process.  
In doing so, the research is located within debates around what constitutes the 
public sphere (or even whether it exists) in a world in which communicative spaces 
are increasingly fragmented and becoming increasingly filtered, and within ongoing 
debates on the nature of deliberative democracy, particularly within online spaces. 
The thesis also addresses issues around the quality of debate and the importance of 
informal political conversation, rather than focused deliberation, in supporting 
political engagement. What Habermas referred to as the ‘more sobering ‘is’’ of real-
world political talk, against the ‘demanding ‘ought’’ of academic theory too rooted in 




Thus, the bulk of the data gathered during this four-year research project is 
focused on online ethnographic watching of real political conversations as they 
happened, contributing to an identified need for more academic study of political talk 
unfolding in everyday public spaces (Eliasoph, 1997; Jacobs et al, 2009; Eveland et 
al, 2011; Chambers, 2012). And, in identifying the civilising role women were seen 
to play in those political conversations, the research also contributes to the work of 
academics investigating gender differences in how people engage with politics, and 
the emergent area of diversity theory within deliberative democratic theory 
(Chambers, 2003). 
The research also considers and contributes to ongoing work on the range and 
form of public deliberation or debate necessary to democracy, including the 
importance of disagreement (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996); of opinion and reason-
giving (Chambers, 2012); of civility (Papacharissi, 2004); and of rhetoric and the 
personalisation of opinion (Benett, 2003; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). 
Facebook’s goal to transform human relationships and communication is still at 
the core of the company’s mission. From the company website: “The phrase “this 
journey is 1% finished” is posted on our walls, reminding us that we’ve only begun to 
fulfill [sic] our mission to bring the world closer together.”3 Zuckerberg (2016) has 
spoken of his company’s ‘Ten Year Roadmap’ and the three big changes it wants to 
see in the world (and is working to enable). These are 1) getting everyone in the 
world on the internet and connected by the internet; 2) ubiquitous AI (artificial 
intelligence) and developing it beyond a commercial data tool to benefit humankind; 
and 3) the development of the next (post-smartphone) computing platform. Facebook 
 




saw this next platform as virtual and augmented reality (VAR) because of its capacity 
to create a more immersive, vision-led experience.  
Facebook is a company that is taking everything it has learned about how people 
communicate with each other, and how to track that communication, into its vision of 
a future in which everyone is connected and – through VAR – everyone has the 
capacity to step into each other’s life, instead of just watching or reading about an 
experience or event. 
This thesis argues that Facebook’s corporate ambition; the scale of its user base; 
the interconnectedness of its networks; and its dominance of online social media, 
makes this wholly-commercial company a global political actor in its own right. It 
has the capacity to create a new form of public sphere - one in which political talk is 
both public and social. It is this social aspect, coupled to the network’s extraordinary 
focus on what an individual may be most interested in, that delivers Facebook’s 
potential to influence change in public opinion.  
In exploring that hypothesis, this study goes further than existing research by 
considering the role of Facebook in the public sphere. While other studies4 have 
considered Facebook’s contribution to political debate by studying the role of the 
internet or of social media more broadly, this research focused on Facebook itself on 
the basis that the unprecedented scale, reach and corporate ecology of the social 
media service necessitated independent study 
 
 




1.2 Scope of research 
This research project set out initially, at its inception in 2013, to consider whether 
Facebook’s rapid rise represented a technological paradigm or only a phenomenon, 
and to hypothesise that the rapid growth of Facebook – its scale and global reach - 
had led to the creation of a new form of public sphere. 
By 2014, that broad and perhaps over-complex research question had narrowed to 
focus on Facebook’s role within the public sphere5, using the forthcoming 2015 UK 
General Election as an anchor point for data collection. As the research progressed, 
other strands emerged which began to re-link those two early elements – Facebook as 
market dominant social technology and Facebook as a social dominant network for 
public discourse. 
The research strategy enabled new questions to emerge and be explored, allowing 
for a constant comparison between what was observed in the field and existing theory 
around the public sphere and how people engage socially in political talk. Thus, by 
late-2014, the research question had coalesced around the place of Facebook within 
the public sphere and whether it was providing new, distinct spaces for political 
discussion. A mixed methods research strategy was agreed (see chapter three) 
focused around three stages of data gathering:  
 
5 While this paper makes reference throughout to “the” public sphere, this is a literary shorthand. The 
thesis does not assume a single entity public sphere but accepts a more multi-faceted construct which 
may consist of several multi-dimensional public spheres (Dahlgren, 1995; McNair, 2000; Temple, 
2006; Perloff, 2018) and which Habermas himself acknowledged (Calhoun, 1992) may not helpfully 




• Stage one quantitative surveys conducted with 253 targeted participants in 
order to gather information about pre-election political engagement on 
Facebook; 
• Stage two qualitative, online ethnographic research monitoring public 
Facebook feeds of candidates in four target constituencies in the month 
preceding the 2015 UK General Election, with around 3,500 posts and 
comments read, logged and assessed; 
• Supplemental material in the form of screenshots of Facebook material on 
election day, submitted by volunteers and follow-up questions and interviews 
with MP candidates or their agents; 
• Stage three data collection in the run-up to the May 2017’s “snap” General 
Election in the form of an interventionist case study built around direct 
engagement with political content production. 
However, as data emerged the question became more focused on whether this 
massive new communication space Facebook provided was encouraging or limiting 
such discussion. Was Facebook capable of operating within the public sphere or was 
its scale, reach, and in particular its corporate ecology, changing the nature of both 
political talk and the public sphere? A new hypothesis began to emerge that, rather 
than creating a new public sphere, Facebook may be undermining or even 
disintermediating the public sphere.6 
 
6 For brevity, a broadly Habermasian concept of the public sphere underpins references to “the” public 
sphere within this thesis but a more nuanced concept is acknowledged which allows for multiple 
spheres (see footnote, page 5), and which accepts the limitations of the theory in terms of who may be 




While these are still perhaps overly-complex questions to answer in one research 
project, it was felt that by focusing on an event and time period (around a General 
Election) when more political discussion would reasonably be expected to occur in 
everyday conversations, and in spaces (political pages on Facebook) where such 
discussion would reasonably be expected, it should be possible to see more clearly if 
and how political talk happened on Facebook. 
Further, these spaces – political candidate’s public Facebook pages – could offer a 
21st century analogy with Habermas’s 18th century coffee houses and salons as places 
where public debate among peers is expected and encouraged. Is Facebook delivering 
a uniquely large and global Habermasian salon, or a behemothian missed opportunity 
for progressing civic societies? Does Facebook represent a new space and 
opportunity in which to rail against elitist power and men-in-suits hegemony, or will 
its architecture, commercial interests, and user culture necessarily limit the 
effectiveness of debate? 
As the quote on page one outlined, the social and global ambition of Facebook as 
a company is to create not simply a popular communications tool but a 
transformational communications medium. One that will give people a voice through 
delivering a new space in which to ‘speak’ and connecting those voices across the 
globe to transform society.  
There have been other studies which have considered Facebook’s contribution to 
political debate – as outlined in chapter two of this thesis – but they have 
concentrated on the role of the internet generally or of social media more broadly, or 
have looked at other aspects of Facebook, such as its network effects, privacy 




research focuses on Facebook itself, arguing that the scale, reach and global corporate 
ecology of Facebook necessitates studying it as a political actor in its own right. 
Chapter two also points to academic work that has looked at how users interact 
with each other on Facebook and how the technology itself changes with the 
behaviours of its users. However, this study makes an original contribution to that 
pre-existing work by focusing on one particularly difficult area of communication – 
political talk – to look at whether Facebook as communications platform, linked as it 
has been to a number of seismic political events, is enabling political debate that 
might lead to civic action. 
This research project makes a unique contribution to the debate around the power 
and influence of Facebook by focusing on one societal reorganisation opportunity - a 
UK General Election - and looks at whether Facebook is able to deliver that space in 
which to speak, to connect those voices, and to engage people in political debate.  
The research tested the type and quality of debate seen in order to ask whether 
Facebook’s architecture enabled or discouraged political discussion or was neutral. In 
exploring that hypothesis, this study has gone further than previous research by 
considering the role of Facebook in the public sphere. In thus assessing the quantity 
and quality of political talk, the research contributes to the broader research question 
in political and media communications disciplines, which is whether Facebook is 
delivering effects which are, on balance, to the benefit or detriment of Western civic 
society and democracy. 
 




References to that broader research form part of chapter two’s literature review, 
which looks at the key literature underpinning this thesis – from the development of 
the internet, to social media, to Facebook’s near-ubiquity; with reference to 
applicable technology, social and media theory. It considers studies of social media 
and the internet as transformational social technologies and charts the development of 
the internet into a communicative and social network and the subsequent rise of 
Facebook.  
Chapter two also looks at literature around the public and civic spheres7 and the 
effect of the internet and the social media on engagement in civic and political 
society. It highlights the limited literature around Facebook’s place within global 
civic society and on considering Facebook as new communications media.  
It considers literature and research which looks at how Facebook’s architecture 
may affect political debate by filtering content towards people’s cognitive ease8, and 
positions that against research into how Facebook may be reducing “degrees of 
separation”9 between individuals and increasing interpersonal engagement. And it 
 
7 In particular, Habermas on the public sphere and Dahlgren on civic spheres 
8 A reference from Daniel Kahneman’s 2011 book ‘Thinking fast and slow’, it refers to theory around 
how easy it is for a person to understand a piece of information or complete a task and the 
corresponding level of motivation to do so. How easy or difficult something is (for example 
completing a level in a videogame) affects how hard the brain has to work and thus the motivation, 
with too easy being perceived as just as problematical as too difficult. Achieving the correct state of 
“ease” means achieving the correct level of motivation – thus the concept has gained particular 
relevance in marketing. 
9 Travers and Milgram’s (1969) “six degrees of separation” experiment tested how far one individual 
is separated from any other individual by sending a postcard, routing it person-to-person only via 
people they knew. The experiment concluded that a maximum of six people (4.4 to 5.7) (degrees of 
separation) were needed for the postcard to reach its final destination. For Facebook’s updated 




considers literature which looks at why and how citizens discuss – or more usually do 
not discuss – politics. 
Chapter three outlines the mixed methods approach taken to gathering data for 
this project, while addressing the limits in being able to independently collect data 
within Facebook’s commercial “walled garden”10 architecture.  
The chapter outlines the chronological stages of the data gathering, beginning 
with stage one which consisted of quantitative surveys of targeted participants in 
order to gather evidence of pre-election engagement in Facebook. The four surveys, 
involving 253 respondents – mostly young people – sought to gather information on 
people’s willingness to discuss socio-political issues and whether they are more or 
less likely to discuss such issues on Facebook. 
Stage two focused on the 2015 General Election itself with data collected from 
qualitative, online ethnographic research through monitoring public Facebook feeds 
of candidates in four target constituencies between April 27th and May 13th, 2015. 
During this stage, around 3,500 posts and comments were read, logged and assessed, 
and other material was included in the form of follow-up questions and interviews 
with candidates or their agents. 
The final, stage three data collection provided “bonus” material. The calling of a 
“snap” general election in May 2017, provided an opportunity to look at changes in 
Facebook in the intervening two years - a period which had seen increasing state and 
 
10 The phrase “walled garden” has evolved to describe closed software and systems which control who 
can access what. For example, a school might restrict access to some websites for its pupils, or a tech 





media criticism of Facebook as encouraging so-called “filter bubbles”, delivering 
users more of the political content they or their friends appeared to be interested in, 
rather than a spread of opinion and news.  
Concerns about the potential effect of this algorithmic editorialising, particularly 
where extremist or inaccurate material had been filtered in, were beginning to be 
raised in relation to the results of the 2016 US Presidential election and the UK vote 
on remaining in the European Union. The media and then-governments in both 
countries were surprised by the election results and, in looking for reasons for the 
vote outcomes, Facebook’s role as information conduit during the elections came 
under the spotlight. Thus, during the five-year period of research for this thesis, the 
issues under consideration became increasingly relevant to both the discipline and to 
a broader media and political discourse around Facebook.  
As chapter three notes, that also made this research project more difficult. The 
frequent changes to Facebook’s architecture; the growing criticism of that 
architecture in encouraging particular behaviours; the investigative work of 
journalists such as Carole Cadwalladr into whether those behaviours were managed 
by third parties for political ends; meant that the research project was constantly 
subject to new information and the need to keep evaluating that information against 
the original research question – Facebook as public space or public sphere for 
political talk.  
Alongside being able to note changes in Facebook’s architecture between the two 
elections, stage three enabled the addition of an interventionist case study. This 
focused on the Facebook page of a candidate in one of the four constituencies and 




debate – and further study monitoring the actions and effect of the page’s 
administrators in encouraging or curtailing debate.  
Chapter four steps through data gathered from each research stages and analyses 
the results. The analysis draws on literature within the areas of social capital and 
rational choice theory to look at why and how people use Facebook.  
Finally, chapter five summarises the results of the research and the conclusions 
reached, while suggesting ways forward for further research and for exploring related 
areas. The project delivered four conclusions – detailed in depth in the chapter:  
1. Facebook’s architecture has multiple chilling effects on political 
talk, and on debate in particular.  
2. Facebook’s corporate concerns drive content algorithms which tend 
towards the creation of filter bubbles, and bias that can be bought by 
third party influencers. 
3. The likelihood of debate comes down to the positive actions of 
individuals (the “right people”) vs the negative influence of 
Facebook’s architecture.  
4. Facebook is not a new public sphere, rather it has undermined or 
disintermediated the public sphere as it is largely understood. 
 
1.4 Facebook’s sphere of influence 
The starting point for this thesis was to argue why it is that Facebook, rather than 




autonomous communications media, and specifically why it warrants study in 
relation to its potential to transform engagement between the public and the political 
and civic spheres.  
Facebook is a global mass communication phenomenon. Founded in 2004, it has 
grown from a tool used by a few hundred students at Harvard University to share 
their self-edited profiles, to a communications medium actively used by two billion 
people each month11 to chat, share content, organise events, flag locations and 
interact with people they largely already know.  
Users are occupied or distracted by engaging with people they largely know. It is 
a time eater but not necessarily a time engager. It makes the present richer by 
episodically showing users what people they know are up to, but that information 
may not necessarily engage. Miller compared Facebook to living in a reality soap 
opera (2011: 193), while Jones a decade earlier had warned about the internet’s 
insertion into day-to-day life, and its displacement of peoples lived (“being”) time 
and functional (“doing”) time (1997: 13). Similarly, van Dijk warned of the 
expectation placed on people of being always online and therefore always available. 
Not only in time pressure but pressure to communicate (2006: 227).  
However, Facebook’s emphasis on the here and now delivered through a 
potentially vast network does mean that news stories can travel very quickly, and that 
creates an unprecedented opportunity for thousands, even millions, of people to 
comment on or act upon that story. Thus, this ultimate time eater has come to be 
credited with at least partial responsibility for a string of recent political upheavals – 
 
11 Monthly active users 2.27 billion as of September 30, 2018, according to Facebook newsroom 




the Brexit decision in the UK, the election of Donald Trump in the US, and the loss 
of Theresa May’s parliamentary majority in the 2017 UK election.12 
In addition, as sections 2.2 and 2.3 explore further, time spent on Facebook may 
be rewarded in bonding or bridging social capital13: information and/or support from 
both close and weak-tie acquaintances, which in turn may encourage more 
engagement. This section also explains how research into the inter-relationships 
between Facebook users suggests an increasingly linked global population with the 
degrees of separation between individuals being shown to have reduced as Facebook 
has extended its reach. The effect is to encourage feelings of interconnectivity among 
users and to facilitate the speed and range of travel of “viral” content – the 
epidemiology of how messages may spread, infection-like, through media (Gladwell, 
2000). 
Facebook has built a successful global business14 on the back of building a 
phenomenally successful social communications tool. However, this thesis asks 
 
12 See ‘Cambridge Analytica helped ‘cheat’ Brexit vote and US election, claims whistleblower’: 
Politico, 27 March, 2018: https://www.politico.eu/article/cambridge-analytica-chris-wylie-brexit-
trump-britain-data-protection-privacy-facebook. One of several similar claims made and reported 
during UK parliamentary committee investigations into Cambridge Analytica and Facebook (accessed 
November 6, 2018). 
13 There is no clear, single definition of social capital but it is generally understood as the value of the 
relationships and links between people and the benefits delivered to the individual, a group or society 
more broadly, by the effectiveness and durability of those networks (for a useful summary of 
definitions and literature, see: https://www.socialcapitalresearch.com/literature/definition/ (accessed 
November 6, 2018 ).  
14 Facebook’s 2016 Annual Report showed the company earned over $27.6billion ($10.2bn net) – 
against $17.9bn in 2015 (43.7bn net) and $12.4bn ($2.9bn) in 2014. Source: 
https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/annual_reports/FB_AR_2016_FINAL.pdf  




whether the social network site is also being used - or is capable of being used - as a 
place for civic and socio-political debate and the advancement of democracy15.  
Before moving on to consider that question, it is important to understand that 
Facebook is not simply a social network, nor should it be described (as it too often is) 
as a social network within a basket of social networks. The scale and reach of 
Facebook is so far beyond that of Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, WhatsApp and 
competing social networks that, while all online social networks have core elements 
in common (as the next chapter outlines), Facebook stands alone in its 
transformational potential.  
Compare Twitter’s 326 million MAU (monthly active users)16 or WhatsApp’s 1.3 
billion (as April 2017), and Instagram’s 100 million MAU against Facebook’s two 
billion. Then add to Facebook’s numbers the figures from the other social networks 
the company now owns – including WhatsApp (bought for $19bn in 2014) and 
Instagram.17 What these figures represent is that, in a polysocial world in which 
 
15 Whether one sees democracy as a series of actions focused around the act of adults voting for their 
agents and representatives, or in grander terms: “democracy is.. the idea of community itself” an ideal 
state towards which society travels but may never arrive (Dewey, 1927: 148), or a chaotic process 
beset by a mythical concept of “will of the people” and 18th century idealism (Schumpeter, 1976: 253). 
16 For Q3 2018, according to the company’s investor report. See: https://investor.twitterinc.com/static-
files/b9402133-be92-4ea4-ac2b-db20be19d1cd  and https://investor.twitterinc.com/ (both accessed 
November 6, 2018). 
17 Throughout this thesis, in referring to Facebook as a company, the reference is to the company as a 
whole – including its ownership of other social networks such as WhatsApp. However, in referring to 
Facebook as it is used, i.e. its architecture and the way users engage with the social network (including 
the data gathered and analysis of use in chapter four) the focus is only on the Facebook platform itself, 




people can choose from multiple online social media, the majority choose to only use 
Facebook or a combination of Facebook-owned social media. 
Facebook’s reach as a communication company is phenomenal. A comparison 
would be if one-in-six people around the world used the same private telephone 
company to communicate with each other; and if that telephone company also 
delivered most of the news and media its users watched or read every day; and if that 
telephone company also kept very, very detailed records on who its users spoke with; 
who they preferred to hear from; what content they shared and with whom; what 
videos they chose to watch and how long for; and what subjects generally engaged 
them the most. And if that telephone company then used that data to encourage users 
to phone the same people more often, and to give them more of the news and media 
they seemed to prefer.  
We invest in this huge testing framework. At any given point in time there’s 
not just one version of Facebook running in the world, there’s probably tens 
of thousands of versions running because engineers [at Facebook] have the 
power to try out an idea and ship it to, maybe ten thousand people, or a 
hundred thousand people…They then get a readout on how that version 
performed compared to the baseline version of Facebook … on everything we 
care about. How connected people are; how much people are sharing; how 
much they say that they’re finding meaningful content. Business metrics like 
how much revenue we make, and engagement of the whole community. 
(Zuckerberg, 2016a) 
There is nothing like Facebook in terms of a single, private communications 
company having that scale, that ambition, and that societal embeddedness. A 
company with a business success metric based not just on revenue, but on how much 




and societal embeddedness, together deliver the potential for Facebook to create a 
new public sphere through its global reach; its network effects; and its ownership of a 
mammoth, transnational, dataset on individuals and communities and how they 
communicate with each other. 
Facebook is also unique in that, unlike other social network sites, its focus is on 
communication between people who already know each other. Facebook’s rejection 
of the anonymity of predecessor sites such as MySpace (Papacharissi 2009, Gehl 
2012) in favour of moving offline relationships online (Ross et al, 2009) creates trust 
and encourages normative behaviours mirrored in offline social engagement. These 
offline-to-online social mores were prevalent in the conversations studied during the 
stage three and stage four research phase of this project, as detailed in chapters four 
and five.  
While academics and the media have referenced Facebook as playing a part in 
democratic action – the 2008 anti-Farc protests in Columbia for example 
(Kirkpatrick, 2010), the question being considered in this thesis is whether Facebook 
enables debate precipitous to democratic action, or simply provides an accessible 
communications tool for organising action. 
Miller (2016) questioned whether Facebook – or any social media site – was able 
to influence action. Rather than look at the affordances such platforms lend 
themselves to, he suggests that the robustness of genres of content – playground chat, 
pub banter, discussions between mums – transform the social media, rather than the 
other way around. Thus, Facebook becomes simply the carrier of political talk – as 
the telephone may carry conversations rather than encourage particular types of 




encouraging particular types of discussion as the first step in assessing whether 
Facebook is able to deliver a new medium for enabling political talk. 
In addition, for Facebook to form part of the public sphere as it has been defined, 
what its users discuss has to be noticed by the state and society at large – whether 
directly or mediated by the media (Habermas, 1962, 1996; Dahlgren, 2005a). 
Facebook demonstrates its corporate ambition here too, with CEO Zuckerberg saying 
in 2016 that his company is not a traditional media company, but “a new kind of 
platform” and an “important part of the public discourse.”18   
Facebook is all about the words, pictures, videos and links its members create and 
share across its platform and the millions of websites and applications now connected 
to and through it. Users are simultaneously producers and consumers of the content 
carried on Facebook (“prosumers” Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010; “produsage” Bruns, 
2008). It is this - the way that Facebook is used, alongside the scale of its use, which 
warrants study.  
People communicate with each other in myriad ways: face-to-face talk; electronic 
emails; letters, phonecalls, mobile phone text messages; online instant messaging, 
Tweets; via WhatsApp, Snapchat, Instagram, and dozens of other digital spaces for 
sharing photographs, events, actions, thoughts, updates and news with their shifting 
social networks and groupings. This digital third space is creating a digital public 
sphere through which publics have greater access to political information (Gaber, 
2016). 
 
18 In a one-to-one video conference filmed with Facebook CEO Sheryl Sandberg and published to 




Yet within this plethora of today’s communications options, around 30 percent of 
the global population choose to share those communications through a single, private, 
American, wholly-commercial website. That people do so is linked to a number of 
theories across several academic sectors: technology network effects which value a 
social network based on who else is participating; social capital benefits gained from 
relationships with people in the network, and media communications theory around 
why and how people communicate with each other and with elites.  
It should also not be underestimated how much Facebook and its social network 
site (SNS) peers are seen as a place to spend time and to be entertained. A place of 
play, rather than work. To quote Mark Twain (1876): “Work consists of whatever a 
body is obliged to do, and play consists of whatever a body is not obliged to do.” 
However, it might be argued that Facebook for most of its users has become play 
which they do feel obliged to do. 
As a social space therefore, Facebook has benefits for its users and, in socialising 
in that space, it would be expected that users will discuss the same range of topics as 
they may in analogous social spaces in which friends, almost-friends and 
acquaintances might mix – the local pub, for example. In that context, a small 
percentage of the discussion (Almond and Verba’s eight percent, for example19) 
would be expected to be political talk.  
However, in social spaces in which political discussion is encouraged 
(Habermas’s 18th century coffee shops, for example) more political debate might be 
expected. Similarly, at times of heightened political interest (such as around a 
 
19 Almond and Verba, in their 1963 study on civic culture, concluded that around eight percent of 




national election), an increase in political talk would be expected. This research looks 
at whether, given that encouraging time, Facebook is also able to provide that 
encouraging place. 
Similar issues have been considered in relation to the potential for the internet to 
create a new public sphere for political engagement, although academics have largely 
looked at the internet as a whole rather than one website. For example, Papacharissi 
(2002) said that the internet had created a new public space for politically oriented 
conversation, but that whether this public space transcends to a public sphere is not 
up to the technology itself. None-the-less, the internet had the potential to “revive the 
public sphere” (2004: 280). 
That an extraordinary number of people communicate with each other via 
Facebook would make it a public space (depending on how ‘public’ a public space 
has to be – an issue tackled further in chapter two).  However, it is other factors – the 
quality and type of discourse happening in that public space; the structural and 
representational role of the actors in that space; the result of interaction - that need to 
be proven, within the epistemology of the theory, before a public space transcends to 
public sphere. The research considers whether Facebook is just another public social 
space, like the local pub or church, and no more or less likely to encourage citizens to 
engage in debate.  
As a wholly-commercial organisation, it may be that what happens on the social 
network site (SNS), including political talk, is simply a by-product of a business 
ecology designed to link as many people as possible in order to map and profit from 
those links. Simply “making communication more efficient”, as Zuckerberg’s letter 




technologies to give “everyone a voice”, as Zuckerberg suggested, if governments 
and corporations cannot hear that voice or are ignoring it will not in itself change 
society. But connecting and giving voice to over two billion people across the world 
presents a hitherto unique transformational opportunity. This paper argues that, until 
Facebook, there has not been a single media business with the scale to deliver a 
public space capable of becoming a transforming public sphere and asks how that 
potential might be tested.  
However, the research is not simply arguing that Facebook has the capacity to 
create a new public sphere, but tests whether, given the convergence of political time 
and space around a UK General Election, all the things that make Facebook so 
attractive as a communication medium for so many people will also make it attractive 
as a space for engaging in political talk. By looking at what users say (in surveys) 
that they do on Facebook and considering that against evidence (from ethnographic 
study) of what users are saying and doing in some of its online political spaces, this 
research sets out to test how encouraging an environment Facebook is able to provide 
for political talk, and from that data to consider its potential within the public sphere. 
The original contribution of this thesis is to show that the reality is that Facebook 
has a chilling effect on political talk and on debate in particular. 
 
 




In looking at how citizens engaged in political debate on Facebook and at 
Facebook’s place in encouraging or discouraging that debate, several areas of theory 
informed the literature review. These range from the socio-historical context of the 
internet as transformational technology and its development into a communicative 
and social network (Abbate, 1999; Jones, 1997; Papacharissi, 2002; boyd and Ellison, 
2007; Castells, 2010); theory around the public and civic spheres and the effect of the 
internet and the social media on engagement in both (Bohman 1996 and 2004; 
Papacharissi, 2002; Downey and Fenton, 2003; Dahlgren, 2005; Benkler, 2006; 
Shirky, 2009, 2011; Khan et al, 2012; Miller, 2016); and literature which looks at 
how Facebook’s architecture may affect political debate both by filtering content and 
by increasing interpersonal engagement (Williams and Gulati, 2007; Gustafsson, 
2012; Halpern and Gibbs, 2013; Silverman 2015). And finally, theory around why 
and in what circumstances people engage in, or more usually avoid, political talk 
(Bennett et al, 1995; Eliasoph, 1997; Bohman, 2004; Kahneman, 2011; Jackson et al, 
2013; Graham et al, 2015). 
This literature review begins by charting the development of the internet into a 
communicative and social network and the rise of Facebook. It looks at how personal 
computing delivered a new personal communications system, and how this led to the 
rise of online social networking, and then to Facebook’s (current) global dominance 
of online social networking.  
It goes on to consider the technological distinctiveness that created the network 
effects driving the SNS’s growth. It looks at literature around bonding and bridging 
social capital and social networks and the particular pull of Facebook in encouraging 




Section 2.5 considers Facebook against technological determinist theory and asks 
whether scale or type of use of Facebook is sufficiently radical to suggest the 
emergence of a new technological paradigm.  
The final sections look at the literature around the public and civic spheres and 
the effect of the internet and the social media on engagement in political and civil 
action. And, as the research also considers one consequence of Facebook’s use as a 
global communication medium is the possibility that it may deliver a new public 
sphere, literature around the public sphere and global civic society is also reviewed.  
 
2.1: How the internet got social 
Abbate (1999) in her seminal book on the development of the Internet, argued 
that it was the arrival of the Internet that placed computers at the center of a new 
communications medium: 
Between the 1960s and the 1980s, computing technology underwent a 
dramatic transformation: the computer, originally conceived as an isolated 
calculating device, was reborn as a means of communication. (1999:1) 
Two things had happened – the arrival of the internet pushed the technological 
trajectory of computing to shape the use of the personal computer as a new 
communications media, while user demand-pull took the trajectory further towards a 
new social, communicative use of the internet. The internet’s success as a mass 
communications media, she argued, is linked to its flexibility and diversity which 




The Internet’s identity as a communication medium was not inherent in the 
technology; it was constructed through a series of social choices. (1999: 6) 
The internet not only placed computers at the center of communications but 
changed the nature of personal computing from a predominantly solo to a 
predominantly social, and potentially global, activity. Users wanted their PC to do 
more than deliver information; they wanted it to aid communication. So, as Abbate 
noted, the personal computer as calculator was reborn as communicator, and the 
internet developed as a further response to inherently human social and connective 
needs. It is this, rather than any specific technological leap forward that has driven 
online social networking – available technology has been demand-pulled to be used 
in more social and networked ways.  
The internet itself is an old technology, having been around since 1969, but it 
took the development of the World Wide Web  from the mid-1980s and specifically 
its launch in 1992 as, effectively, a user operating system for the internet, that led to 
its near-ubiquity as global communications media. The internet, argued Jones (1997) 
is a “piggy-backed medium”, following already known technological paths yet 
delivering a fluidity of movement through time and space that has become a 
dependency. The flexibility and inbuilt user-responsiveness of the internet has 
enabled both its rise as information and communications tool, and its development 
into a connective media able to link individuals across disparate cultural groups in 
potentially transformational ways. 
Castells (2010) went further, arguing that a shift from traditional mass media to 
horizontal communication networks via the internet had created a fundamentally new 




independent source of productivity and power (1996). The network society, formed 
from the digital networks of the Information Age, has enabled expansion beyond 
traditional boundaries, undermining nation-state control in favour of global agents. 
However, the network society is not something with a fixed beginning (or indeed 
end) point, rather it is part of a longer-term evolution in which human society is in 
the process of becoming information and network societies (van Dijk, 2006: 21). 
While social networking platforms are defined by having architecture designed to 
encourage social activities such as profile sharing and articulated social networks 
(boyd [correct] and Ellison, 2007), they are also defined by technology which relies 
on its users creating their own content to meet their own needs - providing a closed 
but open communications loop between users, their social networks, and the 
businesses and advertisers seeking access to those networks. 
The visible display of social connections is a “crucial” component of social 
network sites. according to boyd and Ellison’s definition. Social network sites are 
both technologically and socially defined, they are: 
web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-
public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with 
whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of 
connections and those made by others within the system. (2007:211) 
boyd and Ellison use the term “social network” rather than social networking to 
emphasise the articulated social network as a critical organising feature. It is about 





However, boyd and Ellison’s definition is focused on the connective network 
and the “showcasing” of that network, not on the content that is shared across that 
network. While that may have been the focus of social network sites in 2006, over a 
decade later, the emphasis has shifted from “here are all the people I know” to “here 
are the people who like me enough to respond to the content I post”. The articulation 
of networks has become less important than the content and acknowledgement shared 
across those networks. Positive responses to content posted becomes the reward for 
network connectivity – delivering proof of personal worth to the network. 
 
2.2 The rise of Facebook 
Whereas early online communities such as Usenet were structured around topics 
and shared interests, social network sites and platforms are egocentric networks 
structured around the individual and their connections. They are primarily organised 
around people, not interests (boyd and Ellison, 2007), mirroring unmediated social 
structures, where “the world is composed of networks, not groups” (Wellman, 1988) 
The first social network site was SixDegrees.com, launched in 1997 (boyd, 2008; 
boyd and Ellison, 2007) as the first to combine the three defining elements of profile, 
articulated connections, and traversable connections (‘Friends’). It was followed 
by LiveJournal, Asian Avenue, Black Planet, MiGente and CyWorld. The launch of 
Ryze, in 2001, headed a wave of new social network sites (Ryze, Linked In, 
Tribe.net, and Friendster) founded by individuals who were themselves part of the 
same real world social network. (Kirkpatrick, 2010). An explosion in SNS launches 




focused on demographic or interest communities, or on adding social networking 
features to content sharing (eg FlickR, Last.fm, Tripadvisor, Foursquare, or 
Pinterest).  
MySpace, launched 2003, grew rapidly, in part by picking up former Friendster 
users that had become disillusioned with a combination of technical difficulties, 
social collisions, and a rupture of trust between users and the site (boyd, 2006). After 
News Corporation bought MySpace in 2005, previously lukewarm press interest in 
the site changed to massive media attention. Friendster (launched 2002), MySpace 
(2003) and Facebook (2004) were the most important of the pre-2005 SNS and 
shaped both the way the web developed and beyond it “the business, cultural, and 
research landscape.” (boyd and Ellison, 2007). 
Thefacebook – the initial, Harvard-based version of Facebook - launched on 
February 4th, 2004, and its simplicity of design and purity of focus contrasted sharply 
with its rivals, notably MySpace’s chaotic look and feel (boyd, 2007).  
Another competitor, Campus Network at Columbia University, had much of 
Facebook’s functionality ahead of Facebook. Co-founder Wayne Ting, in a BBC 
radio interview (2011), described how Campus Network took off fast, signing up 
most of Columbia’s students within a few months: “One reason is speed, the other is 
who’s on your network.” As Campus Network tried to expand into other universities 
however, they began to meet competition from newcomer Facebook. Ting said: “In 
places where we did have competition, the simplicity of Facebook really won.”  
That simplicity of focus continues in Facebook today with architecture which, as 




than focus on small – and more manageable and therefore more comfortable - friends 
and family groupings. 
The company officially became Facebook on September 20, 2005, and soon after 
began to gradually open the network beyond colleges to American high school 
students. By April 2006, Facebook had over a million US high school users. 
Facebook’s standardisation encouraged simple user actions (invite someone into 
your network; share a picture – introduced 2005; “like” something – introduced 
2010) that are familiar. Gehl (2012) compares it to the sanitised shopping mall versus 
the street market on the “bad side” of town and suggests that the implication in danah 
boyd’s work that “educated whites fled MySpace for Facebook” echoes his assertion 
that mass audiences chose Facebook because it did not “inadvertently present them 
with the Other or ask them to do complicated work”. (2012:113) 
In the BBC radio series, ‘The Secret history of Social Networking’ (2011) Bebo 
co-founder Michael Birch said why he thought MySpace lost its position at the top of 
the social networking tree, above Bebo and Facebook: “We both thought that 
MySpace was a great site [at that time] but it wasn’t that good a product.” He said 
MySpace was hobbled by poor build and that NewsCorporation had had to re-
architecture it several times, soon after buying into MySpace for $580m, adding 
substantially to the company’s costs.   
Chris Cox, then VP Product for Facebook, told the same programme that one of 
the things that was different about the period pre-2003 was that most internet sites 




could find the GDP of Spain but you couldn’t find out what your friends from school 
were up to.” 
Birch’s comment about the architecture problems faced by MySpace, and Ting’s 
position that his Campus Network lost out to the simplicity of Facebook, support the 
argument that Facebook was different enough to other SNS to win market share, and 
that the reliability and usability of the social networking service for users were key 
factors. 
Kirkpatrick (2010) makes several references to how Mark Zuckerberg and his 
Facebook co-founders followed Friendster’s rise and fall with interest and tried to 
learn from its mistakes in building Facebook, particularly in relation to growth vs 
technical capacity. Similarly, they made design decisions intended to avoid the 
technical and cultural problems that undermined MySpace. Being the follower 
technology rather than the leader meant that Facebook’s developers would have been 
able to watch and learn to gain market advantage over earlier-to-launch rivals. 
But technical strength is not enough, users have to not only want to be in that 
online space but to be there frequently for a social network to grow at the rate 
Facebook has. The money NewsCorp spent on MySpace’s re-architecture may have 
been wasted because the company vision was to simply build a more robust version 
of the existing, profile-focused SNS, when what users were looking for from social 
networking had already moved on to the interaction-focused offerings of Bebo, 
Facebook, and Campus Network. 
Following Facebook’s 2004 launch, social network platforms such as YouTube 




and Snapchat (2011) have focused on sharing more limited content (limited by 
content type such as videos, photographs, visibility, or length - i.e. 140 characters). 
These later competitors emphasised the fast and easy sharing of information and 
content above the articulation of networks: what information a user can read and 
access on Twitter (and who sent it) rather than showcasing a user’s network of 
followers. 
What made Facebook different – and ultimately more successful - than rival 
MySpace and predecessor Friendster, is architecture designed to encourage users to 
grow online social networks that reflected their offline networks; to interact with that 
network; and to share their content with it. While at the same time delivering 
valuable data to Facebook (and subsequently advertisers and partners) about the 
network’s real-world identities, connections, and preferences. The “free” information 
and services that Facebook delivers is not really free, it is paid for by Facebook users 
in the data they willingly give away and, as Keen remarked (2007), in a user’s time - 
“the most valuable resource” spent online.  
Facebook “took off” when it launched the sharing of tagged photos in October 
2005 (Kirkpatrick, 2010) and thus linked content and the articulation of networks. 
Facebook’s founding team decided photographs should be tagged with just one thing 
– the names of the people in the photograph. As Kirkpatrick writes: “It sounds 
elementary, but it had never been done before” (154). Photo tagging was instantly 
successful: 
[I]n a minute or so they [Facebook developers] started seeing photos of girls – 
girls in groups, girls at parties, girls shooting photos of other girls. And these 
photos were being tagged!…Girls were celebrating their friendships. 




It is also an example of Facebook’s developers reinforcing what mattered most – 
who everybody is and who knows who. Details that are normally written on the back 
of a snapshot or added to a picture archive: such as when a picture was taken, where 
it was taken, what it’s a picture of, are all dropped in favour of focusing the network 
and the user on who is in the picture (and perhaps also articulating who in that 
network was not there and joining in the photographed fun). 
By focusing on who is in the picture and encouraging users to “tag” each other (a 
user is only able to tag and so identify someone who is also a Facebook member), 
Facebook’s architecture accomplishes another task – collecting data on relationships 
between users who may not be in the same network (network data that has value to 
third parties). Ordinary photos had become, in effect, more articulate. When it was 
tagged, a photograph on Facebook expressed and elaborated on a set of relationships. 
That linking of one user’s network to another, initially through photo tagging and 
then through other Facebook and third party applications, marked a turning point for 
the service. The team began to talk about the “social graph” of users connecting with 
their friends. Zuckerberg (2016b) said that helping new users go from signing up to 
connecting to “the people you care about most” is “one of the most important things 
that we can do”, signaling the company’s focus on encouraging users to build and 
expand their network of friends and acquaintances. 
When, on May 18, 2012, Facebook made its Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the 
New York Stock Market, it had around 900 million active users.  Documents filed as 
part of the IPO showed that the company had broken even financially by the end of 
2008 and had sales of $3.7bn ($1bn net) in 2011. The company was valued in 




high multiples”, according to an editorial in The Economist (February 4, 2012). The 
$38 share price on IPO day meant an actual valuation of £104 billion.  
According to the Economist, those valuations rested on two assumptions; rapid 
spread of internet connectivity growing Facebook’s potential global market; and the 
rise of the mobile phone and with it increasing user access to Facebook via mobile. 
These two together could propel the number of users beyond one billion, the article 
suggested. In fact, Facebook announced it had hit the one billion monthly active users 
figure on October 4, 2012, just a few months after its IPO. 
Initial concerns post-IPO about whether Facebook could keep growing and keep 
making money for its investors, were overtaken by rising mobile access to Facebook, 
which the SNS was able to take advantage of. By October 2013, a tipping point of 48 
percent of users accessed Facebook only through their mobiles (Techcrunch, 2013), 
and by April 2014, two-thirds of daily users accessed Facebook only from their 
mobile phone. As a technology designed to encourage content sharing with people in 
their social networks, Facebook would have failed had its technical design not 
responded to that changing preference for interaction via mobile devices rather than 
fixed location devices such as PCs. 
The next stage for Facebook, as Zuckerberg has made clear (2015, 2016) is 
preparing for a future in which everyone in the world is connected to the internet and 
via Facebook (“the world’s biggest internet service” – 2015), through a future 
artificial intelligence and/or augmented reality (AI/AR) computing device, delivering 
more immersive and intuitive experience. To do that, Zuckerberg said, requires 
changing underlying assumptions about how the world works in determining what 




be managed (Facebook has been criticised for plans which challenge the democratic 
neutrality of the internet in order to build their user base20) and how it will be 
delivered (e.g. beamed down from space) and paid for – all big picture scenarios that 
the company is publicly investing in. 
 
2.3: Social capital and the pull of the network 
As the previous section outlined, the concepts of online social networking are not 
new and many components of the early Facebook were pioneered by its predecessors. 
As Kirkpatrick (2010: 66) noted, Facebook is heir to ideas that had been evolving for 
forty years. Yet as a service it has not only outlived its peers but grown to a position 
of user dominance and, through technical initiatives introduced over ten years, 
become a platform delivering services and connections way beyond the Facebook site 
itself. While some of the reasons have been outlined in the preceding chapter 
(simplicity of architecture, robustness of service, emphasis on real-world 
relationships) there are broader reasons which may underpin Facebook as a socio-
transformational media.  
Gehl argued that MySpace’s failure (against Facebook’s success) was down to 
failing to create real software abstraction for users, and thus an architecture of 
 
20 See ‘Facebook’s satellite went up in smoke but its developing world land grab goes on’, Emily 
Reynolds on Facebook, net neutrality and its internet.org space programme in the Guardian, 




abstraction that could appeal to advertisers. Facebook has created an effective system 
for its users to happily produce the data that marketers need: 
Facebook has associated social and technological elements into a real 
software abstraction, thus managing its users as immaterial laborers in the 
affective online marketplace. (2012:100) 
Researchers such as Papacharissi (2009) and Gehl (2012) emphasised that 
Facebook’s insistence on using real names (and real email addresses, initially via 
harvard.edu) from the beginning, was the key difference between Facebook and other 
SNS at the time it launched. Validating people’s identity in this way made Facebook 
both fundamentally different to the anonymised culture of internet use before 2004, 
but also provided the real-world data that would form the basis for Facebook’s 
subsequent business success.  
Papacharissi (2002:21) also said that people’s real-world social relations drove 
society to repurpose the internet to create spaces for private and public expression. 
The rise of ‘social’ in the online world is the inevitable result of taking offline 
interactions onto the web. She suggested (2009) that a social network site’s 
effectiveness relies on delivering architecture which encourages freer social 
interaction, while at the same time guiding users towards agreed behavioural norms. 
Facebook’s “glass house” public-ness is tempered by architecture providing tools (for 
example ‘Like’ buttons) with which individuals may construct and leave behavioural 
cues for each other (2009:215). 
Thus, Facebook grew by offering an online version of offline, real world social 




actually doing. Stripped of the freedom to misbehave that anonymity offered21, users 
chose to apply offline social norms to Facebook interaction and Facebook offered a 
safer, recognisable social environment than rivals such as MySpace. 
Research by Facebook itself (2012) into 721 million users suggested that users’ 
friends on Facebook tended to be of a similar age, experiences and living in the same 
country. It is understandable that users’ work or university colleagues, offline friends 
and former schoolfriends should be the starting point for building Facebook friend 
groups. However, it does tend towards the concept of Facebook as composed of local, 
heterogeneous social groups.  
The issue of Facebook heterogony in relation to political influence is explored 
further in this thesis however, it should be noted that, long before Facebook, 
researchers Katz and Lazarsfeld had already found that – perhaps not unexpectedly – 
people tend to vote the way their associates vote (1955:32). That is, people politically 
influence people they know well - offline heterogony has travelled online. 
Cheung and Lee (2010) studied a convenience sample of students and noted that 
social identity and subjective compliance (everyone they knew was on Facebook) 
drove individuals to join Facebook. Other studies have added perceived usefulness of 
 
21 As summarised in Rowe (2015:124), extensive academic work exists, particularly in the 1980s and 
early ‘90s, into how the high level of anonymity afforded by other computer-mediated 
communications (CMC) encouraged anti-normative behaviour characteristic of deindividuation (the 
psychological theory around why people in groups may lose their sense of self and engage in acts as a 
group that they would refrain from as an individual). Reduced social cues and reduced social context 
within CMC, it was suggested, made it more difficult for users to adjust their tone and behaviour. Van 
Dijk described this period of academic research as being overly focused on the objective defects of 




the network (Kwon and Wen, 2010) to social identity as the key reasons for joining 
Facebook. 
The ways in which individuals use Facebook and the type of content they spend 
their time on, becomes a factor in the social capital users gain as their reward for time 
spent on the SNS. Bonding (emotional support) and bridging (novel information) 
social capital describe the different benefits individuals may gain from their 
relationships with people in their social network (Katz and Aspen 1997; Rosenberg 
1989; Wellman and Wortley, 1990). Close friends and family may deliver more 
emotional support, while weak tie acquaintances may deliver more useful 
information (job opportunities, exposure to new ideas or opinions).  
Facebook delivers both bonding and bridging social capital according to the 
individual user’s Facebook network; their use of that network, and the content they 
choose to focus on (Burke, Kraut and Marlow 2011; Ellison, Steinfeld and Lampe 
2007).  
Some academics have pointed to Facebook’s value in strengthening social capital 
for users with weaker social capital and/or social skills. Steinfeld et al (2008) showed 
that young people with lower self-esteem benefited from Facebook in terms of 
bridging social capital – being able to watch and learn, rather than gain emotional 
support (bonding social capital), from their peers. While Burke et al (2011) found 
that users with weaker social skills benefited from the passive consumption of “social 
news” i.e. reading status updates by friends, while this had no effect on the more 




Ross et al (2009) had similar results when they compared Facebook users against 
the Five-Factor Model of personality (as developed by McCrae and Costa, 1985) and 
saw that while extraverts22 may belong to more groups on Facebook, they did not 
necessarily have more Facebook friends than neurotic personalities, who also 
preferred to passively consume social information. (2009: 582).  
This is part of the ‘pact’ users have with the SNS (and indeed many other web-
delivered services which collect and sell user data) – exchanging personal privacy for 
social usefulness. Even in 2005, explaining why investors had just given around $13 
million to grow Thefacebook, Mark Zuckerberg knew that it was because of his 
company’s access to that data: 
[W]e have so much data about what people are doing on the site and how 
people are using it, that it just makes it that we can really enhance the 
experience and target [advertising] towards those peoples in ways that no one 
else has really been able to do before. (2005, Zuckerberg interviewed by 
Bambi Francisco). 
The issue of people’s willingness to give up that data, moreover to give up the 
privacy rights they expect in the offline world, is one that has engaged academics and 
the media almost since Facebook’s inception. As Miller notes: 
If there is one thing that shocks those who either rarely use or do not use 
Facebook, it is the awareness of how little regard people may have for 
Facebook’s potential to destroy privacy. (2011: 172) 
 
22 Outgoing, socially-confident individuals. The Five-Factor Model uses five broad traits to determine 





Facebook is extremely public compared to its antecedents (Miller, 2011) and 
despite this (and despite users’ understanding that Facebook is not a private space – 
see survey results in chapter four) it has become a common medium for expressing 
private and intimate thoughts and actions. Users may rant, declare their love, discuss 
their depression, post photos of embarrassing incidents, signal the end of 
relationships; all the while knowing that these messages will be seen by people they 
may barely know.  
A year before that 2005 interview with Zuckerberg (previous page), Facebook’s 
co-founder displayed a rather more disquieting attitude towards the willingness of 
users to give up their data, in an online chat with a college friend23: 
Zuck: I have over 4,000 emails, pictures, addresses, SNS 
[Redacted Friend’s Name]: What? How’d you manage that one? 
Zuck: People just submitted it. 
Zuck: I don’t know why. 
Zuck: They “trust me” 
Zuck: Dumb fucks. 
 
2.4: A merging of online and offline worlds 
 
23 Source: BusinessInsider: ‘Well these new Zuckerberg IMs won’t help Facebook’s privacy 
problems’, May 13, 2010. Email exchange is as quoted in the story: 
https://www.businessinsider.com/well-these-new-zuckerberg-ims-wont-help-facebooks-privacy-





Albrechtslund (2008) coined the phrase “participatory surveillance” and 
suggested online social networks had introduced a participatory approach to 
surveillance, which can empower – and perhaps not necessarily violate – the user. 
Albrechtslund argued that there is no sharp distinction between users’ virtual and real 
worlds and that online social networking operates as a mixed world relating to both 
online and offline activities. This makes sense if the online activity is largely a 
recording space for the lived experience offline – family photographs; messages 
between friends; party arranging, and so forth. But it is also important to ask how far 
the online experience influences offline behaviour. Could, for example, that ready 
acceptance of online surveillance encourage acceptance of offline surveillance by 
police and security forces, governments and their agents?   
The boundary between people’s experience of the online world and the offline, 
‘real’, world is not a wall but a permeable membrane, with ideas and actions moving 
relatively easily between the two. Reading a post online may reinforce a political 
perspective which leads the reader to then join a political group or donate to a 
campaign, which may be picked up as an action online (such as an ‘I voted’ or ‘I 
funded…’ button), and seen by others who may (or may chose not to) follow suit. 
In a 2015 panel discussion, Zuckerberg spoke of how society had been organized 
around big, top-down institutions but that the emergence of the internet had given 
people the ability to change that; to organise the world from “people first and our 
own relationships”. To give people a voice by enabling them to share content and 
ideas and build relationships, “all the way up to greater civic discourse”  
We’re going to work on tools that make it so that people can share content 




all the people they want. This is the mission of the company – to give every 
person in the world the ability to share as much of what is important to them 
as we can, and to connect people through that…That’s what we’re here to 
do.” (2015) 
In the ongoing (at the time of writing) global anthropological study ‘Why we 
post’, led by Daniel Miller (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/why-we-post), researchers noted 
that, rather than social media changing the way people communicated, people were 
changing the way the social media operated by using it in ways that the developers 
may not have expected. For instance, young Muslim women using WhatsApp’s 
private networks to directly communicate with young Muslim men. While within 
Facebook’s broader social networks, people tended to be more conservative and 
avoid posting anything which might offend friends and relatives. Miller noted in an 
earlier study: 
Facebook never exists in isolation; it is never the totality of the lives of the 
people we meet. It is not surprising that it is at least as often the complement 
to offline lives as the expression of offline lives. (2011: 174) 
Rather than helping to “transform” society, as Zuckerberg had pledged in 2017 
(see page one), Facebook delivers an online version of offline lives. Albeit perhaps 
with a more simplistic version of complex human communication, as chapter five 
explores.  
Miller (2016) also questioned whether any social media platform was able to 
influence action, suggesting that it is the robustness of genres of content – playground 
chat, pub banter, discussions between mums – that transformed the social media, 
rather than the other way around. These genres of content pre-date social media and 




Miller did see societal transformation was in Facebook’s younger brother – 
WhatsApp24, with its emphasis on privacy rather than publicness enabling women in 
more patriarchal societies to be freer to communicate. He cited young Muslim 
women being able to use WhatsApp to directly contact young men “maybe for the 
first time in history”, sending hundreds of messages a day in some cases (2016:4). 
This thesis focuses on Facebook but the SNS has to be considered within the 
context of Facebook as global business and global platform. This is a company with 
an ecology to change the world it inhabits - and to make as much money as it can 
while doing so. That latter part is important. Facebook is not a public service, 
Zuckerberg may talk about connecting the world and transforming the way people 
communicate, but the ambition does not begin or end at better communication.  
Facebook is not a free service, its users pay with access to their data, their 
connections, their privacy and, to some degree with their political opinions; the 
architecture of the platform encourages polarisation and a narrowing of access to new 
people and views. This too is a concern, as explored further in section 6.2; the 
combination of that data, that uniquely large user base, and Facebook’s commercial 
willingness to sell access to both, means third parties also have routes to direct 
 
24 WhatsApp is a messaging application which lets users set up multiple chat groups (for example 
different family, friend or work groupings). Text, images, video and audio can be exchanged within 
the groups and each group is separate and, at least in the start-up phase of WhatsApp, private with 
messages encrypted. The product launched in 2009 and became popular as mobile smartphone usage 
grew as a free alternative to texting. In 2014, it was bought by Facebook for an £11.4bn package of 
cash and shares (see: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26266689). During 2018, both co-founders 
left WhatsApp and Facebook, accusing the company of trying to weaken the encryption and 
undermine users’ privacy by making data available to Facebook and third party partners (see: 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/30/jan-koum-quits-facebook/ and Parmy Olson for Forbes (in media 




content to users in ways which encourage political polarisation in order to direct 
political actions. The user’s experience of Facebook cannot be divorced from their 
actions in the “real” world, and the user cannot be separated from the many actors – 
from advertisers to political groups to civic agents – with an interest in those actions. 
Kranzberg’s “Third Law” states that technological paradigms are composed of 
packages or systems which cannot be studied in isolation but “one must also look at 
the interaction of these systems with the entire social, political, economic, and 
cultural environment.” (1986: 550). The scale of Facebook and its interconnectedness 
with and between its users has to be looked at within that social, political and cultural 
environment, the question becomes how far Facebook is – or has – affected change in 
those areas.     
 
2.5: Technological determinism, trajectories and the pull of the network 
The difficulty with considering Facebook as a next step along a path of similar 
technologies – ie one among many social network sites, is the risk of technological 
determinism which only sees Facebook as a progression along the same technological 
path (as Gehl suggested, 2012). The question is whether Facebook is simply a 
progression along the technological path of online social networking - a progression 
on the technological path of the internet, and by extension personal computing; or a 
new paradigm in computer-mediated communications.  
While this broader question is beyond the focus of this study, which concentrates 
on the narrower concern of Facebook as mediated space for political talk, it is 




further assess Facebook’s place and importance in socio-technological history. In 
considering the rise of online social networking sites (SNS) and Facebook, it is also 
necessary to consider literature that relates both to how SNS developed and why they 
developed - the “technology-push” and “demand-pull” pillars of technological 
change.  
Academics, as noted previously, have argued that technological change is affected 
by demand for that technology, and that how the technology is then used shapes how 
it then progresses (Rosenberg and Mowery, 1978, Rosenberg, 1994, and others). Dosi 
(1982) argued that technological development is driven both by demand-pull from 
user preferences and the technology-push of what is possible at that stage.  
That push-pull concept was a step forward of the technological determinism of 
Ellul (1964) and Winner (1977) who saw technology as autonomous, its development 
pursued for its own sake, without regard to human need, and the prime factor in 
shaping society. 
The underpinning theory in determining the importance of an individual 
technology to technological change is that of Dosi (1982), who defined the 
technological paradigm as the common outlook and core knowledge base understood 
to be involved in that technology. Thus, Facebook might be a step change on a 
trajectory that saw the internet evolve into the social web and social media sites 
develop along common standards. A technological paradigm progresses through 
continuous change – defined by Dosi as the “technological trajectory”, and each 
paradigm progresses according to its own technological and economic factors. 
However, where radical rather than continuous change happens, that signals the 




Continuous changes are often related to progress along a technological 
trajectory defined by a technological paradigm, while discontinuities are 
associated with the emergence of a new paradigm. (1982:14) 
Freeman described the shift from technological change to paradigm as 
characterised by falling relative costs and rising universal availability (1988: 10), 
with the cheaper processing of information as the paradigm’s raw material. 
Castells (2010: 70) argues that the information technological paradigm displays 
five core elements: technologies that act on information; technologies that are 
pervasive; technologies that grow through strong networking logic; technologies that 
are flexible; technologies that become part of a convergent, integrated system, 
wherein in old and new technologies become interdependent and indistinguishable. 
[T]he information technology paradigm does not evolve toward its closure as 
a system, but towards its openness as a multi-edged network. It is powerful 
and imposing in its materiality, but adaptive and open-ended in its historical 
development. (2010: 76)  
However, it is difficult to apply Castell’s definition to Facebook in and of itself. It 
is multi-edged in the myriad ways in which users may access it, on different devices 
and through third parties, but its openness is limited and skewed to commercial 
interests. Similarly, while Facebook acts on information it would be more accurate to 
say it mines information as a resource, rather than acts upon it.  
It is certainly pervasive - powerful and imposing in its scale and reach but limited 
in its adaptability – this is pretty much the same Facebook, with the same set of 
things a user can do (share pictures, post content, find people) almost since inception. 
And, while it is difficult to imagine a near-future world without Facebook and its 




been a shift in its user base towards older users25 and the company finds itself 
increasingly criticised by lawmakers and government agencies which may ultimately 
curtail its growth (see pages 66-68). 
Perez (2004) added a broader view, arguing that technological paradigms – or 
“revolutions” – occur every 50 or 60 years. Her theory of long-wave phenomenon 
economics coupled techno-economic change with socio-institutional change to affect, 
she argued, the entire structure of global society over decades of gradual change. 
Rosenberg (1994) posited that it is only with historical analysis that the 
importance of a technology becomes clear because technological change often takes 
place in information-poor and uncertain environments. Technological change is 
“path-dependent”: 
one cannot demonstrate the direction or path in the growth of technological 
knowledge merely by reference to certain initial conditions. (1994:6) 
Thus, future growth in technological knowledge is not predetermined but is 
affected by events that happen along the way. The place of Facebook, or indeed the 
shift in computing technologies towards increasingly communicative and social uses, 
is part of a long-wave trajectory that society is still moving through, and which will 
ultimately only become measurable with historical hindsight. 
 
25 A 2018 report by eMarketer, widely reported in the press, suggested that the over-55s were the 
fastest growing demographic for Facebook in the UK with younger users drifting away from the 
service. (See: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/12/is-facebook-for-old-people-over-




As previously argued, users influenced the technological development of the 
internet to meet inherently human communicative needs. It is this, rather than any 
specific technological leap forward that has driven online social networking. As 
technology has become available (pushed into the market) it has been demand-pulled 
by users to be more social, more networked – in short, the technology reflects its use. 
Dosi (1982) and Rosenberg and Mowery (1979) concluded that both push and 
pull (supply and demand) factors were necessary to technological innovation, with 
paradigms arising from the push of emerging technology driving progress, or from 
demand from users for a particular technological option or way of using the 
technology. Dosi (1982, 1988 and Dosi et al 1993) and other evolutionary economists 
such as Molino (1999) and Malerba & Orsenigo (1997), saw a technological 
determinism with technology push leading to both the creation of new technological 
paradigms and determining change within paradigms. Technology push drove 
change, not user demand, with demand-pull only selecting between different 
paradigms and thus affecting the trajectory of those selected.  
However, Van den Ende and Dolfsma (2005) suggest that at distinct periods 
during the 20th century, either demand-pull or innovation-push played the bigger role 
in shaping computing technological paradigms. Both factors played an equally 
important role in what they saw as the current Kondratieff Wave26 of computing 
technology development. Van den Ende and Dolfsma argued for an amended 
 
26 An economic theory first expounded by Nicolai Kondratieff in 1925, which sees major economic or 
sectoral change in 40- to 60-year ‘supercycles’ moving from high growth to slow growth and vice-
versa. The theory is controversial, for example in determining when a ‘K-wave’ cycle begins and ends, 




evolutionary economics theory approach which looks for influences and patterns in 
developing technologies. Rather than focusing on demand-pull/technology-push in 
relation to the sources of innovation, the theory needs to consider changes in 
technological knowledge and demand factors on the development of technological 
paradigms. By asking whether an adopter would have adopted a technology earlier 
had it been available to them, it is possible to establish whether absence of supply 
(technology-push) or lack of demand (demand-pull) was the deciding factor in actual 
adoption time.  
Therefore, one way to determine the importance of Facebook would be to ask 
whether the SNS would have reached the same level of take-up had it been available 
ten years earlier. The difficulty with that question would be trying to divorce 
Facebook from wider technological advances between 2004 and 2014 which enabled, 
for instance: easier taking and uploading of photographs, or anywhere/anytime access 
to the SNS via smartphones.  
New technologies are often thought of in limited terms as simply supplements to 
an existing system or invention – Rosenberg cited the success of the Sony Walkman 
which was based not on any radically different engineering design, but on the 
“imaginative leap that identified an important market niche” (1994:3-5). Thus, one 
might see Facebook’s development as a continuation along a path of social media-led 
technological development, but that its success represents an imaginative leap. 
Evolutionary economics theorists of the ‘80s and ‘90s saw technology paradigms 
as primarily physical (microchips, computers, telecoms) not as systems (software, the 
web). However, the development of non-physical elements of the information age, in 




change it introduced to how computers and mobile technology would be used as new 
communications medium.  
Personal computing as a technological paradigm has continued to progress along 
a trajectory which has seen smaller devices carrying more capacity, and usage which 
includes personal communications, entertainment, information gathering and physical 
tasks - the twin pillars of technology-push and demand-pull. But this thesis suggests 
the internet delivered a shift in personal computing radical enough to be seen as a 
technological paradigm in its own right, regardless of its lack of physicality, and 
shows the influence of technology-push and demand-pull in its own, concurrent, 
Kondratieff Wave.   
A computer network that connects people is a social network (Wellman, 1997) 
but the simple act of social connection is not enough to suggest a paradigm shift in 
the technology. That has to be assessed against the changes in behaviour and, 
perhaps, societal changes, that follow on from the emergence of social media 
networks out of computing and the internet. 
The technology to deliver the internet was in itself a significant change but, as 
part one of this chapter outlines, it was demand-pull from users that radically changed 
the trajectory of personal computing to social network-led computing. Users selected 
the internet as their preferred new communications medium (rather than, for instance, 
cable TV which in the early ‘90s was also being heralded as a radically new and 
promising means of communication) and by doing so influenced it as a social 




Cusumano (2011) argued that social media networks are new kinds of computing 
platforms built to facilitate communication. Social media networks are platforms 
because they enable computing through access to different applications and databases 
and, by that definition, do some of the jobs of other platforms (eg Microsoft, Nokia 
Symbian, Google GMail) and, Cusumano suggests, compete with those other 
platforms. Seeing social network sites as platforms rather than websites or software 
might in part explain their success – users can do more through a single internet 
access point: their Facebook log-in (2011:31). 
Successful platform attributes, according to Cusumano, include having a 
technology strategy that can be described as open but not open, or closed but not 
closed, in that it gives controlled access to application developers or platform users to 
import or share content across different systems. Allowing access in this controlled 
way also delivers modularity and richness through third parties being able to add 
functionality or create and add compelling products, services or content – for 
example games27  
Facebook opened its platform to third-party developers in May 2007 – a 
revolutionary move for the time, and many Facebook colleagues and analysts saw it 
as an incredibly risky move by Zuckerberg (Kirkpatrick, 2010). However, within a 
year of launching Facebook Open Platform, 24,000 new applications had been added 
 
27 Zynga games alone, including Farmville, delivered 15 percent of Facebook revenues in Q1 2012 
(Techcrunch), however the percentage of income from games has fallen in recent years and Facebook 




and 400,000 external developers had built new “social experiences” (Facebook, 
2008) for Facebook’s users.  
Third party developers have been crucial to Facebook delivering a platform that is 
richer in terms of user and advertiser services and more connected to the rest of the 
web than its competitors. The traditional IT company model would have been to take 
on more developers and build in-house, but by opening his platform to third party 
developers just four years after launch, Zuckerberg created an ecosystem of 
innovation that enabled that richer, more integrated environment to be built faster and 
cheaper. At the same time, the risk to Facebook’s market position is mitigated by its 
“open, but not open” structure of proprietary software (eg the Facebook Connect 
APIs) and its own mark-up languages, which third party application developers are 
then locked into using. 
The more Facebook offers services that its users could access elsewhere, e.g. 
location-based or news services, the more it is able to encourage users to stay within 
the Facebook “house” and continue to feed data about themselves into that network, 
now shared with third-parties. Its post-IPO strategy of buying up competing social 
utilities (e.g. WhatsApp, see page 43) is a more traditional business response to this 
need to provide the richness and connectivity that will keep both users and 
advertisers locked into Facebook’s platform. Part One of this chapter outlined the 
pull of the Facebook network in building social capital, but the counter to what is 
gained is what might be lost by leaving the network. 
Cusumano argued that the winner in any technology platform “race” has to have 
strong network effects – something Facebook has through peer relationships driving 




Facebook’s usefulness to them as a personal communication tool within their 
network. But a winning platform must also make it costly for users and external 
developers to use more than one platform – similar to the concept of switching costs28 
as a market driver. Facebook users are therefore less likely to switch to another 
platform if they have years of accumulated content on Facebook. (2011: 33).  
Rohlfs’ (1974) fundamental assumption that an individual or household’s 
willingness to pay for telecoms is dependent on who they would use the telecoms to 
communicate with is a direct network effect. Rohlfs developed a formula to account 
for the process by which consumers decide whether to join a network set – the 
uniform calling model which suggests that the utility of the service to any one 
individual depends only on the number of individuals who also subscribe, rather than 
on who is subscribing and the desire of the user to communicate with that subscriber 
set. Rohlfs suggested that unlimited growth in the market is both unlikely and 
undesirable, what is required instead is a “desirable equilibrium” based on attracting 
subscribers of sufficient worth (w) that have value to individual subscribers, at an 
acceptable price (p) (which in today’s terms might be privacy or time constraints). 
Those subscribers who are put off by p or not interested in w will leave the network, 
leaving the subscribers who are more likely to attract new subscribers: the desirable 
equilibrium. 
 
28 Switching costs or switching barriers is abroad definition of the costs incurred by the consumer in 
switching to a new product or service provider. Those costs may appear more prohibitive in terms of 
time and effort (for example notifying people of changing in telephone number), rather than financial 




Schmalensee revisited Rohlfs 1974 study of how network effects impact demand 
for telecoms goods and services in the context of new web-based businesses such as 
Facebook and YouTube to argue that they too rely on network effects, suggesting 
Facebook’s university-based launch strategy could have been cribbed from Rohlfs’ 
discussion of launching a new service in a population consisting of multiple groups 
with strong intra-group affinities. Schmalensee goes further and links social network 
businesses to Rohlfs’ model as also having direct network effects in that the value of 
being a participant in any particular social network depends on who else is 
participating (2011:15).  
Gladwell (2000) tells us that ideas, products, messages and behaviours spread 
among communities just like viruses do, and that the most important factor in virus 
spread is speed of change and “that one dramatic moment in an epidemic when 
everything can change all at once is the Tipping Point.” (2000: 9) He argues that 
word-of-mouth is key to creating Tipping Point for ideas or behaviours, but that who 
delivers the information is equally important: “success of any kind of social epidemic 
is heavily dependent on the involvement of people with a rare set of social gifts” 
(p32). Thus, he echoes Rohlfs and Schmalansee in suggesting an individual’s 
decision to join a social network site such as Facebook is based not only on the 
volume of acquaintances already using the site, but also on the recommendation of a 
particular type of trusted acquaintance, i.e. Rohlfs’ “w” high-network-worth 
subscriber. 
For Katz and his colleagues writing in the 1960s, the spread of a new technology 
or innovation was not that of the aggressive-sounding virus or infection, but of 




item (“an idea or a practice”) by individuals or groups, which Katz et al (1963) saw 
as necessarily linked to social – rather than mass media - channels of communication 
passing on information about that item, and to the social structures and values of the 
adoptees (1963:239). This had led to a revival of interest in the importance of 
interpersonal relations in the flow of influence and innovation (245).  
Cannarella and Spechler (2014) applied infection modeling to explain user 
adoption and abandonment of Facebook. The research attracted a lot of press interest 
on its release because it suggested that Facebook had passed peak growth and was 
beginning an infection-like cycle of immunity (in the sense of reduced activity) 
among existing users which would lead to them abandoning the social network. 
Using quantitative methodology, the researchers looked at weekly search query 
results for “Facebook” and “MySpace”, as published by Google Trends. They 
concluded that a reduction in searches for the term Facebook signified reduction in 
take-up and use of Facebook. However, they did not address whether Google search 
is a valid way to measure interest in Facebook as an increasing percentage of 
Facebook users access the SNS direct, via mobile phones, apps and plug-ins from 
websites, rather than via Google. 
As previously argued, the place of Facebook within the current long-wave 
trajectory of increasingly social computer-mediated communication (CMC) may only 
become measurable with historical hindsight. However, the combination of two 
things: using real-world identities, and opening the platform to third-party 
development, is sufficiently radical to suggest the possibility of Facebook as a new 
paradigm within CMC, alongside delivering the network effects and the richness of 




So far, these theories concentrate on the network effects of Facebook’s 
technology, but Facebook as a business has also benefited from types of network 
effects. Ferrary and Granovetter (2009) suggested that one reason Silicon Valley 
(Facebook’s birthplace and home) has been so successful, and so consistent, in 
spawning innovation and successful high-tech companies is because its 
entrepreneurs, investors and other actors are part of a complex, real-world social 
network. They concluded that the embeddedness of the entrepreneur and the start-up 
in that network directly affected the start-up’s economic success (2009:337).  
Castells pointed out a similar effect at play in 1970s’ Silicon Valley, when the 
clustering of technological expertise around companies such as Intel led to 
development of the microprocessor, the personal computer, and on to the 
development of new telecommunications networks and the internet. This 
technological shift was not, he argued, socially determined, but was technologically 
induced (2010: 60). However, once the technological shift towards that networked 
society had begun, further technological development became shaped by historical 
and social context: 
By the 1980s, capitalism (specifically, major corporations and governments of 
the club of G-7 countries) did undertake a substantial process of economic 
and organizational restructuring, in which new information technology played 
a fundamental role and was decisively shaped by the role it played. (2010: 60) 
For Castells, Ferrary and Granovetter, the influence of Silicon Valley and its 
place in technological/social determinism is not just about the inventors and the tech 
companies, but about the infrastructure – the venture capitalists and bankers and their 




filtering the next generation of Silicon Valley’s “movers and shakers”29. It was also 
about the milieu of minds meeting and companies forming, changing, spinning out 
and buying out – a constantly shifting technological primordial soup from which new 
ideas and powerful companies could not help but emerge. 
Facebook is very much a part of that Silicon Valley soup and the history of 
venture capitalist involvement with Facebook is dominated by Silicon Valley-
headquartered investors – from seed funding by Peter Thiel to second and third round 
investors Accel, Greylock and Meritech. As the next section explores, it is easy to 
become seduced by the PR image of Facebook as media game-changer led by its 
maverick young inventor, but the reality is that Facebook has influence and power 
that is not confined to the technology. 
 
2.6: Technological determinism and the Facebook effect on society 
McLuhan (1964) argued that technology, specifically media technology shapes 
societies. This theory of technological determinism argues that, rather than having 
free will to interact with technology, each new media technology determines how we 
will act and think as individuals and as a society (McLuhan, 1964; Postman, 1992).  
Stepping further back in terms of technology transforming society, it was 
Havelock (1982) that showed how it was the development of the alphabet, around 
 
29 Indeed, Silicon Valley exists because of the work of Stanford University Dean of Engineering, 





700BC in ancient Greece, that made it possible for Western civilization to move from 
spoken to written language and thus make possible conceptual discourse (from 
Castells, 2010: 355) and in so doing, separating the alphabetic communication and 
sensorial storytelling. But the internet and electronic communication, argued Castells, 
has reunited written, oral and audio-visual modalities of human communication into 
one integrated, interactive system to fundamentally change the character of 
communication (2010: 356). 
Castells was writing in broader terms about the emergence of online 
communication rather than specifically about the new internet-delivered social 
networks such as Facebook, but the fundamental communication change the social 
web delivered was users seeking out and communicating with strangers around 
shared interests. Sharing information and content, playing games together, debating 
ideas and joining forums, groups and campaigns with people they did not know in the 
offline world, as part of an explosion in the number or range of people an individual 
may communicate with. 
In his assessment of why people willingly gave up so much of their time and 
attention to TV in the 1980s, Castells could easily be describing why around two 
hours a day (Nielsen, 2016) is given over to smartphone-delivered communication: 
[T]he television modality of communication is a fundamentally new medium, 
characterized by its seductiveness, its sensorial simulation of reality, and its 
easy communicability along the lines of least psychological effort. (2010: 
361)  
Castells (2010) references Neuman (1991) in explaining the rapid rise of 




down to people’s unwillingness to put effort into engaging with their media, whether 
because of tiredness or laziness: “the first decision is to watch television, then 
programmes are scanned until the most attractive is selected or, more often, the least 
boring.” (2010:359). Television viewers were choosing to give their time, but not 
necessarily their attention to the medium, and the emergence of so-called ‘second-
screen’30 activity is perhaps a natural outcome of the emergence of the internet, with 
viewers passing time with multiple media rather than only with one media. 
Postman (1985) argued that television represented a return to pre-alphabet 
communication, to oral and visual traditions of storytelling and information sharing 
that was predisposed towards entertainment, and the “overarching presumption that it 
is there for our amusement and pleasure.” (1985: 87)  
Many of the respondents in the interviews and questionnaires for this thesis 
expressed similar thoughts in relation to their use of Facebook and their enjoyment of 
it expressed in TV-like terms of watching and entertainment. They watched “funny 
videos”, or videos that are posted “such as vines”, they used it to “see what people I 
know are doing”; to catch up with “games updates, celebrities, K-pop idols”; but also 
for “killing time”. Facebook is an easy place, a no-effort place to consume, often 
visually, information about people and what they’re doing, to be entertained or at 
least to kill time. 
 
30 Whereby TV viewers will watch a programme while also engaging with it on their smartphone or 
other internet-enable device, including tweeting or posting about what they’re watching while they 
watch it; taking part in advertising or programme sponsored activities, or searching for related 
information. Castells too noted in relation to television consumption that it was rarely an exclusive 
activity but an “almost constant background presence, the fabric of our lives. We live with the media 




But many also said they used it for outwards communication – them to others – 
something TV could never deliver. They were organising events, keeping in touch, 
passing on information and promoting their own blogs or activities through 
Facebook: “Organisation between players in a brass band”; “event planning & storing 
photos”; “keeping in touch with family. Also to communicate with work”; “friends 
all over the world can be contacted quickly and easily”; “Keeping in touch with 
people I will probably never meet again”; “I run a compound conversation RPG 
[role-playing games] using its messenger”; “Communication with students and 
networking”. Facebook entertains but is predisposed towards communication. 
Silverstone (2005) and Livingston (2009) suggested a theory of mediation with 
media technology transforming society and being socially shaped in return. Recently, 
academics have suggested that such technology does not follow a single trajectory 
but offers a range of affordances which are shaped by local social and cultural norms 
of users (Hutchby, 2001; Madianou and Miller, 2012; Miller et al, 2016). 
That technical design is shaped by social values is a generally accepted academic 
concept (Abbate, 1999; Bowker et al, 1997; Friedman, 1997; Feenberg, 1995, 
MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985). The concept of technical code, as developed by 
Feenberg (1992, 1995), sees cultural and social assumptions embedded within a 
technology’s physical and structural form. This social constructivist theory31 of 
 
31 Social constructivism as theory was developed by post-revolutionary Soviet psychologist Lev 
Vygotsky. Vygotsky argued (1978) that cognitive functions originate in (and must therefore be 
explained as products of) social interactions; that learning was not only about what is learned - the 
acquisition of new knowledge – but how it was learned - the process by which learners were integrated 




technological design is neatly summarised by Flanagin et al (2009: 180), who then 
extend the theory to the internet, arguing that the internet’s technical design 
encouraged new forms of collective action by favouring open access, personalisation 
and collective social activities. They argue that the internet has not only encouraged 
social and networked activities but generated a shift towards greater individual 
interconnectivity that undermines the power of the traditional mass media in favour 
of the individual:  
the technical code of the internet exhibits an enhanced sense of 
empowerment, in as much as internet users feel their collective efforts result 
in desired outcomes. (2009: 186) 
However, the authors also point out that the same technologies that increase 
individual agency can diminish it via commercial or political exploitation of 
individuals’ security, privacy, freedom, or expression. The positive potential of the 
internet is balanced against passive acceptance of restrictions on, or monitoring of, its 
use. (2009: 191)   
For Bennett and Segerberg (2012), the internet and social media in particular had 
delivered a new form of collective action – “connective action” – supporting and in 
many instances supplanting traditional, face-to-face collective action through 
enabling personalised political action and delivering large-scale action networks. 
Thus, social fragmentation in western democracies, had led to young people in 
 
how – how both a technology’s development and its use are shaped by social interactions and cultural 




particular engaging with politics as “an expression of personal hopes, lifestyles and 
grievances” (2012:743). 
Abbate suggests the internet shares the protean character of communications 
media (1999: 4) in that users focus on its delivery of information, rather than the 
technology. The technology delivering information via the TV, radio, or PC is 
dematerialised and the communications media become systems that transmit ideas 
rather than electrons. She quotes Donald Davies, who co-developed the internet’s 
underpinning technology and noted at the time:  
Even though there is a communication system and a computer operating 
system, the user must be able to ignore the complexities. (Davies, 1966: 2) 
Thus, Facebook’s users expect to be able to use its services and access their 
content wherever they are on whatever device they choose to use. New technology 
needs be unlimited in usefulness while appearing simple to the point of magical. 
Users will ignore the iceberg of privacy, legal and access issues below Facebook’s 
sparkling sea of usefulness in so long as it continues to be both useful, accessible, and 
– crucially - free.  
That question of privacy versus magical usefulness is increasingly exercising 
governments, agencies and analysts. As Bernt (2010) points out, Facebook is of 
particular concern because it is both the world’s largest social network provider and 
its business model is dependent on user data driven advertising. Able to deliver a vast 
amount of data about its users with the added benefit that most of that information is 
freely given up by the users themselves. Facebook has become, she notes, a 
“Rorschach test” for expectations of privacy in social networks. Laws and regulations 




data and information. Consequently, lawmakers have played catch-up – creating new 
limits, testing existing ones, while Facebook itself continually pushes the envelope on 
what its users will share. 
That Facebook is coming under increased scrutiny from lawmakers and 
government agencies is a reflection not only of such privacy concerns but of the 
maturing of Facebook as a technology. There are four drivers of technological 
change: the technology itself; the way users use that technology and change it to fit 
their own behaviour; the response of changing markets, and the response of 
governments and lawmakers in the form of regulation of the technology. 
Greenwood (2017) describes this as the “truck of change” with its four wheels – 
technology, behaviour, markets and regulation. 
Think of it as a front-wheel driven truck, with technology and behavior 
pushing the speed [of change], and markets and regulation chugging along 
behind, sort of stabilising the load. (2017: 19) 
Thus, in April 2018, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg appeared before a US 
Congressional hearing to answer questions on his company’s use of data and 
Facebook was facing dozens of class action lawsuits in relation to its links with 
Cambridge Analytica (see page 14), as well legal challenges in multiple countries. 
Facebook’s SEC 10-Q32 (the formal statement of business and financial health 
American companies submit to the Securities and Exchange Commission) for the 
 
32 See SEC Filing April 26, 2018: https://investor.fb.com/financials/sec-filings-
details/default.aspx?FilingId=12705651 and pdf here: http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-




first quarter of 2018, dedicated large sections of its Risk Factors analysis to the 
market and regulatory challenges the company was facing.  
Those legal challenges included: restrictions on user access by the governments of 
China, Iran and North Korea; challenges led by Irish lawmakers to the ‘Privacy 
Shield’ agreement covering data transfers between Europe and the US; a challenge by 
the Supreme Court of India following changes to data sharing between Facebook and 
WhatsApp; “multiple inquiries, investigations, and lawsuits in Europe, India, and 
other jurisdictions” in relation to the August 2016 change to WhatsApp’s terms of 
service; the impending application of GDPR law across the European Union member 
states (Facebook was subsequently sued, along with Google, as the new law came 
into effect in May, 2018); “actions, investigations or administrative orders” initiated 
by multiple EU data protection authorities; the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and 
other government inquiries in the United States, Europe, and other jurisdictions, 
alongside “multiple putative class action suits” initiated as result of the Cambridge 
Analytica data “misuse”; “a number of” intellectual property lawsuits; “numerous 
other” lawsuits and class action lawsuits; claims relating to information published on 
Facebook and its products (for example defamation, hate speech, intellectual property 
rights); and ongoing battles with the IRS over tax liabilities. 
Orders issued by, or inquiries or enforcement actions initiated by, government 
or regulatory authorities could cause us to incur substantial costs, expose us to 
unanticipated civil and criminal liability or penalties (including substantial 
monetary fines), or require us to change our business practices in a manner 
materially adverse to our business. (2018:46) 
Regulation, that fourth “wheel of change”, had become less a steadying influence 




Facebook - a potential threat to its business. However, one might also argue that the 
volume of lawsuits faced by Facebook is a sign of a company that has attracted 
litigation because of questionable business practices, rather than as natural next stage 
in its maturation. Facebook is not the victim here.  
 
2.7: Political talk, the public sphere, and Facebook 
Kranzberg’s First Law reads as follows: Technology is neither good nor bad, 
nor is it neutral. (1986: 545) 
Kranzberg was an early advocate of the concept that technology has unintended 
effects on the social ecology, and those effects may change when the technology is 
used in different contexts or in different ways. 
 
Many of our technology-related problems arise because of the unforeseen 
consequences when apparently benign technologies are employed on a 
massive scale. Hence many technical applications that seemed a boon to 
mankind when first introduced became threats when their use became 
widespread (1986: 546) 
The examples Kranzberg gave were of the simultaneously beneficial and harmful 
effects of DDT crop-spraying and the Industrial Revolution. It is perhaps too soon for 
academics to fully understand what effect the widespread use of Facebook as 
communications media in the 21st century is having on social interaction, politics, the 





Several academics have noted that engagement with mass media is not a one-way 
process. It is not simply about receiving messages, including messages about how to 
think or what to think about, but of whether that message is actually heard; how it is 
interpreted; and whether the message results in an action (e.g. the re-sharing of the 
message, or the buying of an advertised product). The mass media audience is an 
active not passive receiver of media (Castells, 2010; Croteau and Hayes, 2000; Eco 
1977) and therefore, noted Castells, “the notion of mass media refers to a 
technological system, not to a form of culture.” (2010: 364) Instead, mass media (and 
Castells had television rather than the internet in mind) is the framing medium for 
who and what citizens should know about. 
In addition, media segmentation, channel “surfing” and the growth of channels 
and TV providers, meant that a uniform message became harder to deliver. In 
choosing what to watch and when, the viewer created his or her mosaic view of their 
preferred world. 
Every cultural expression, from the worst to the best, from the most elitist to 
the most popular, comes together in this digital universe that links up in a 
giant, non-historical hypertext, past, present, and future manifestations of the 
communicative mind. By so doing, they construct a new symbolic 
environment. They make virtuality our reality. (2010:403) 
Thus, Castells describes a mass media which delivers a virtual version of the 
reality its users exist in (or perhaps would prefer to exist in); one which captures 
reality in such a way that the on-screen virtual reality becomes the lived experience. 
(2010:404) 
In September 2016, as criticism built around Facebook’s algorithm-driven 




the US and UK, Zuckerberg posted a message arguing that the social media had 
encouraged rather than hindered the sharing of diverse ideas. Social media, he 
wrote33, was the most diverse form of media that had every existed. Research34 
showed that Facebook users were exposed to a much broader set of people than they 
would been pre-internet and, whilst it is “human nature to gravitate towards people 
who think like we do”, Facebook users he suggested were being exposed to a greater 
mix of viewpoints. Regardless of that optimism, Zuckerberg and his team spent 
increasing time and resources in 2016 and 2017 attempting to filter out false 
information, clickbait, fake news and extremist views to deliver something like the 
plurality of opinions Zuckerberg’s post promised.  
Academics have previously pointed to people’s willingness to believe a 
convenient untruth or a truth-like statement, rather than have their biases or 
perceptions challenged. Psychologist Daniel Kahneman (2011) defined as “cognitive 
ease” people’s avoidance of facts that would challenge them to think deeper or work 
harder in forming an opinion about an issue. And, as has previously been noted, 
academics have also identified people’s willingness to put concerted effort into 
avoiding politics (Eliasoph 1997, Jackson 2013), even while they may simultaneously 
be involved in local issues and civic action. Indeed, the more “public” the space, the 
 
33 Taken from Buzzfeed, original Zuckerberg post can only be viewed through a Facebook account: 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/zuckerberg-said-facebook-could-be-better-at-filtering-
fakes?utm_term=.tqgxBJBQq#.xfo0VXVDn (accessed November 6, 2018). 
34 It is likely that Zuckerberg had in mind research by Bakshy et al, (2012, 2015) which found that 
most users had Facebook friends with opposing political views and that News Feeds would generally 
reflect those diverse views. The research (as Facebook’s own research arm) concluded that the 
majority of information shared by users came from weak tie (distant) contacts and that those contacts 
were more likely to share novel information, including news and political information and thus 




more likely it is that citizens either avoid political conversation or engage in more 
negative or less public-spirited discourse (Eliasoph, 1996). 
Eli Pariser’s “filter bubble” (2011) warned against the race to personalise the web 
experience, arguing that the result would be to deliver a bias towards news people 
seemed to prefer, rather than stories that would challenge existing views. That filter 
bias extends from the web to online social media – according to Reuters 2016 report 
on UK digital trends, social media had become sources 24 percent users regularly 
used to share news stories with Friends and the stories they chose to share were 
predominantly ones they approved of or agreed with (Reuters, 2016: 11). 
Jonathan Albright researched how Google’s (and Facebook’s) algorithms drive 
people towards particular news stories and, more worryingly, how those algorithms 
can be ‘gamed’ by organisations, including political bodies, to push individuals 
towards false stories or extreme viewpoints. Mapping connections between right-
wing websites, the academic and data journalist found a dark ecosystem of fake news 
and alt-right propaganda using web trackers to “bleed through” into top news and 
search results on Google and Facebook, completely surrounding mainstream media 
(Medium, 2016). 
Silverman (2015) researched how false news stories spread around the internet 
and over social media: 
Rather than acting as a source of accurate information, online media 
frequently promote misinformation in an attempt to drive traffic and social 
engagement. The result is a situation where lies spread much farther than the 




Returning to the question of Facebook as public space vs public sphere, it is 
necessary to look at what might constitute a public sphere ‘test’. Habermas’s grand 
theory defined the public sphere as people’s public use of their reason within a 
network for communicating information and points of view between state and society 
(1989). A test might therefore be whether communication within Facebook is both 
public and reasoned and is accessible to both state and society. 
Dahlgren (2005a) echoes Habermas in focusing on both the publicness and 
quality of the communication but adds a result – the formation of political will: 
In schematic terms, a functioning public sphere is understood as a 
constellation of communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of 
information, ideas, debates – ideally in an unfettered manner – and also the 
formation of political will (i.e., public opinion). (p.148) 
Eliasoph (1990) also saw the publicness of the debate as central to a functioning 
political society. 
The substance of political life is public discussion; even if a person can 
experience feelings of political concern without having a language for giving 
those feelings socially recognizable meaning, the feelings do not matter if 
they only remain private. (465) 
Bohman (2004:133) saw the necessary pre-condition for democratic significance 
as that the forum exists as a social space in which speakers show willingness to hear 
each other with equal respect and mutual expectation of being listened to. The online 
space, opening the speaker up as it does to an indefinite audience, also made her or 
him accountable to that audience’s objections and “answerable to demands to 
recognize their concerns” (2004: 136). Each communications technology, Bohman 




communication has delivered “many-to-many” communication and increased 
interaction without the cost of mass-media mediation. 
Habermas saw the formation of public opinion as a cornerstone of the public 
sphere. Evolving from the “world of letters” (coffeeshop clubs, salons and the press), 
public opinion would “put the state in touch with the needs of society” (1989: 30). 
This suggests a test of whether Facebook delivers a public sphere should include the 
structure of the communication (“public”, “unfettered”); its quality (“reasoned”, 
“ideas”, “debates”); and its result (“formation of political will”, forming “public 
opinion”). Thus, study of political beliefs and actions became a search for a process. 
[A] process of conversation that cultivates or impairs citizen’s abilities to talk, 
think, and imagine together. (Eliasoph, 1997: 606)   
Public opinion is not only formed but achieves something - in the Habermasian 
model telling the state (public authority) what society (its public) need. Although this 
“test” does not include that the state should act on this knowledge – Castells (2010) 
points to the “backlash of the disaffected” against nation states and global powers, 
facilitated by the horizontal communications networks of the web and mobile media.  
Habermas saw the mass media (primarily the national press) as the structural 
lynchpin of the public sphere (Khan et al, 2012) acting as the conduit of public 
opinion to the state – representing the views of the public to the state who would 
govern them. However, well-documented issues - from market forces to the rise of 
the public relations industry, had undermined that role even before the emergence of 
the internet, and Habermas himself had doubts about the value of a consumer-




The world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only. 
By the same token the integrity of the private sphere which they promise to 
their consumers is also an illusion. (1989: 171)  
Habermas in his later work saw the public sphere as having become more limited 
with the rise of the mass media and subsequent decline in critical debate (1989: 201). 
He doubted the democratising potential of the internet because he saw its 
development as led by commercial rather than social interests (Papacharissi, 2008: 4).  
Downey and Fenton noted Habermas saw the bourgeois public sphere of the 20th 
century having become one of vertical communication of mass media influenced by 
the state, capital and consumers, rather than horizontal communication between 
citizens (2003: 186). However, they point out that political activity in the 1980s 
which saw, for example, the development of the Green Party in Germany and the rise 
of community and localised media, prompted Habermas to revise his pessimistic 
opinion of the public in favour of a “pluralistic… much differentiated mass public” 
(1992: 438) able to create its own political interventions (2003: 187). 
Dahlgren argued for a normative ideal of public sphere beyond Habermas which 
referred to the more generic democratic goals and responsibilities of the media and 
civic life (2005a). He defined a three dimensional test of the public sphere35:  
These three dimensions – the structural, the representational, and the 
interactional – provide an analytical starting point for examining the public 
 
35 This three-dimensional test may also be seen as a refining of the six-dimensional “test” Dahlgren 
wrote about in 2003 as necessary for healthy civic culture. Dimensions of knowledge, values, 




sphere of any given society or analyzing the contribution of any given 
communication technology. (p.150) 
The interactional dimension is key for Dahlgren, Habermas, Dewey (1927) and 
others, in determining what constitutes a/the public sphere: 
atomized individuals, consuming media in their homes, do not comprise a 
public…democracy resides, ultimately, with citizens who engage in talk with 
each other. (Dahlgren, 2005: 149) 
Publication is partial and the public which results is partially informed and 
formed until the meanings it purveys pass from mouth to mouth. (Dewey, 
1927: 219) 
Any public sphere test for Facebook therefore may be primarily interactional by 
assessing the type and quality of interaction among users, but Facebook as an entity 
would also have to pass structural and representational tests. The discourse being 
tested within Facebook would have to pass Habermas’s “reasoned” debate test, but 
Facebook itself would also have to pass Habermas and Dahlgren’s structural tests in 
relation to the institutional (including control, funding, legal framework), 
architectural (accessibility) and political ecology features of the business. 
Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini (2009) in summarising the arguments for 
deliberative democracy (that is the deliberation between citizens necessary to a 
healthy democracy) came up with a not dissimilar “test” in determining five 
conditions of deliberation: universality, inclusivity, rationality, agreement, and 
political efficacy36. This “discursive participation” in politics may not lead to political 
 
36 Bohman (1996) focused on three conditions for deliberative democracy based on public agreement 




actions such as voting but delivers “discursive capital” (2009:3) of benefit to the 
individual, the collective, and in building a healthy democracy37. 
Public talking contributes to the formation of public opinion, to the 
identification of the interests and values that citizens have “at stake” in the 
political process, and it helps motivate citizens to pursue them. (p4) 
For both the deliberationists and the Habermasians, public political talk is seen as 
central to a healthy democracy38. However, whether it is the reasoned and reasonable 
debate of the Habermasians or the reason-giving and reliant on reason public talk of 
the deliberationists, there is no allowance made for the partisan, passionate or 
irrational.  
That in itself may be further criticism of the public sphere and political 
deliberation as the domain of the white, privileged, educated male (Fraser, 1992; 
Kohn, 2000; Mouffe, 2000; van Zoonen, 2003) and the way they prefer to conduct 
debate. And by favouring the rational over the emotive and personal, political 
discussion is separated from the lived experience and ignores that it is frequently how 
much a person is emotionally affected by an issue that drives them to engage with it 
politically. Further, that it is the point of politics to reconcile divergent – often deeply 
divided – views and that requires accepting the nonrational.  (Perrin, 1971). Citizens 
 
37 Of course, this rests on an assumption that democracy is healthy, or that it is by default beneficial to 
societies. Critics of democracy – as Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini point out – argue that citizens lack 
competency in being able to form considered, reasoned opinions, relying instead on subjective 
response to issues, emotion and irrational prejudice (see Schumpeter, 1976, in particular).  
38 Indeed, as Perloff notes, deliberative democracy theorists see deliberation as helping citizens view 




speaking with each other is valuable in and of itself because “it is through talking that 
thinking becomes doing and doing becomes thinking” (1971: 145). 
For Eliasoph (1996) the discourse is not just about the quality of the political 
conversation but the ways in which individuals shift and change according to the 
space in which the conversations happened: how public is the forum and the 
speaker’s relationship to the forum itself. The political conversations an individual 
will engage in in one space may be entirely different to other spaces and governed by 
collective, tacit understandings of what can be said where and when. 
Temple (2014) saw the public sphere as all the places in which matters of public 
interest might be discussed or shared from “chatting about immigration in a pub” to a 
town hall meeting. It is the fact of discussion rather than the quality or result that 
matters. That debate may have moved online and onto the social media, is a reflection 
of a desire to search out a wider range of opinions than represented by mainstream 
media where the “narrow focus of broadcast news and the national press belongs in 
the past” (p196). Even if those opinions are those of “fruitcakes and fascists”. 
The issue of how able Facebook is to act as representational conduit of public 
opinion, is even more complex. The fragmented structure of interaction on Facebook, 
which can be both very private as messages between two people, and very public - 
across Group Pages for instance, negates against a traditional Habermasian concept 
of a single channel of communication between a collective public and their collective 




Papacharissi (2002) sets the bar higher than both Habermas and Dahlgren. In 
defining the public sphere online as the ‘virtual sphere’, she sets the test as being the 
positive effect of online discussion on democracy: 
As public space, the internet provides yet another forum for political 
deliberation. As public sphere, the internet could facilitate discussion that 
promotes a democratic exchange of ideas and opinions. A virtual space 
enhances discussion; a virtual sphere enhances democracy. (p.11) 
The internet, she further argued (2008), may not deliver a public sphere in the 
Habermasian sense because it is not necessary for it to do so in order to enhance 
democracy. The public sphere is a metaphor for a mode and ideal of civic 
participation, rather than a plan, and online technologies need their own “virtual 
sphere” test: “It is not online technologies that fail the public sphere test; rather it 
could be the other way around” (2008: 12) 
This returns the discussion to the quality of the interaction – not just a forum for 
discussion of political issues, but an exchange of ideas and opinions that “enhances 
democracy”. However effective Twitter39 may have shown itself to be as a rallying 
point for dissent, the character limit on interaction will limit it as a platform for 
reasoned debate40.  
However, the evidence is that democracy is influenced by multiple social network 
sites – the videos posted on YouTube by Saudi women of themselves driving, plus 
 
39 Twitter’s 140 character limit was increased to 280 characters in November 2017 
40 Of interest however is Twitter’s role in what Vatny (2016) describes as the rhetorical arena of 
social media, particularly in relation to Twitter and his research into the Norwegian “Tweetocracy” of 
established voices and pundits from the media, politics and academia using Twitter as an arena for 




their tweets, and bloggers, and Facebook posts, all contributed to an online grassroots 
campaign capable of attracting the attention both of potential participants and 
potential lawmakers.41 
In addition, Papacharissi is asking her reader to test not only the quality of the 
interaction but its normative effect in that it must “enhance democracy”.  
But whose democracy - the democracy in every one of the countries in which 
Facebook is the top social networking site – and how is “enhance” to be measured? 
Any test of whether a particular debate led to action in a particular country and which 
(eventually) led to political change or decision-making in that country, may not be an 
accurate test of whether a communications medium which operates in many countries 
is delivering a public sphere to each of them. As Khan et al (2012) noted, it seems 
inappropriate to compare the 21st century public sphere of globalised, networked 
societies linked by information technology and social software to Habermas’s public 
sphere of the 18th century. Public spheres do not need to be spatially bounded by 
nation state but can be issue-based across transnational public spheres - for example 
the Occupy movement42.  Khan et al argued for a modern, transnational public 
 
41 See multiple media reports over several years, including this from 2011: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/business-13928217/saudi-women-turn-to-social-media-for-right-to-
drive, this from 2016 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/11/a-social-
media-campaign-to-get-saudi-women-driving-finds-support-but-also-
mockery/?utm_term=.d51205af76c0, and this after the ban was finally lifted in 2018: 
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/19/middleeast/saudi-women-driving-ban-intl/index.html (accessed 
November 6, 2018). 
42 The Occupy movement began in 2011 as a response to the dominance of large corporations and 
financial organisations in controlling the world in ways the protestor argues benefitted a rich minority 
rather than “the 99%” majority, in way that undermined democracy and social cohesion. The 
movement spread across 82 countries and hundreds of cities within months; each protest being 




sphere, which represents a paradigm shift from Habermasian nation-state focused 
spheres to a global public sphere which includes, as structural precondition, 
communicative networks which enable broad participation across state borders 
(2012: 44). This condition has been met in capability – Facebook is used by enough 
people in enough countries - the issue is whether it has been met in reality. 
  The question of whether a democracy has or has not been enhanced by discourse 
is also problematic.  Judgment of what constitutes a healthy democracy is subjective; 
based on cultural norms, lived experience and perhaps wishful thinking. In testing 
whether public sphere interaction has enhanced a democracy one might decide 
whether it is proven by more people being able to vote, or more people choosing to 
vote, or more people choosing not to vote, or more people debating whether to vote. 
All of these are valid judgments on a democracy but it would be difficult to identify 
instances in which discussion on Facebook definitely led to one of these outcomes, 
not least because democratic changes take place over long periods. 
..the potential of social media lies mainly in their support of civil society and 
the public sphere – change measured in years and decades (Shirky, 2011:3) 
Zhang et al echoed that concept in a study (2010) that showed that heavy use of 
social network sites had a positive effect on civic participation but not on political 
participation. 
The forming of public opinion – and the enhancement of democracy by the 
delivery of that opinion, is not the same as political participation. Brady (1999: 737) 
defined political participation as “action by ordinary citizens directed towards 
 
movement, focused on the role of Wall Street and multinational corporations in the financial crisis of 




influencing some political outcomes.” But for most citizens, the political outcome is 
of limited importance against   the weight of the everyday life (Jackson et al, 2013) 
that occupies time and attention, and the culture of political avoidance that pervades 
much social interaction (Eliasoph, 1997). Engaging with politics becomes 
unnecessary and largely irrelevant to our going about our daily business. Dahlgren 
(2006) asked whether it was “sociologically realistic” to expect more people to 
engage with public life and argued for a rethinking of notions and expectations of 
citizenship. To devise a test based only on democratic actions therefore is at odds 
with the everyday experiences of most people most of the time.  
Several academics have considered the role of the internet in delivering (or not) a 
new public sphere. Benkler (2006) used the term “networked public sphere” to 
describe the potential of the Internet to produce a more communicative, more active 
public able to engage both in participatory politics and in creativity. Negroponte 
(1995), Bohman (1996) and Rash (1997) were among the first to argue in favour of 
the internet’s democratic potential, while Graham and Wright (2014) suggested 
internet forums can deliver third spaces (Oldenburg, 198943) important to political 
talk and community formation. 
Others, including Papacharissi (2002), drew on research into online 
communication and the potential it delivers for miscommunication and the venting of 
emotion, rather than for reasoned debate. She references Jones (1997) who suggested 
 
43 Oldenburg defined the “third place” as spaces outside of home and the workplace in which people 
gather informally, voluntarily and regularly in “happily anticipated gatherings” (1989:16) as important 




the internet allows us to shout more loudly without any evidence that we are being 
heard. While Abramson et al (1988) saw the internet encouraging hasty opinions 
rather than rational discourse and argued that we needed to study the content, 
diversity, and impact of online discussion in order to determine whether democracy 
had actually been enhanced (2002: p.18) And for Perloff, that debate is mostly 
rational and thoughtful is enough. 
The public sphere is the amorphous arena – frequently online – where people 
talk, argue (sometimes angrily and harshly), but ideally in a thoughtful 
fashion. (2018: 39) 
Poster (1995) argued that rational debate was not possible online because the 
internet encourages shifting, protean identities which are not consonant with forming 
a stable political community. Dissent leads to a profusion of different views, rather 
than to a commitment to seek consensus. Similarly, Breslow (1997) concluded that 
the web’s anonymity was a barrier to it becoming a public sphere: “when the chips 
are down, will people actually strip off their electronic guises to stand and be 
counted?” (p.255) 
There are two issues here – firstly, the contrast between the anonymised web of 
newsgroups and forums that Breslow knew in 1997 and the ‘this is me’ social web 
that is experienced now. Secondly, for the commercialisation of the social web to 
work – in particular Facebook, dependent as it is on gathering and using data about 
users, those users need to have real online identities. This transparency, however, 
goes one way – outwards from the user. As previously noted, there has been criticism 




social network launched as (effectively) a way to “snoop” on fellow students44.  That 
issue becomes even more important if Facebook is becoming a space for global 
democratic debate and dissent.  
Fernback remarked that true identity and democracy are found in cyberspace “not 
so much within the content of virtual communities, but within the actual structure of 
social relations” (1997:42). So, who users know – the relationships and networks 
articulated in Facebook - has value alongside what they say to each other. Which 
Friends’ posts are read most frequently (i.e. listened to) reflects who the Facebook 
user trusted and whose opinions they valued most. 
Zuckerberg notes that Facebook’s commercial potential is based on the “Holy 
Grail” of trusted referral: “Nothing influences people more than a recommendation 
from a trusted friend”. (2007) How powerful, therefore, might be the 
recommendation to think, say or do something when it comes from someone whose 
opinion is trusted? If a friend suggests joining them in signing a petition, or taking 
part in a march, that is likely to be more influential than a stranger handing out a 
leaflet, or talking about an issue on TV.  
Shirky (2011) referenced the work of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955 and 2006) who 
found a two-step process in forming political opinion via similar ‘friend’ interaction: 
 
44 The 2004 home page of Thefacebook told students at Harvard University they could use the service 
to “Search for people at your school; Fine out who are [sic] in your classes; Look up your friends’ 
friends; See a visualization of your social network” (see: 
https://www.forbes.com/pictures/fi45eefdgd/2004-welcome-to-thefacebook-com-2/#150a17c32e3c 




Opinions are first transmitted by the media, and then they get echoed by 
friends, family members, and colleagues. It is in this second, social step that 
political opinions are formed. This is the step in which the Internet in general, 
and social media in particular, can make a difference. (p.6) 
The work of Katz and Lazarsfeld is also useful in looking specifically at 
Facebook as mass media. They found that not only were interpersonal relations 
important in forming political opinion, but who people are communicating with and 
the quality of that association matters. Individuals are more likely to be influenced by 
people they know if they associate with them frequently; if they share their norms 
and standards; if they have shared access to the same sources of political information; 
if those sources have a route to the mass media. (1955, 2006 and Katz 195745). These 
parameters apply to the majority of communication in Facebook where the 
architecture is designed to encourage users to interact with “Friends” with whom they 
share current or past association, family ties, hobbies or common interests – the 
social sphere of people who influence the forming of opinions.  
Several academics have noted that the internet, Facebook included, encourages 
weak social ties (Donath and boyd, 2004; Leung and Lee, 2005) characterized by low 
levels of commitment and focused on entertainment (Jones, 1997; Calhoun, 1998; 
Gladwell, 2010). Others, particularly Granovetter (1973) insist the weak ties that tend 
to characterise online communications also have value, not least in supplementing 
other forms of friendship and maintaining relationships that might otherwise falter 
and fail (Wellman et al, 2001; Cumming et al, 2006). Facebook is built in such a way 
that these weak tie links are encouraged – half of all Facebook users have more than 
 





200 ‘friends’ (the Guardian, 2014) - Facebook itself determines the nature of the 
social contact (Lewis & West, 2009) and, as Charles (2010) notes, friendship as a 
friend count; as quantifiable commodity, may not be friendship at all.   
The issue of the quality of the social network – the strength or weakness of the tie 
and the level of trust between individuals, is not a part of the normative Habermasian 
concept, focused as it is on broad categories – the press, the public, the state - and 
discourse between them. However, an assessment of the role of Facebook as public 
sphere has to include consideration of whether the quality of the social tie impacts on 
the quality of the discourse – it takes “bravery” to talk politics with strangers online 
(Jackson et al, 2013) and “cultural work” to take any political position (Eliasoph, 
1997). Real political action such as the high-risk activism of the American civil-
rights movement or the fall or the Berlin Wall, are strong-tie phenomena, requiring 
the support that only strong person-to-person relationships can deliver (Gladwell, 
2010). 
Katz and Lazarsfeld also highlighted relationships and the sub-set of individuals 
they termed “opinion leaders”. These were people who had greater personal influence 
on those they knew and who shared a stronger exposure to the mass media, so that 
political ideas flowed from the mass media, via these opinion leaders, to less 
politically active people (1955:151). They developed their theory of this two-step 
flow of ideas from the mass media, via interpersonal influence, before Habermas had 
published his public sphere concept and it is interesting to see the role each assigned 
to the mass media as conduit (Habermas) or originator (Katz and Lazarsfeld) of 




Kirkpatrick attaches a ‘gift’ concept to users’ contributions on Facebook46: gifting 
views, comments and ideas via their real names and real-world identity as a gift of 
opinion into the polity which, he suggests, may ultimately strengthen civic culture 
(2010: p.288). Users are rewarded for their participation in public debate by 
reciprocal contribution of friends and strangers – and that encourages ideas and 
protests to quickly develop and spread via the social sphere. 
Facebook has now become one of the first places dissatisfied people 
worldwide take their gripes, activism, and protests. These campaigns on 
Facebook work well because its viral communications tools enable large 
numbers to become aware of an issue and join together quickly. (p.290) 
Kirkpatrick offered an example of Facebook activism – the 2008 anti-Farc 
protests in Colombia when the setting up of a Facebook campaign group led, within a 
month, to ten million people taking part in street protests against the rebel group. Yet 
in 2016, the majority of Colombians, probably including many who had joined those 
2008 protests, voted against ending the 52-year war with the FARC rebels47. 
Facebook may be able to deliver an extraordinary political action, but its ability to 
encourage continuing debate and engagement with complex political issues is the 
subject of this thesis.  
 
46 Jenkins et al (2013) wrote of the gift economy of social media in which users not only produce 
much of the content but play and active role in sharing and spreading it – gifting it – creating a more 
participatory culture. 
47 The reasons for the (close) vote against ending the war were complex and neatly summed up in this 
article on Harvard Business Review: https://hbr.org/2016/10/the-leadership-clash-that-led-colombia-
to-vote-against-peace. Subsequently, negotiations continued between Farc and President Santos’ 
government with the signing of a peace deal in June, 2017: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/27/colombia-farc-weapons-war-government (both 




The fact that activists use Facebook is not evidence that Facebook turns more 
people into activists. (Miller, 2011: 189) 
 
2.8: Facebook in the political sphere 
Facebook is not just enabling communication with people users more-or-less 
know, it is giving users a route into a public sphere that traditional media had 
previously controlled. Kirkpatrick quotes Chris Cox, vice-president of product at 
Facebook, in interview: 
We want to give to everyone that same power that mass media has had to 
beam out a message. (2010:296) 
Facebook has form when it comes to ‘beaming out’ powerful messages. In the 
2006 Midterm Elections in the US, the company created Facebook Profile Pages for 
all congressional and gubernational candidates (whether the candidates wanted the 
page or not, used it or not). If a Facebook user liked or followed a candidate’s page, a 
notification was sent to their Facebook friends. The company displayed that support 
and then calculated the percentage of “votes” that candidate had. The privacy of the 
polling booth had become a shared and social experience. 
As Williams and Gulati (2007) noted in their research into the Facebook election 
intervention some 1.5m – 13 percent – of its user base, became connected to a 
candidate or an issue as a result. Further, the researchers saw a correlation between 
support on a candidate’s Facebook page and their final share of the vote, noting that 
this support provided a proxy measure of the underlying enthusiasm and support a 




UK election (see page 226) with a correlation noted between supporter activity on a 
candidate’s Facebook page/s and likelihood of that candidate winning the contested 
seat. All the winning or second-placed candidates in the four constituencies studied 
were also the candidates who – personally or through their agents - were most active 
on Facebook48. 
The 2006 US election was, noted Ancu and Cozma, the first time that social 
network sites had been part of the “campaign media medley” (2009: 567). They 
studied how and why citizens chose to friend candidates’ MySpace profiles during 
the 2008 US primaries, applying uses and gratifications theory to the selection of 
MySpace as media in which to engage politically. Ancu and Cozma concluded that 
voters were drawn to candidates’ pages largely in order to interact with like-minded 
supporters, and only additionally to seek information or access political content. 
Research by Weeks and Holbert (2013) found similar results in Facebook users 
who choose to Friend journalists and news organisations. Their secondary analysis of 
data from Pew’s 2010 survey of news engagement in the US, focused on social media 
news reception and found that friending particular journalists and news providers, 
made it more likely that a user would receive news and information from that source.  
 
48 This echoes research into 16 constituencies in southern England (Gaber, 2017) which, while focused 
on the use of Twitter by candidates rather than Facebook, found a correlation between activity in the 
form of responding to incoming tweets and relative electoral performance – albeit with a number of 
caveats. The pilot project had limitations, as the researcher points out, not least the technology used to 
analyse tweets and Twitter’s limitations as a research tool from which broader conclusions about 




That should be obvious – friending indicates interest in hearing from that source 
and the likelihood of being more actively engaged with the news and information 
provided. However, Weeks and Holbert also found that whether a user then 
disseminated – shared – that news or information with their own network was 
influenced by their degree of partisanship. Political partisanship may draw Facebook 
users to particular content they but not necessarily to disseminate that content. They 
might visit Pages to gather information and news stories that reflect and reinforce 
their partisan views, and would be more likely to receive that news, but not 
necessarily to share it. Whereas, non-partisan Facebook users would be more likely to 
disseminate stories they found interesting or engaging. 
The strength of the links between friends also affected user actions. Research 
during the 2010 US congressional elections found that Facebook Friends had limited 
effect on political actions compared to the influence of close, offline friends. The 
research team (including Adam Kramer of Facebook’s Data Science team) tested 
whether feeding Facebook users messages encouraging them to vote would have the 
effect of actually encouraging more of them to vote. Over 60 million users were 
shown a “social message” package of information about where to vote; who among 
their Facebook Friends had voted; an ‘I voted’ button, and a counter of how many 
Facebook users had already voted49. The result was a marginal (0.39%) increase in 
the numbers of people voting. However, seeing closer friends voting or receiving 
information from closer friends had a stronger result (280,000 extra votes) than 
 
49 See https://www.facebook.com/notes/government-and-politics-on-facebook/facebook-focused-on-
helping-voter-participation/448310010881/ for Facebook’s announcement of the initiative. Note – only 




simply receiving the social message (60,000 extra votes). The researchers concluded 
that close friends matter more than Facebook Friends: 
Online mobilisation works because it primarily spreads through strong-tie 
networks that probably exist offline but have an online representation. In fact, 
it is plausible that unobserved face-to-face interactions account for at least 
some of the social influence that we observed in the Kramer experiment. 
(Bond et al, 2012: 298) 
Research into the 2006 congressional elections (Williams & Gulati, 2007) was 
more positive. Facebook directly intervened in the elections by setting up Profile 
Pages for all candidates. Users who visited and supported a candidate’s page had that 
information shared with their Facebook friends. While the researchers did not assess 
whether this resulted in any increase in the vote share, they did note that there was a 
correlation between support for a candidate’s page and their final vote share, 
concluding that there was a “compelling case” that Facebook had played a significant 
role in the elections and that social network sites have the capability of affecting the 
electoral process.  
The Williams and Gulati research supports the results of this project, which as 
previously noted, saw a correlation between the candidates who were most active on 
Facebook and the candidates who did best in the 2015 election in the four 
constituencies studied. In addition, this paper argues that there is link between the 
presence of the candidate (whether real or through their agent) and the activity of 
supporters on the candidate’s page. The more visible the candidate, the more likely 
they are to encourage engagement from page visitors, whether in the form of 






2.9: Towards a public sphere test for social media 
In his study of 50 Swedish Facebook users, Gustafsson (2012:1122) found that 
Facebook does not prompt political participation but it does operate as a latent tool 
for political communication and information sharing. In developing a public sphere 
test, the concept of a pre-public sphere state may therefore be more relevant. 
Habermas described the evolution of a critical-reasoning public sphere via a “literary 
precursor” state, described as: 
The training ground for a critical public reflection still preoccupied with itself 
– a process of self-clarification of private people focusing on the genuine 
experiences of their novel privateness. (1989:29) 
People focused on their own novel privateness and engaged in self-clarification 
might describe the majority of Facebook communications and could therefore signify 
that reasoning on Facebook is mostly in that precursor state of self-absorption. This is 
especially important when we consider the demographic of Facebook users in the UK 
is more women than men (around 53% to 47%) and particularly women in the 23 to 
37 age-range50.  This is not Habermas’s lettered, male bourgeois and therefore their 
discourse should not be judged in the same way. Indeed, criticism of Habermas’s 
view of the bourgeois-initiated public sphere can be summarised as being overly 
dependent on privileged men debating in socially-restrictive spaces51.  
 
50 Source Statista: https://www.statista.com/statistics/507417/number-of-facebook-users-in-the-united-
kingdom-uk-by-age-and-gender/ (accessed November 16, 2018) 
51 It is also acknowledged that similar criticisms can be applied to democracy itself with its 




Anyone over the age of 13 can join Facebook and, except in a handful of 
countries which block it, Facebook is accessible for over-13s in any country to join. 
Those who join can choose to set differentiated limits on who can see the content 
they post. Similarly, group and organisation pages on Facebook can choose to be 
public or not. In addition, these privacy settings will limit what content appears on 
the internet outside of Facebook – a Google search for that individual or organization 
may deliver none or some of their Facebook content.  
In hypothesising on whether Facebook has created a new public sphere, the 
question of whether it is a public medium is key. Equally, it is also necessary to ask 
what is meant by ‘public’ in relation to a public sphere. Facebook’s walled garden 
technology has created a semi-permeable public space, with users being able to 
manage – to a degree - their own public and to differentiate access to their own 
content.  
Public is necessarily always limited, whether by space, geography, gender, or 
class - the whole world could not crowd into one of Habermas’s 18th century 
coffeeshops to debate, yet around 30 percent of the global population52 currently 
“crowd” onto Facebook; sharing content and engaging in conversation through a ten-
year-old commercial public space.  
 
marginalised, including women and ethnic minorities, are not present or are not heard (see also Kohn, 
2000). It can be argued that, just as there is no truly open debate in which all voices might be heard 
and given equal weight, so there is no truly open democracy in which all people’s interests and 
perspectives will be heard and given equal weight by decision-makers. 
52 According to www.internetworldstats.com, the figure at June 30, 2017 was 26.3%  global 




It should also be noted that the Habermasian coffeeshop of a level debating space, 
of deliberation between peers, is an ideal that has never reflected the reality of 
citizens separated by gender, class, income, race and/or education. Equality, as Kohn 
noted “must be fought for rather than assumed” (2000: 417). Social standing matters 
and while Facebook may offer the possibility of some leveling of the online space, it 
will also reflect offline social structures in the way discussion may be encouraged or 
inhibited. Critics such as Fraser (1992) and Mouffe (2000) argue that the concept of 
the public sphere itself is exclusionist; homogenous rather than pluralist; and 
romanticised in its championing of the power of rational debate. Kohn (2000) 
suggested that Habermasian deliberative discourse – deliberation - was not necessary 
for democratic politics, only an “abstract notion of consensus” via discursive 
democracy. She challenged the consolidation of deliberation as normative ideal 
within democratic theory as reinforcing an elitist status quo. 
Poster (1995) was more positive, arguing that while the gathering places of the 
public sphere – the coffeehouses, Greek agora, village squares &c, had never 
included everyone and by themselves could not determine the political outcomes, the 
public sphere none-the-less contributed to “the spirit of dissent” underpinning a 
healthy democracy. A place where people could talk as equals, where status did not 
exclude frank discussion, where “rational argument prevailed, and the goal was 
consensus”. Schudson however, (1997) questioned the very existence of the public 
sphere and argued that public discourse is not the cornerstone of civil society and 
offers no magical solution to the problems of democracy. 
Dahlgren pointed to a precursor state in the pre-political reasoning of what he 




remains a potential”. (2005a:153) The parapolitical domain could be applied to 
hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of groups and pages on Facebook where 
issues and social topics are focused on and – to a greater or lesser degree - discussed. 
Dahlgren considers the place of the advocacy/activist domain of online public 
spheres and the potential they hold for fostering civic cultures: 
Discussion here may or may not always take the form of Habermasian 
deliberation, but what is more important is the reciprocal dynamics that it can 
generate, reinforcing the parameters of civic culture and the impact this may 
have on the larger political situation. (2005a:159) 
For Bennett et al (1995) the issue was the importance of political talk in itself, not 
as precursor to political action but as political action: “To talk with others about 
politics is to participate in the political life of one’s community or nation” (1995: 
279) Political talk was a necessary “horizontal” activity of citizens engaging with 
each other, rather than the vertical political action of citizens interacting with 
government and political elites. In a society which, from the 1970s onwards, has 
become more preoccupied with self rather than collective, with “highly personalised 
forms of identity politics” anchored in consumerism (2003:139), citizens have 
become distanced from conventionally organised politics. 
Downey and Fenton saw new media, specifically online, as having contributed to 
the destabilising of a public sphere-dominated mass media, state and capital, and 
leading to the emergence of counter-public spheres. New forms of fragmentation and 
solidarity had emerged, they argued, presenting “both opportunities and dangers to 




Facebook has become the entry point both for people’s experience of democratic 
action through the information they receive that informs their understanding of what 
that action might be. However, the Facebook user has been left to navigate a flood of 
information, including news, that may or may not be truthful; that may or may not be 
partisan. That user may choose to believe some of it, or may decide it’s easiest to 
reject all of it – if some news is “fake”, why not assume all news is fake? But in 
doing so, their ability to interpret, deliberate and act on that information is weakened.  
Silverman (2015) researched how false news stories spread around the internet 
and over social media, but was also critical of the mainstream media’s own role in 
extending the influence of “fake” information on the public sphere of the virtual 
world in his report into how journalists may amplify misinformation and “lies, dam 
lies, and viral content” through unquestioning reporting and sloppy or absent 
verification of material. 
Both the 2016 and 2018 Reuters Institute Digital News Reports pointed to 
decreasing trust in journalists and in the news they consume online with over half 
(54% in the 2018 report) saying they were concerned about what is real and fake on 
the internet and 75% of respondents saying that it is the responsibility of the news 
publishers and platforms (i.e. not Facebook) to fix the problem. This is because, 
according to the report, people are mostly unhappy about biased or inaccurate news 
from the mainstream media rather than about fake content distributed by foreign 
powers or other agents. Indeed, news consumption via Facebook had declined 
according to the 2018 report – down nine percentage points in the US and down two 




this decline may be down to Facebook having changed its algorithm53 to deliver less 
news to users, rather than users choosing not to engage with news via Facebook. 
 A loss of trust in the media tends to be mirrored in a loss of trust in the state. In 
2015, pollsters Gallup reported that Americans’ trust in the mass media had declined 
to just 40 percent having a “great deal” or a “fair amount” of trust. In the same 
period, Gallup found that Americans had also lost trust in federal government (only 
38 percent trusted their government to tackle domestic problems). There’s a similar 
pattern in the UK, with just 21 percent in 2016 trusting politicians to tell them the 
truth, against 25 percent trusting journalists.54 
In a public sphere which relies on the state and the mass media as the bridge 
between state and people bridge between people and state, a loss of trust in both 
“pillars” is of concern to a properly functioning – or perhaps traditional functioning – 
democracy.  
When democracy falters, journalism falters, and when journalism goes awry, 




53 In January 2018, Facebook announced it was to change its news feed algorithm to prioritise “news” 
from friends and family, rather than news from news organisations and others: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/12/technology/facebook-news-feed-changes.html (accessed 
November 6th, 2018). 




In this chapter’s consideration of the key literature underpinning this thesis, the 
question of whether Facebook is on balance a positive or negative influence on 
democratic engagement is frequently referenced but not answered. In reality, it may 
be some time before academics are able to answer that question with authority. 
However, this study makes an original contribution towards answering the 
question through assessing the role of Facebook in enabling or limiting political 
debate. In particular by considering Facebook’s place within the public sphere and 
whether it delivers a new public sphere, an adjunct to the public sphere, or whether it 
undermines the public sphere. 
The chapter set out to explore understanding of the public sphere through key 
literature, concluding that a public sphere “test” for Facebook would be primarily 
based on assessing the type and quality of interaction among its users – whether there 
is Habermasian reasoned debate - but that Facebook as an entity would also have to 
pass structural tests in relation to the institutional (including control, funding, legal 
framework), architectural (accessibility) and political ecology features of the 
business. 
From looking at the development of internet, to the rise of the social web, to 
Facebook’s dominance as social media technology, this chapter references key 
literature in technology theory to consider the technological distinctiveness that has 
driven Facebook’s rise to near-ubiquity as new communications media. The chapter 
also looked at social capital theory to show how users are encouraged to spend more 
of their time within Facebook and to explain their willingness to give up personal 




It argued that it is Facebook’s scale, coupled with global corporate ambition and 
societal embeddedness, that delivers the potential for Facebook to create a new public 
sphere and to be considered a transformative political actor in its own right. The 
chapter considered literature around the public and civic spheres and the effect of the 
internet and the social media on engagement in political and civil action. 
Finally, the chapter introduced the concern that Facebook’s corporate culture- 
driven architecture; focusing on commercialising user data; filtering content towards 
people’s cognitive ease or bias; encouraging users to build one-to-most networks of 
weak tie acquaintances; would influence both the likelihood of debate and the quality 















Chapter 3: Research strategy 
3.1: Introduction to Facebook and its difficulties 
Before looking at the research strategy and data collection, it is necessary to 
outline how Facebook works and what the user sees and does within its walled 
garden. It should be understood that the description that follows may vary in details 
as Facebook frequently changes the layout of the home page (or News Feed) and 
other aspects of how the site operates, however the following has remained core to 
the user interface.  
New subscribers create a Facebook account. They have to give key information 
such as name and email address, date of birth, gender identification, and location. It is 
possible to give a false location, gender, birth date, etc. but giving a false name would 
defeat the object of Facebook which is to connect people who know each other.  
Users create a password and may or may not add other security information 
(such as mobile phone number) and may or may not choose to link their Facebook 
account to automatically open on their smartphone, personal computer, or when 
visiting other websites.  
Users will add a small profile picture and may add a larger picture to the top of 
their home page (or News Feed) – akin to the banner or header image on a website – 




Friends55 are notified of (i.e. This person has updated their Profile picture). Users 
may also add other information to their Profile – a couple of sentences about who 
they are, their relationship status, and can post (at any time) updates on their status 
(sometimes called the ‘Wall’) about what they’re thinking or doing.  
The user will look for ‘Friends’ on Facebook and send Friend requests. Currently 
they will be prompted to send requests by Facebook showing them ‘People you may 
know’ pictures and links. This is core to the business model of Facebook, and by-
and-large to its success. Facebook is based on real-world identities, rather than – as 
previously discussed – the anonymised social networks of MySpace and other early 
SNS competitors. Zuckerberg spoke about the value of those real-world connections 
between “trusted” and known friends. In 2007, announcing Facebook’s wholesale 
move into social advertising, he said: 
People influence people. Nothing influences people more than a 
recommendation from a trusted friend. A trusted referral influences people 
more than the best broadcast message. A trusted referral is the Holy Grail of 
advertising. 56  
Users can also apply to join public or private Groups, and Like public Pages 
produced by individuals (for example celebrities), organisations and companies. 
Once a friend request or request to join a Group is accepted, status updates, posts and 
comments from those individuals or groups will become visible in the user’s News 
 
55 Note that throughout this thesis, terms which relate to specific areas of Facebook’s architecture – for 
example Friends, Posts, News Feed, Comments, and so forth, are capitalised in order to distinguish 
these from the ‘real world’ use of and understanding of friends, pages, comments, news, etc. 
56 Quoted from techcrunch.com: ‘Liveblogging Facebook advertising announcement’, November 6, 
2007. http://techcrunch.com/2007/11/06/liveblogging-facebook-advertising-announcement/ (accessed 




Feed. The News Feed is the core content a user will see. Delivered via Facebook’s 
shifting algorithms the feed is, according to Facebook57, the result of three “signals” 
of relevancy – with news posts prioritised according to how much a user is seen to 
interact with that person or news source and that type of content (eg video or links); 
and how much other people have interacted with that post, i.e. does it already have a 
lot of Likes or Comments. As such, what a user sees in their News Feed should, by-
and-large, reflect what they have already signalled to Facebook that they are most 
interested in seeing. 
However, as this research found, which updates are shown, by who and when 
from is not strictly chronological or determined by the user, and may not necessarily 
reflect what the user is interested in. Facebook’s commercialised algorithms may 
prioritise particular advertisers or organisations, for example through “boosted” posts 
(as explored in the final data collection stage of this research), to the user selecting 
which Friends s/he wants to mostly hear from, to Facebook’s algorithm prioritising a 
competitive content circle which will see content with lots of Likes or Shares 
promoted more widely and thus attracting even more interaction. The issue of what 
content a user sees is problematic, both for this research project (as detailed later in 
this chapter) and for Facebook itself which is frequently criticised for the lack of 
transparency in how its algorithms select what users get to see.  
The key challenge in determining research methodology was one of access to 
data. The research, investigating how citizens engage in political talk on Facebook, 
and whether Facebook’s architecture encourages or discourages genuine debate, 
 
57 For a fuller description, see https://www.facebook.com/facebookmedia/solutions/news-feed 




required access to ‘watch’ debate between Facebook users. For validity, that access 
needed to to debate that was uninfluenced by the process of being watched. 
In addition, the question of whether Facebook’s phenomenal rise has brought with 
it a new public sphere requires – as discussed previously - an assessment of what 
constitutes a public sphere in order to judge whether interaction on Facebook is 
indicative of a public sphere rather than a public space. The “test” needed to be based 
on the epistemology around public sphere theory and the Internet as public or virtual 
public sphere. As discussed in chapter two, the literature largely argued that for 
communication within Facebook to be indicative of a new public sphere it must be: a) 
public; b) reasoned; c) accessible to both state and society; and d) able to form public 
opinion – a collective will.  
The forming of public opinion is not the same as political participation. The 
hypothesis is tested by looking at whether debate happening on Facebook leads to a) 
forming of shared (public) opinion on political, civic or global civic issues; and b) the 
delivery of that opinion to state or global leaders. And that both are enabled by 
Facebook because of its structure; its interaction focus and, as with the traditional 
mass media, a recognition that it is representational of the views and opinions of a/the 
public - i.e. is Facebook representational as a conduit of public opinion analogous to 
traditional mass media58?  
 
58 While the focus is on the role of the media as representing public opinion, it is accepted that to 
greater or lesser degrees media play a part in also shaping opinion. That for most media and political 
communication academics, the issue is not whether media have an effect but what kind of effect media 




There is therefore a further issue, that of whether Facebook is seen as an 
important conduit of public opinion by politicians and decision-makers, or whether 
its importance has been over-estimated, perhaps in media reporting of political 
events, such as the two elections which form the basis of this research. While users 
and the media may over-estimate the relevance of Facebook to decision-makers, it 
may also be true that decision-makers, not least because of their age, race and social 
position, underestimate the validity of opinions formed and shared on Facebook to its 
younger and more diverse users. 
Is Facebook merely enabling its users to “shout more loudly” (Jones, 1997) with 
behavioural norms and weak-ties emphasis which discourage real debate because of 
fear of being out-of-step with the group norm? Is, as Miller suggests (2011), 
Facebook merely another medium for facilitating political action rather than a 
transformational politics? Or is it, as Papacharissi suggests (2008), part of a new 
virtual public sphere which is forging new ways of communicating and delivering 
civic action?59  
The particular challenge, as stated, in research around Facebook is access to real-
time data.  Most of the research strategies considered in the early years of this project 
proved unviable either because of structural barriers in accessing data or ethical 
concerns. For example, the Trending Topics test (detailed in the footnote on page 
 
59 Conversely, Fuchs criticises Papacharissi as “reducing collective action to individual action and the 
public sphere to the private sphere” in empathising the virtual sphere over physical collective action. 





112) and an early idea based around attempting to manipulate the political content 
users were exposed to in their News Feed.  
Facebook does not have Twitter’s publicness. Each user operates within their own 
walled garden Profile of Friends, Groups and Pages they have chosen to connect to. 
There are pathways, via Friends in common, leading from each user’s garden to 
another (journalists and others have become skilled in navigating these pathways in 
order to access newsworthy content). However, there is no general access to people 
you do not know unless that user creates an open public Profile, Page or Group60. 
Facebook is a system built to communicate with people users have real-world ties 
with. Therefore, gaining access to the accounts of strangers, to watch what they say 
to each other, is difficult unless all the parties have open, public accounts. 
Because Facebook, both as a technology and a company, controls access to its 
users and their content, being able to conduct large-scale experiments across broad 
user groups or large datasets requires Facebook’s permission and help. Without that 
help, it is not possible to, for instance, access large datasets to track keywords 
Facebook users search on which might indicate interest in discussing political and 
civic issues.  A 2010 experiment involving Adam Kramer and Facebook’s own Data 
Science team looked at whether feeding particular messages to Facebook users 
during the 2010 election in the US would have the effect of actually encouraging 
 
60 This thesis uses Facebook’s own terminology in defining each of these. Friends are “people you 
connect and share with on Facebook”; a Profile is an individual user’s “collection of the photos, stories 
and experiences that tell [their] story”; Pages allow “businesses, brands and organizations to connect 





more of them to vote. The experiment, (previously detailed on page 90) involved 
over 60 million users – again, a dataset only Facebook can access. 
 A similar mass dataset project was published by Kramer and his colleagues in 
2014. This controversial research used a massive dataset of 689,003 randomly 
selected individuals producing posts over one week in January 2012. The project was 
again conducted by Facebook’s own Data Science team, with access to Facebook-
owned data. The research tested whether “emotional contagion” – the transference of 
positive or negative emotions between individuals – could occur outside of face-to-
face contact among the weak tie links of Facebook, via exposure to emotional content 
in a user’s News Feed. 
In the experiment, posts were determined to be positive or negative if they 
contained at least one positive or negative word, as defined by Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count software (LIWC). In total, over three million posts were analysed, 
containing over 122 million words, 4 million of which were positive (3.6%) and 1.8 
million negative (1.6%). What made the experiment controversial (to the degree that 
the publisher was forced to add an editorial expression of concern61) was that the 
team manipulated users’ feeds in order to alter the amount of negative or positive 
 
61 The ‘Editorial Expression of Concern and Correction’, signed by PNAS editor-in-chief Inder M. 
Verma addressed questions of concern around the lack of consent. The research participants were not 
informed that they were the subject of an experiment; did not give consent; and were not offered the 
option to opt out – contrary to best practice (the “common rule” in the US) for experiments involving 
human subjects. The editor notes that a private company Facebook was under no obligation to adhere 
to the common rule and that the researchers had been able to conduct the experiment within the terms 




material they saw – and did so without the subjects being made aware of the 
experiment or giving permission for their feed to be monitored or manipulated.  
The findings were striking. When positive expressions were reduced in a News 
Feed, people produced fewer positive posts and more negative posts themselves; 
when negative expressions were reduced, the opposite occurred. Emotional contagion 
was happening and happening without the need for in-person interaction and 
nonverbal cues as had previously been thought. Kramer’s team concluded that seeing 
other people being positive had a reciprocal positive experience, which could have 
positive benefits for users’ health and well-being. 
However, the paper chose to focus on the positive benefits of positive messages 
and, as the following chapter explores further, the effect of negative messages and of 
negative political messages should not be underestimated within the context of this 
emotional contagion experiment. If, as Kramer et al concluded, “[o]nline messages 
influence our experience of emotions, which may affect a variety of offline 
behaviors” (2014:3) then the weight of positive or negative emotions expressed in a 
forum such as a political candidate’s Facebook page may also affect political actions 
and behaviour offline. 
One investigative route considered during this research was whether debate would 
be encouraged by positive feedback from Friends (for instance “Likes”62 on a post). It 
was not enough to find a Facebook user posting about a political issue - if they were 
‘testing the water’ among their Friends by making a political comment, did they need 
to get a warm response before debate would happen? Moreno et al (2011) analysed 
 





200 Facebook user profiles and found users that talked about depression and got 
responses were more likely to disclose depressive behaviours again. Facebook is a 
social network: social effects matter at least as much as network effects. 
As mentioned, the 2014 “emotional contagion” experiment received a great deal 
of criticism at the time63 because users were being tested upon without their 
knowledge or (explicit64) agreement. This was a concern in devising the methodology 
for this research project, too. Two early ideas had been rejected – one to monitor 
political content and watch interactions on the News Feeds of students who 
participated in the Stage One surveys, and the other was to “push” political content 
into selected users’ News Feeds to monitor the effect65. Even had Facebook allowed 
access to user feeds for either or both of these proposals, the lack of determinism on 
the Facebook user’s part would raise significant ethical considerations. 
A further concern was that any mass dataset would only show what is happening 
at that point in time and could be skewed by events happening in the real world – 
such as a particular news story - and may not show change over time, i.e. whether 
Facebook was becoming more of an arena for debate as election day drew closer. 
The concept of measuring search results data to gauge interest in a subject is an 
accepted way of identifying trends, used by both researchers and marketeers and it 
 
63 Article: http://mashable.com/2014/07/03/facebook-data-research  ‘Will Facebook Backlash Kill 
Scientists’ Data Dream?’. See also footnote 52, previous page. (Accessed November 6th, 2018). 
64 In the paper, the research team had argued that, because the content posted couldn’t be seen by 
researchers, the privacy of Facebook users was safeguarded and “it was consistent with Facebook’s 
Data Use Policy, to which all users agree prior to creating an account on Facebook, constituting 
informed consent for this research”. 
65 It should be noted however that a version of this “push” content strategy was able to be employed in 




was felt that this could be a way of measuring interest within Facebook by users in a 
particular subject. For instance, searching on the words “election” or “Labour” would 
indicate interest in those subjects and thus interest levels might be gauged from 
popularity of search terms, adjusted for location and time, within Facebook. 
The issue, again, became one of access - Facebook as a company chooses what 
data to release on the search terms its users use and, by-and-large, the company 
focuses on trending topics in relation to stories of the day or to commercial interests. 
At the time of writing, there is no Facebook equivalent to Google publishing Google 
Trends, the search engine’s simple and public summary of most-trending keywords in 
searches. Whilst there is both free and paid-for social analytics software available 
which can track brand mentions and other marketing analytics across particular social 
media (such as hashtags66 on Twitter or Instagram), software able to track trending 
keywords on Facebook was not available during the data collection period. 
Facebook’s Trending Topics feed, which appears on a user’s home page, was also 
investigated67 early on in the research to see whether it could offer a viable 
 
66 A word or phrase preceded by a hash sign (#), used on social media websites and applications to 
identify messages on a specific topic. The hash sign creates a metadata tag which means instances of 
the hashtag used on other social media sites can be found in a search or linked together as data. 
67 The thinking had been that Trending Topics could encourage political debate by reflecting what a 
user showed they were most interested in. Or could discourage debate by ignoring user actions in 
favour of paid-for political content or may be neutral in responding to simple triggers such as links, 
Likes or hashtags. To test whether this was a route worth investigating, an initial test asked four users 
to follow a series of steps (nine stages). Starting by picking a current campaign news story related to 
the 2015 election then creating a post about that story which mentioned the organisation but did not 
include a hyperlink to it or hashtag. The testers were given the campaign by nota.org (to vote ‘none of 
the above’) as an example they might use but were free to choose another. They were asked to monitor 
their Facebook newsfeed over 24 hours to see whether the action of mentioning the campaign was 
picked up by the algorithm and produced any changes to the Trending Topics or adverts they were 




alternative to tracking search terms, given that it was meant to reflect the popularity 
of topics68. However, initial tests proved disappointing and, over the course of the 
period spent ‘watching’ Facebook feeds, there was no evidence that Trending Topics 
was reflecting the interests or posted content of the individual user. 
It should be noted that in the 2017 version of Facebook, the ‘Trending’ stories 
feed (the word ‘Topics’ had been dropped) now gave information on the provenance 
of a story by saying where it had come from, and there appeared to be a greater 
reliance on news stories from reputable news sources. This was presumed to be a 
response to criticism of Facebook in the years between 2015 and 2017 for showing 
and giving equal weight to so-called “fake” news stories from partisan or unreliable 
websites alongside mainstream news sources (see page 70). 
These concerns aside, the idea of conducting any form of mass dataset experiment 
was finally dropped when a request to the academic relations team at Facebook to 
access the data was rejected. This is not unusual; the company does not, in general, 
give access to researchers from outside or working on research not authorised by the 
 
proactive steps, including posting a link to the organisation, Liking it, and asking people in their 
Facebook Friends group to comment on the post. At each stage they were asked to wait 24hours and 
monitor any changes. Although only a small pilot group, none of the participants saw any changes at 
any stage, suggesting that the Trending Topics algorithm was not responding to individual actions. It 
was generalised, rather than personalised. It was therefore felt Trending Topics did not have sufficient 
validity as a test of Facebook’s personalisation algorithms. 
68 From Facebook: “Trending shows you a list of topics and hashtags that have recently spiked in 
popularity on Facebook. This list is personalized based on a number of factors, including Pages you've 




company. Researchers who try to ‘scrape’ or access data without permission are 
liable to be sued.69 
3.2 Comparable research methodology 
Of more interest was the methodology chosen by Jackson et al (2013) and 
Graham et al (2015)70 in assessing the level of political talk among everyday citizens 
online. While that research did not include Facebook (it sampled three online public 
forums), by setting out to measure quantity and quality of political debate it had 
analogies with this project. 
The two teams of researchers used quantitative content analysis of datasets with 
qualitative narratives on actual political talk, selecting large forums with broad 
interest in key aspects of everyday life: saving money (HotUKDeals in 2013 paper 
and MoneySavingExpert in the 2015 paper), entertainment and media (Digitalspy), 
and family life (Mumsnet). Demographics were broadly representative of Internet 
users but the sites also offered scale of activity and membership far exceeding 
explicitly political sites. 
The sites were monitored during non-election periods and threads (discussion 
strands) collected on different days and at different times. In the 2013 research, 1,620 
threads were collected by Jackson and his colleagues, equating to 9.5 percent of total 
posts during period. Each thread was categorised according to whether the opening 
 
69 Pete Warden is an entrepreneur and blogger who experimented with “scraping” Facebook data to 
gather research information and was consequently threatened with legal action by the company’s 
lawyers. Source: http://petewarden.com/2010/04/05/how-i-got-sued-by-facebook (accessed November 
9, 2018) 




post appeared to invite explicit or implicit political discussion71, or was non-political, 
with the bar “deliberately set high” on what constitutes political talk (and following 
Schudson, 1997). The aim was not simply to look for political talk, but for political 
debate. Debate that, as Schudson argued (1997), was among people “acquainted by 
virtue of their citizenship… under norms of public reasonableness”, rather than 
simply social interaction. 
It was again a research method that could not be directly applied to this project, 
because posts on Facebook are not public in the same way that posts on the three 
forums would be. Further, Jackson’s 9.5 percent sample would be an impossibly 
large number of posts and comments to scan on Facebook, representing billions of 
posts over the period studied, and would require a very different technical approach. 
However, the core concept in Jackson - that of reading what people are actually 
saying and assessing the relevance of what they say, made sense within the context of 
this research. It also had analogies with the methodology used by boyd [correct] in 
her work. In particular her own PhD dissertation (2008) which looked at how young 
people engaged with each other on social networks via a case study of MySpace. She 
produced an ethnographic study of American teens’ engagement with social network 
sites and the ways in which their participation supported and complicated three 
practices—self-presentation, peer sociality, and negotiating adult society 
 
71 Explicit required direct reference to a political agent (e.g. an MP, parliament, government policy) 
Implicit political talk used words and expressions that referred to political systems, structures and 
participants (Hay, 2002). All posts coded as explicitly or implicitly political (115 found) were then 




boyd [correct] used a qualitative research strategy; inductive (rather than 
deductive) in that the theory developed emerges from the data collected rather than is 
tested through it. Inductive research strategy is more typical of a qualitative research 
approach with its emphasis on data collection through structured and semi-structured 
interviews rather than large-scale fact finding (Bryman, 2008). boyd had been 
broadly constructionist in that her research had a bias towards teens determining how 
they interact on MySpace rather than the social network site determining their 
interaction. However, this project took an objectivist position by looking at Facebook 
as a social entity with a reality external to its users. The hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that Facebook has external reality because the technology it chooses to 
offer its users and the way it decides to run its business drives (causes) user 
engagement levels and interaction. 
Ethnographic data for boyd’s research was collected through field study - 
observation and interviews over time, to develop theory about the culture and 
behaviour of that group within the context of the field. She used participant 
observation and interviews within the community (teens online) that she was 
immersed in over the period of her study. She referred to this approach as “deep 
watching” (2008). Being able to watch what people are saying on Facebook, even if 
within a fairly controlled area of individual profiles and groups, became central to 
this research project. It became important to be able to follow the path of a debate - 
when it began; what prompted it, and how it concluded.  
Nina Eliasoph’s research into how groups of citizens engaged in local civic and 
political action also took an ethnographic approach. While not concerned with online 




web), Eliasoph did follow a similar ethnographic fieldwork pattern. Her 1995-7 study 
on how and why people avoid politics, even when they may be engaged in civic 
(political) action, was a two-and-half-year fieldwork and interview study of groups of 
volunteers, activists and citizens in an area on the US West Coast. Through observing 
(deep-watching) interactions, interviewing people, and analysing news reports, she 
concluded that people have to work hard to keep the wider world at bay, and their 
focus on issues that are “close to home” is a reflection of perceived powerlessness 
and not apathy.  
Eliasoph also noted that, at the time of her study, no other researcher had analysed 
actual political conversations as they unfolded in real time, in everyday spaces and 
within existing groups and emphasised the importance of recording and studying 
actual political conversations and “public-spirited talk” (1997: 263). She noted also 
the danger in research which was too focused on interviews72 when interviewees may 
feel their words are being taken “abnormally seriously” and thus affect the context of 
the interview (1996: 285). 
An earlier study by Eliasoph explored the different responses to questions 
individuals would give in surveys and in interviews, according to level of publicness 
of the material. By pretending to be a radio journalist asking questions, Eliasoph 
sought to add the publicness of the media, and the interviewee’s awareness of that, to 
 
72 As example, the work of Perrin (1971) which, while it included many examples from actual 
discussions to illustrate how citizens talk about politics, used as source material discussions within 
targeted focus groups on a series of hypothetical scenarios. Whist these were actual existing groups (eg 
sports, church, union) and their real-time conversation was being monitored, they were debating in 




create a “stand-in” for the public sphere (1990: 467). In doing so, she sought to 
survey public – rather than private – opinions on political issues, contrary to most 
public-opinion research of the time which she argued tried to avoid public displays of 
opinion; to avoid the question of what political positions people take in public. 
However, in today’s social and web-enabled, “always-on” public the concept that 
any interviewee would not presume a level of publicness and self-publicising 
awareness in their answers would seem naïve. Even with a promise of anonymity, 
most people would assume that someone, or perhaps more accurately some bot, 
would ‘hear’ their view on an issue. 
Daniel Miller (2011) also followed an ethnographic approach in his study of small 
groups of individuals living in different countries and cultures, and the different ways 
that they chose to engage with Facebook. In doing so, he noted the difficulties in 
abstracting what he saw in the Facebook ‘Tales’ of each individual studied into 
creating an overall theory of Facebook. While each chapter highlights particular 
aspects of behaviour via Facebook, each also represent that individual’s multiple 
worlds, each with its own Facebook and its own consequences: 
What is more difficult to ascertain at this stage is whether the use of 
Facebook, and the internet more generally, changes, as well as consolidates, 
particular patterns of cultural expression. (2011:2013).  
Two other studies used methods external to activity on Facebook but were none-
the-less concerned with Facebook. Zhang et al (2010) conducted a telephone survey 
to examine the extent to which reliance on social network sites engaged citizens in 
civic and political activities. Interviewers contacted 998 people (randomly selected 




30.2% participated. The research used three measures of social capital: civic 
participation, political participation and confidence in government. Research 
questions assessed both political variables and reliance on social networking sites to 
each of the three measures. 
The authors themselves acknowledged their findings relied on a survey of a 
community that is more conservative than the rest of population. Plus, respondents 
who agreed to participate were not representative – generally older (median age 52), 
with some college education and mostly female (64.8%) and white (74.4%) - perhaps 
reflecting pre-existing interest in the subject matter, or just people who had more time 
to participate. 
Gustafsson (2012) set out to test attitudes to political content on Facebook and 
whether this differed according to pre-existing level of political activity or interest 
among users. He used six focus group interviews involving 50 individuals. Two 
groups were made up of members of political parties; two of members of interest 
groups; two groups comprised people who were neither active in politics nor 
members of interest groups. One group in each category worked online and one 
offline with the online group using a discussion tool and the offline group meeting 
face-to-face. Both groups were fed the same questions. The online group members 
were recruited using snowball sampling73 resulting in demographic of 19-34-year-
olds, mostly university-educated people or current students. 
He found that using social network sites alone did not drive previously politically 
inactive users towards political participation. Those who were already politically 
 
73 Initial subject provides names of others in accepted technique, particularly when dealing with 




active found social network sites to be useful tools for sharing information and 
further participation, whereas the politically inactive were more likely to avoid 
sharing political views through social media.  
Vraga et al (2015) conducted similar research during the 2012 US election cycle, 
focused around in-depth interviews with twenty 18-29-year-olds on their perceptions 
of the Facebook political climate and their willingness to engage with it, including 
looking at and discussing with them their Facebook feed. Whilst a small sample74, the 
researchers found the young people generally avoided engaging in political talk, not 
because they did not have opinions on politics, issues or candidates, but because of a 
fear of “drama” and conflict, coupled with the unknowability of who on Facebook 
would see material. 
Focus groups and in-depth interviews are useful when the object is to study 
individuals’ thinking and experiences; explore a new field; or generate hypotheses 
(Rezabek, 2000; Stewart and Williams, 2005: 398). The Gustafsson study explored 
the reasoning of individuals, against the Civic Voluntarism Model, so the focus group 
interview method was appropriate.  
For the Vraga et al project, the interview stage helped to develop hypotheses to be 
explored further via the surveys. However, while the method could offer a route to 
investigate the reasoning of individuals, focus groups can encourage individuals to 
react to each other (Hundley and Shyles, 2010: 410) – participants may influence 
 
74 The researchers followed up this interview stage with a convenience sample survey, using 
respondents via Amazon’s crowdsourcing service Mechanical Turk, to complete paid-for 
questionnaires to further test hypotheses. They used material from 231 respondents who matched the 




each other by encouraging mirroring behaviours. For validity, evidence of interaction 
on Facebook, needed to be seen in a “natural” setting with individuals engaging in 
political talk unprompted and unaware that the interaction was being monitored.  
Lewis and West (2009) also used snowball sampling to look at social interaction 
on Facebook, in particular Friending and the quality of interaction and strength of 
ties. They conducted semi-structured interviews with 16 students, recruited via 
snowballing, controlled to limit the group to a particular type of user (purposive 
sampling). Each student had joined Facebook in 2005 when the site was made 
available to UK students, and had experienced the opening-up of the SNS to non-
university users in 2006. All said they were regular users of Facebook of from 20 
minutes to several hours each day. From their analysis of the data gathered from the 
students, the researchers concluded that Facebook promotes mainly weak, low-
commitment ties. However, the small sample size would have led to wide variations 
in use and management of Facebook among the 16 individuals, despite their 
similarities as a cohort. The snowball sampling method may be more likely to deliver 
a bias (i.e. like-minded friends) and knowing they are being recruited in relation to 




Cheung and Lee (2010)75 criticised the predominance of Facebook research that 
relies on “convenience samples”76 (such as Lewis and West’s project) and argued for 
more gathering of participants via “random walk”77 models to strengthen validity. 
Several researchers have chosen to interview political actors in order to analyse 
how they use the internet to reach voters. Gibson (2014), talked to candidates, 
campaign managers and journalists about the use of interactive 'Web 2.0' tools in the 
2010 General Election, while Davis (2010) interviewed 100 politicians, bloggers and 
journalists in looking at the influence of the internet on institutional politics.  
Davis found the internet had enabled political activism to spread outwards; to 
create what he termed a “fat democracy” of more engaged political actors on the 
edges of institutional political groups “akin to a sort of middle-management 
expansion of UK politics” but conversely an expansion that was adding to the 
disengagement and exclusion of most citizens (2010:746). This “middle-
management” expansion may also in part be to blame for what Williamson termed 
the “rather boring” playing out of the 2015 UK General Election on social media: 
 
75 See also Gjoka et al (2010) and Mai, Y (2010) who raised similar concerns and argued for 
Metropolis-Hasting Random Walk (MHRW) (see footnote 65) as be the least biased sampling method. 
76  A convenience sample, also called a non-probability or opportunity sample, is one in which the 
researcher uses any subjects that are available to participate in the research study. This could mean 
stopping people in a street corner as they pass by or surveying friends, students, or colleagues that the 
researcher has regular access to. Typically, only justified if researcher wants to study the 
characteristics of people at a certain point in time or if other sampling methods are not possible.  
77 In statistics defined as a route consisting of successive and connected steps in which each step is 
chosen by a random mechanism uninfluenced by any previous step. In probability theory, random 
walk is a process for determining the probable location of a point subject to random motions, given the 
probabilities (the same at each step) of moving some distance in some direction. Random walks are an 




In general the two big parties, and most candidates, used social media as a 
battering ram of pre-prepared pronouncements, videos – which they vainly 
hoped would somehow go viral; they didn’t – and a range of choreographed 
attacks on the opposition (2015: 29) 
None-the-less, between the 2015 and 2017 elections, the political battleground 
had moved from mass to social media (Bakir and McStay; Chadwick 2017) with 
parties and progressive campaign groups (such as Momentum and 38 Degrees) 
focusing their messages through social media and Facebook in a bid to engage 
younger voters which by and large worked: in 2015, 43% of 18-24-year-olds voted 
(Ipso Mori), in 2017, the figure was 59% (YouGov78) 
In the US, Halpern and Gibbs (2013) focused on messages and comments posted 
to the Facebook and YouTube sites managed by the White House in order to assess 
the quality of deliberations, within broadly Hambermasian indicators, and the civility 
or otherwise of the discourse – finding that the majority, 72% of over 7,000 posts 
analysed tended to be polite and that people were more polite on Facebook than in 
YouTube’s anonymised space79. Rowe (2015) similarly found that comments posted 
to The Washington Post’s own website (where posters were afforded a relatively high 
 
78 Source: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/06/13/how-britain-voted-2017-
general-election (accessed November 9th, 2018). However, it should be noted that other analysts had 
put the figure higher – up to 72% for 2017. 
79 By contrast, Oz et al (2018) conducted similar research, using quantitative date to analyse 
and compare responses to tweets by the White House and White House Facebook posts. They found 
people were more deliberative in their responses to White House posts on Facebook than on Twitter, 
but that there was no overall difference in terms of incivility or politeness. Concluding that variance 




level of anonymity) were significantly more likely to be uncivil and impolite, 
compared to comments posted to The Washington Post’s Facebook page. 
Johnson and Kaye (2014) looked at the credibility of social network services in 
relation to political information, asking how much users trusted the information they 
found via Facebook and other SNS. They surveyed politically interested Internet 
users, posting an online survey two weeks before and two weeks after the 2008 
presidential election. The survey was promoted via politically-orientated websites, 
newsgroups, mailing lists etc. (convenience sampling) and respondents were 
encouraged to ‘snowball’ the survey to politically interested family and friends. Over 
4,000 surveys were completed – 37.6% of those who opened the survey – and just 
over threequarters of the respondents claimed to be very knowledgeable of and 
interested in politics. 
Johnson and Kaye set out to test perceptions of credibility – trustworthiness – 
among SNS users who were pre-disposed to be interested in politics. They found that 
users ranked SNS significantly lower in credibility than other media, including other 
Internet sources such as YouTube. This, the researchers noted, is “curious” given the 
intense reliance on the Internet and SNS by the Obama campaign and the 
acknowledged effectiveness of that approach for Obama in 2008 (dubbed “The 
Facebook election” - Fraser & Dutta, 2008; Johnson & Perlmutter, 2010). One 
reason, they suggested, may be that the SNS is seen as a social space rather than an 
informational space thus users were more likely to seek out (“pull”) information and 
opinions from the SNS that supported their world view, and discount “pushed” 




The work by Johnson and Kaye, and also by Gustafsson, did prompt the question 
of whether it was necessary within this research project to find “hidden” groups - 
people scattered across linked friendship, family or interest groups who share 
thinking rather than social ties. An individual is likely to share political views with 
close friends and family (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955), but may not share those same 
opinions with the weak tie Friends in their extended Facebook social group – 
something that emerged from the surveys for this project. The question becomes 
whether politically-minded or debate-minded individuals are more or less likely to be 
“hidden” on Facebook – i.e. more-or-less likely to engage in political talk when they 
could not be certain exactly who, within their average Facebook group of 300 Friends 
(Pew Research Center, 2014) would read what they say. 
This became a key area for investigation. Will people who are interested in 
political and civic issues, and in debating such issues, use Facebook to seek out like-
minded people – those regular visitors to the Habermasian coffeehouses and salons as 
metaphor. It should not matter whether everyone is using Facebook to engage in 
political talk, it is more important that the people who would want to engage in such 
talk, and perhaps go on to engage in civic and political action, are enabled to do so by 
Facebook. As Bennett et al noted, people tend to talk politics with family and friends 
and most political conversations go on between “like-minded souls” (1995: 293).  
This propensity for people to discuss politics largely with people who agreed with 
them might be seen as undermining democracy in encouraging weaker discussions. 




elections80 showed that people who talked politics were up to twice as likely to be 
more knowledgeable about politics and civic issues, regardless of who they talked 
with.    
Ancu and Cozma, in their research into voters’ use of candidate MySpace Profile 
Pages (2009) showed that users visited candidate’s pages mainly for social 
interaction – the primary gratification was to interact with other supporters of that 
candidate, not necessarily to interact with the candidate his or herself. Through a 
series of invitational surveys, they sought to measure political interest, campaign 
involvement and campaign interest alongside the uses and gratifications for visiting a 
candidate’s MySpace profile. 
Dimitrova et al (2011) went further, testing whether the type of digital media (e.g. 
visiting news website vs visiting candidate’s social media pages) was a factor in both 
the reason voters visited a candidate’s page and the effect of visiting. They 
hypothesized that social media use would have the strongest effect on political 
participation, while news site use would have the strongest effect on political 
knowledge. Their panel studies found that use of all the digital media had only 
limited effects on political knowledge, but that use of social media, particularly 
linked to political parties and candidates, had significant and positive effects on 
political participation (2011:110). 
 
 
80 In work comparing data from Almond and Verba’s 1959 Five Nation study, the 1987 General Social 
Survey, 1992 American National Election Study, 1992 British General election Study and material 
from the 1984, 1986 and 1994 American National Election Studies and the 1992 Eurobarometer 37 




3.3: Identifying research groups and methods 
It is valid to focus on those who are predisposed to debating political or civic 
issues. The “coffeehouse” public sphere metaphor would seem to assume that those 
who attended were there to take part or active listen, unlike in other more general 
social spaces such as a Public House.  It was a self-selecting public space and as such 
encouraged debate. It is therefore reasonable to investigate whether Facebook, 
because users self-select who they accept as Friends or which Groups and Pages they 
Like, might similarly encourage debate within the user’s social network – their 
“accepting” space. Chapter five explores this concept of a “safe” debating space more 
fully. 
Because Facebook’s demographic is more likely to be under 30 and female81 – 
this also provides an opportunity to monitor people who are less likely to be 
politically active but may none-the-less be interested in and willing to debate issues 
of national or global civic society - people who, given a comfortable space and 
encouragement might go on to become politically engaged. The research therefore 
sought to focus on those willing or wanting to debate, rather than any broad 
representative sample and measuring of debate within an “everyman” group.  
One element considered in this research was whether to focus on Facebook 
Group82 pages, rather than on individual user Profiles. Would people interested in 
particular issues be more likely to gather with like-minded individuals on Pages or in 
 
81 Facebook 2015 demographics showed the SNS was used by 83% of women (against 77% of men) 
and 88% of 18 to 29-year-olds (Source: Pew Social Media Update, 2016) 
82 From Facebook: “Groups are private spaces where you can keep in touch with people by sharing 
updates, photos or documents”. Pages “enable public figures, businesses, organizations and other 




Groups? By using an issue-led Group as a starting point – sampling from users who 
join that issue group – would it be possible to then move outwards from them to see 
if their engagement in the issue leads to discussion with and among Friends in their 
own Facebook network? However, while joining an issue-based Facebook Group 
may be an indication of support for the issue it is not necessarily an indication of 
ongoing interest in the issue or of a desire to get involved beyond what has been 
termed “clicktivism” – political engagement limited to low-cost, low-effort actions 
such as signing an online petition or commenting on a meme83 (Gladwell, 2010). 
Beyond that, there are practical and ethical considerations in following 
individuals from a Facebook Group Page to their personal page in order to read 
everything they post in the hope that some of it may contain political content. Being 
able to read an individual’s Newsfeed posts relies on them either accepting the 
researcher as a Friend, or on them having kept their Profile public (i.e. without 
privacy controls to restrict access to their content). In either scenario, the Facebook 
user would be watched without their knowledge.  
Ethics aside, there are practical issues in reading everything an individual may 
post, and everything their Friends post in response, and in monitoring chatter over a 
period of time without missing the ‘important bits’. How long is long-enough in order 
to judge whether someone is interested in debating political and civic issues? 
Because Facebook is a social network it is important to investigate whether its 
social-ness was a factor - is getting a positive response to a political post important; 
 
83 A meme has two meanings according to the Oxford Dictionary but in relation to social media, and in 
this context, it is its second meaning that applies. That of “an image, video, piece of text, etc., typically 




does being ‘rewarded’ by reciprocal contributions (Likes or supportive comments) 
affect the quality and spread of debate and pre-political reasoning? 
The result of this analysis of methodology used in other relevant research was to 
devise a mixed methods approach. Including qualitative online ethnographic 
fieldwork and interviews, and quantitative surveys questioning a representative 
cohort on specific elements.  
Surveys were used to assess predisposition to debate; whether and how 
individuals within the target demographic use Facebook to find out about issues and 
whether they feel they are encouraged or discouraged in discussing such issues on 
Facebook. The surveys - carried out at the end of 2014 and beginning of 2015 and 
using Qualtrics software, were targeted at groups who might reasonably be expected 
to have a higher level of interest in politics, global and civic issues. Thus, students 
studying journalism, politics and social sciences in several UK universities84 were 
invited, via their lecturers, to take part. In addition, a control group of games design 
students also took the survey. In total 253 students completed the survey. 
A further group of 15 students and graduates participated in follow-up research, 
contributing content from their own Facebook Newsfeeds, gathered on the day of the 
UK 2015 General Election. 
The bulk of the data gathering however was focused around the period of the 
2015 election. This consisted in the main of field work and “deep watching” (boyd, 
2008) selected individual and Group Facebook Pages, Profiles and Newsfeeds over 
 
84 Leeds Trinity, Birmingham City University, University of Central Lancashire, City University, and 




16 days pre- and immediately post-election.  This online ethnography was 
particularly suited to open-ended exploration of the reality of debate on Facebook. 
According to Whitehead (1965, 1967, 2005)85 it is an approach particularly suited to 
situations in which people construct complex realities differently expressed according 
to the context of the situation: 
It is through observing, interacting with, and participating in their activities 
that the ethnographer is able to place his or her study participants into 
socio-cultural contexts that have meaning for them.  (Whitehead, 2005: p6) 
Field observation methodology took a constant comparison approach86 in looking 
for debate and political talk. All the content looked at on Facebook was made 
available either because it was on public Pages, or sent as screenshots of content by 
participants, to tackle ethical concerns. 
This was followed by semi-structured follow-up interviews with some of the 
candidates87 from the four election constituencies monitored. Interviews focused on 
 
85 See: ‘Basic Classical Ethnographic Research Methods Secondary Data Analysis, Fieldwork, 
Observation/Participant Observation, and Informal and Semi-structured Interviewing’ Tony L. 
Whitehead, 2005: http://www.cusag.umd.edu/documents/workingpapers/classicalethnomethods.pdf 
(accessed November 9, 2018). Original theory published in Social Problems, 12(1965), pp. 436-45 and 
later as Chapter V in Glaser, B.G. & Strauss, A.L. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: 
Strategies for qualitative research. New York: Aldine DeGruyter. 
86 Constant comparison was chosen rather than, for example the analytic induction method, because of 
the method’s suitability for generating complex and developmental theory from a broad range of data: 
“This method...especially facilitates the generation of theories of process, sequence, and change 
pertaining to organizations, positions, and social interaction.” Glaser (1967). 
87 All the candidates were emailed a series of follow-up questions post-election and asked if they 
would be interviewed. However, only a handful responded and just four candidates or their election 
agent answer questions. This should be put into context however - the majority of candidates 
disengaged with their campaign after they had lost the election, and several had closed the email 




whether the candidate had had a strategy for using Facebook to engage potential 
voters, and attitudes towards political discussion that took place on their own 
campaign page. 
Finally, the calling of the “snap” general election in 2017, provided another 
research opportunity to look at how debate on Facebook may or may not have 
changed in the intervening two years. It was decided to take a more direct, 
interventionist approach by attempting to control the content users might see to test 
whether posting particular content could encourage debate. This intervention took the 
form of creating and posting a number of political posts targeted at voters in a single 
constituency and sent via candidate’s Facebook Page (to which access had been 
given). Some posts were further boosted88, to reach voters not directly linked to the 
candidate, using Facebook’s commercial advertising tools. The results in terms of 
actions (Likes, Shares, Comments) were monitored. Activity took place between 
April 20th and the day of the 2017 election on June 8th. 
Whilst a relatively small number of posts were created and tested (23 in all, 
including geographic variants of posts) statistics showed the posts were seen by many 
thousands of Facebook users over the period. However, the interventionist case study 
shared some of the ethical concerns of Kramer et al’s 2012 emotional contagion 
experiment (see page 108) in that people viewing and responding to the posts were 
not specifically told that this formed part of a research project. 
 
88 ‘Boosting’ is the process by which a business user can pay to have content seen by more people 
and/or by targeted groups of people, particularly people who would otherwise not come across that 





To mitigate against this, explanation of the research and an open invitation to ask 
questions or raise concerns was posted to the researcher’s Facebook page (see Fig. 1) 
and members of the candidate’s social media team were informed. It was also felt to 
be important that all the posts were relevant to and supported by the candidate and 
did not constitute any ‘extreme’ positions that, while potentially useful for research 
purposes, would not be helpful to the candidate and the local party. That is, posts 
needed to have a positive political intention which suited their location as on a new 
Labour candidate’s election campaign Facebook page. 
Overall the aim was to find the least problematic way of being able to monitor 
users’ response to reading political messages. As detailed in the next chapter, this 
decision was largely because of changes within Facebook that had occurred over the 
intervening years that had made it difficult to take the same approach as in 2015. 
Facebook had made architectural changes which had meant users’ pages were much 
more ‘locked down’ and most of the 2015 candidates and their Facebook sites had 
gone. Additionally, it was felt that the second election provided an opportunity to test 
theory into the effect of positive political messages on user engagement (Kramer et 
al, 2010). 
Thus, this mixed methods approach delivered data from surveys, fieldwork, 
interviews, direct interventions, and Facebook material submitted voluntarily by 



















Stage One of the research consisted of four separate group surveys conducted 
with a total of 253 participants. The four groups consisted of 1) Journalism students 
at Staffordshire University; 2) Humanities students at Staffordshire University; 3) 
Journalism students at other universities; 4) Games Design students at Staffordshire 
University. Participation in the surveys was voluntary and each group of students was 
given the same set of survey questions.  
Stage One also included a review of the methodology options, including 
unsuccessful approaches to Facebook and the Trending Topics test referred to on 
page 112. It should also be noted that the final group surveys were produced after a 
substantial period of exploration, including drafting a number of different surveys. 
One early questionnaire sought to focus on interpersonal communication, 
influenced by the work of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), to investigate which method 
of communication (e.g. telephone, social media, face-to-face) was mostly used by 
which age group to communicate with which level contacts (i.e. influencers). While it 
may have delivered interesting data, the survey idea was rejected as not being 
sufficiently relevant to the research question. Another rejected survey idea had 
focused on politicians and sought to ascertain how they used social media and their 
understanding of its influence (see Appendix 1). This survey, worked on in the 
summer of 2014, came close to being put into the field. Its question blocks, focused 
as they were on Facebook and social media as a potential space for debate and the 
sharing of public opinion, influenced the design of the final Facebook surveys. 
The politicians’ survey was finally rejected because it was felt that the likelihood 
of being able to collect enough relevant data was low – not least because politicians 




numbers to make the data viable. However, the process of designing that survey was 
particularly helpful in creating the final set of surveys – this time aimed at potential 
voters as users of Facebook, rather than political candidates. 
The stage two data collection focused on the General Election itself, with the 
Facebook feeds of candidates in four selected constituencies monitored between 
April 27th to May 13th. In all, around 3,500 posts and comments were scanned in 
looking for evidence of political talk and this material formed the bulk of the data. 
Debates were monitored and recorded but also interrogated in relation to how people 
began, continued or ended debate within social norms that might be specific to 
Facebook and its architecture. 
Additionally, stage two included material from individual voter’s News Feeds on 
election day (including some people who had participated in the surveys), submitted 
by volunteers, and questioning of candidates after the election on their use of 
Facebook. 
Stage three was an unexpected bonus. As previously mentioned, the calling of a 
“snap” general election in May 2017 provided an opportunity to look at changes in 
Facebook in the intervening two years in relation to how users and the site engaged 
with the UK general election. This data collection stage focused on one particular 
aspect – whether users’ engagement in political discussion could be encouraged by 
posting particular political material on Facebook. 
 




Four surveys were conducted. Survey One was conducted in December 2014 with 
journalism students at Staffordshire University. Students were invited to complete the 
survey by a class lecturer or by email from their award leader. No credits or academic 
reward was given, and it was made clear to the students that their participation was 
voluntary and the surveys would be anonymised at the individual student level (i.e. 
only their course of study and gender might identify them). Around 150 students 
were approached and 84 (56%) completed the survey. 
Survey Two was conducted with Humanities students at Staffordshire University, 
also in December 2014. Students studying history, international issues, social studies 
and politics were invited to take part by email from their award leader and 39 
students completed the survey. Survey Three was conducted with journalism students 
at other UK universities in January and February 2015 (see footnote page 130). 
Again, students were invited to take part by email from their tutor or award leader 
and 96 students participated. 
Surveys one to three had targeted groups who, because of their choice of study, 
might reasonably be expected to be more interested in political and civic issues, more 
aware of the role of media in raising issues, than other young people in their age 
group89. This was important because the aim was not to ascertain where a randomised 
group of young people might be more likely to debate social and political issues, but 
whether young people who might reasonably be expected to be predisposed to debate 
such issues would be more or less likely to do so via Facebook. 
 
89 It should also be noted that undergraduates were chosen because previous research had indicated 
that education was a factor in whether a person was more likely to talk about politics (Bennett et al, 




In common with their peers, the groups could also reasonably be expected to be 
comfortable in using and navigating social media, including Facebook, and therefore 
not likely to be discouraged from using it as a forum because of knowledge 
limitations. 
The final survey – number Four - was conducted with Games Design students at 
Staffordshire University and again invited by email from their award leader or tutor - 
34 students chose to participate. That survey took place in January 2015. This group 
was chosen to act as a control group because, while their age would suggest they 
would be as comfortable as the other students in using and navigating social media90, 
and they were at the same educational level (i.e. undergraduates) their choice of study 
would not reasonably suggest any particular interest in or engagement with the 
media, political or civic issues91. They were comparable to the other three student 
groups in all aspects except choice of study. 
Thus, a set of four survey groups were created on Qualtrics; including one formed 
as a combined group of the 84 Staffordshire University journalism students; 39 
Staffordshire University Humanities students and 96 Journalism students from other 
universities – the Journalism and Humanities survey group – a total of 217 responses. 
Survey results were looked at first as the combined Journalism and Humanities 
 
90 Ofcom’s 2014 ‘Adult’s Media use and Attitudes Report’ showed 96% of 16-24-year-olds are regular 
users of social media (an increase on 2013), and 98% of that figure were regular Facebook users. 
91 It is accepted that a student, or indeed any individual, may have an interest in political or civic issues 
regardless of their choice of study. None-the-less it was felt that both the choice of study and the 
subject matter taught on Journalism and Humanities courses meant it was reasonable to assume that 
more of those students would be predisposed towards interest in political and civic issues than students 




students group set against the control group results, and then as individual group 
surveys compared against each other. 
The combined Journalism and Humanities students group (hereafter called group 
JH) included a total of 215 completed survey responses after the removal of 
incomplete surveys.  Of the 215, 206 students said they currently had a Facebook 
account and of the nine respondents that said they did not have a Facebook account, 
seven had previously had one. The two who said they had had no involvement with 
Facebook were excluded from the rest of the survey.  
The students each completed the same survey (see Appendix 2), regardless of 
which student group they were in. Questions were banded into groups in order to 
determine their engagement with Facebook and the likelihood of them using 
Facebook as a platform on which to discuss political and social issues that concerned 
them. Thus, the first set of questions sought to identify the level of embeddedness of 
Facebook in their day-to-day life, with further sections on how engaged they were 
with social and political issues, and then how likely they were to discuss such issues 
on Facebook.  
Questions largely used a Likert scale approach, with each section stepping the 
respondent through increasing levels of thinking through their attitude towards 
posting material on Facebook. Thus, question four simply asked them to judge how 
much time they spent on Facebook each day, while question five asked them to think 
about the depth of their relationship to Facebook – from “I feel out of touch when I 





A quarter of the JH Facebook users said they spent between half-an-hour and an 
hour on Facebook each day, while almost as many - 24% - said they spent on average 
one to two hours a day on Facebook (Fig. 2). Fifty-two-percent agreed, and 32% 
strongly agreed, that Facebook is part of their everyday activity. However, the 
embeddedness of Facebook in their lives was not as complete as one might assume. 
While 49% of the JH group agreed or strongly agreed that they felt out of touch if 
they had not logged into their Facebook account for a while, almost as many - 46% - 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that they feel out of touch when away from 
Facebook. Moreover, 44% said they would not be sad if Facebook shut down, against 
40% who said they would be sad (15% answered “don’t know”).  
 
Figure 2: JH group response to question 4: “On average, approximately how many minutes per 





Figure 3: CG group (games students) response to question 4 
 
All 34 respondents in the control group of Games Design students said they 
currently had a Facebook account, with this group generally spending more time on 
Facebook - 46% said they spent between one and three-plus hours a day on the site, 
and 84% agreed or strongly agreed that Facebook was a part of their daily activity.  
This group was also more Facebook-active in other ways too - the majority (43%) 
said they belonged to six to 10 Groups on Facebook (against group JH with the 
largest cohort - 45% - belonging to just one to five Groups). Interestingly however, 
the Games Design group showed a similar ambivalence in relation to the importance 




Facebook for a while, and 38% said they would not be sad if Facebook shut down 
(however, 44% said they would be).92 
Both groups displayed a mature approach to managing and navigating their use of 
Facebook, agreeing that it was important to stay on top of their privacy settings (91% 
group JH; 79% control group), with 77% in group JH and 62% in the control group 
saying that the usefulness of Facebook was not enough to stop them worrying about 
how their data was being used by the company. In the control group, 38% of 
respondents agreed and 38% strongly agreed with the statement: “I don’t post 
anything on Facebook without thinking about who might see it”. Within the JH 
group, 43% agreed and 36% strongly agreed with that statement. 
Finally, in answer to whether they use Facebook more now than a year ago; 45% 
of group JH replied: “less now” and 41% said “about the same”. The control group 
had more active involvement (52% “about the same”, and 31% using it more often 
than a year ago). This may be a reflection of the smaller cohort (34 respondents in the 
control group against 215 in group JH), or a reflection of self-selection bias, with 
individuals having elected to take part in their survey on the basis of already having a 
more active interest in Facebook. 
The undergraduate status of the respondents was also reflected in the reasons they 
gave for using Facebook. While most (42% JH; 48% control) said they mainly used it 
to chat with or keep up with people they know, they also gave work-related reasons 
such as “professional contacts”; “group projects at university”; “work – marketing”; 
 




and promoting or organising events. For many of the students, their course or peers 
had set up Facebook groups in order to communicate course-related information or 
encourage peer-to-peer chat. 
The results across the first set of questions relating to use of and attitudes towards 
Facebook indicate a maturity of understanding about Facebook among all four 
student groups, in terms of its place in their everyday life; its usefulness vs its 
importance to them; and their willingness to actively manage their Facebook site 
around concerns about privacy and data use. 
The next set of questions looked at the students’ attitudes towards issues, politics 
and the media.  Question 11 (see Fig. 4) was particularly key to the research project 
in that it sought to ascertain their level of interest in issues and their pre-disposition 
towards debating politics and issues. Thus the question asked them to rate, between 
strongly disagree and strongly agree, whether they get upset about some of the things 
that are happening in the world and whether they are more interested in global issues 
than in national or local politics; whether they usually joined in when they heard 
people debating politics and whether they enjoyed debating serious issues. 
The question also tested media interest by asking the students whether their main 
source of news was the people they knew and how interested they were in watching 
the news on TV. The combined group of Journalism and Humanities students not 
surprisingly said that if the news comes on TV they usually find themselves watching 
it (41% agree, 27% strongly agree), with 20% disagreeing. The position was a little 
more mixed among the games design students - 28% said they would not watch the 
news if it came on TV, while 43% agreed and 14% strongly agreed that they would 




in the world”, the games designers appeared the more compassionate - 64% said they 
do (against 54% of the journalism and humanities students). A quarter of the games 
design and just over a third of journalism and humanities students said they did not 
get upset.  
Both group’s answers on questions about their interest in politics was more 
nuanced. Among group JH, 39% agreed that they were more interested in global 
issues, against 47% who said they were more interested in local or national politics 
(16% did not know). In the control group, 39% were more interested in global issues 
and 32% in local or national politics, with 29% “don’t know”. However, it must not 
be assumed that the don’t knows are an indication of apathy - it could just as easily 
reflect an “it depends” response, i.e. “it depends on the particular issue as to whether 
I am more interested in local, national or global politics”. Both groups said that what 
politicians had to say mattered to them. Of the statement: “I don’t feel that what the 
politicians have to say has anything to do with me”, 69% of the control group and 
55% of group JH disagreed (8% of group JH and 4% of the control group strongly 
agreed). 
The last two statements in the survey question 11 were designed to test the 
student’s interest in and willingness to debate issues. A majority in both groups 
expressed willingness to debate with 40% of group JH agreeing and 27% strongly 
agreeing that they really enjoyed taking part in a good debate about serious issues. In 
the control group, 54% agreed and 7% strongly agreed that they enjoy a good debate 
too. Asked whether they would usually join in when they hear people debating 




19% strongly agreed - that they would join in. While in the control group the 
response was split, 43% saying they would join in and 46% saying they would not.  
That reticence becomes more evident when the debate transfers to Facebook. In a 
later set of questions (Fig. 5), the groups were asked whether they tend to be wary in 
commenting on “serious” issues on Facebook. Among the Journalism and 
Humanities students, 56% agreed they are wary, along with 57% of the games design 
students.  Asked whether, if they were angry or upset about something in the news, 
would they would usually say something about it on Facebook, 70% of the 
Journalism and Humanities students and 71% of the games design students said they 







Figure 4: Screenshot of question 11 in the surveys 












Figure 5: Question 16 sought to test a student’s willingness to take action, via Facebook, in 





But while the majority of the students had expressed that they personally were 
unlikely to raise serious issues on Facebook, they were torn on whether they thought 
other people should be more willing to raise issues. With both groups split almost 




about serious things that are happening in the world”, and a similar split on whether 
to support a friend making a good point on a serious issue (Tables 1 and 2). 
Perhaps more encouraging is that both groups – JH and the control group – were 
clear that Facebook was not their main source of information. The statement “I find 
out about what’s going on in the world mostly through Facebook” was disagreed with 
by 61% of the respondents. 
This reluctance to use Facebook as a platform for serious issues was echoed in 
some of the responses sent in during the Stage Two data collection, with several 
screenshots of posts exhorting Friends to avoid Facebook on election day, and one 
journalism student commenting in an email response: 
A majority of my friends did not have anything to do with the election on 
their facebook. Only a couple of dozen posted anything throughout Friday 
[election day].  
What was interesting is that I was on Twitter and my friends who did not 
comment on Facebook, where [sic] commenting a lot more on Twitter. Using 
hashtags e.t.c. I was on Twitter more during wed-fri as I was live-blogging it 
and I saw a lot more commentary by my Twitter followers (Many of them 
also my friends on Facebook) than I did on Facebook.  
I spoke to some people and a lot of people on the 7th turned Facebook off 
effectively because they were fed up with the ‘I voted in GE2015’ statuses 











28 45 10 16 7
26.4% 42.5% 9.4% 15.1% 6.6%
42 36 10 70 29
22.5% 19.3% 5.3% 37.4% 15.5%
14 48 33 69 22
7.5% 25.8% 17.8% 37.1% 11.8%
14 64 38 53 18
7.5% 34.2% 20.3% 28.4% 9.6%
14 37 31 80 24
7.5% 19.9% 16.7% 43.0% 12.9%
25 41 17 81 23
13.4% 21.9% 9.1% 43.3% 12.3%
43 91 9 38 6
23.0% 48.7% 4.8% 20.3% 3.2%
7
I find out about what's going on in 
the world mostly through friends on 
Facebook.
4
We don't talk enough on Facebook 
about serious things that are 
happening in the world
5
I tend to be more wary about 
commenting on serious issues on 
Facebook.
6
I often feel I need to "dumb down" 
when I write stuff or comment on 
Facebook.
1
When I'm angry or upset about 
something in the news I'll usually say 
something about it on Facebook.
2
If a friend makes a good point on 
Facebook about a serious issue, I 
usually Like it or reply.
3
I think it's important to respond 
when someone asks a question on 
Facebook about something in the 
news.
 













13 7 4 3 1
46.4% 25.0% 14.3% 10.7% 3.6%
1 4 2 18 3
3.6% 14.3% 7.1% 64.3% 10.7%
3 8 7 8 2
10.7% 28.6% 25.0% 28.6% 7.1%
3 9 5 8 3
10.7% 32.1% 17.9% 28.6% 10.7%
1 6 5 13 3
3.6% 21.4% 17.9% 46.4% 10.7%
4 7 9 7 1
14.3% 25.0% 32.1% 25.0% 3.6%
7 11 2 8 0
25.0% 39.3% 7.1% 28.6% 0.0%
7
I find out about what's going on in 
the world mostly through friends on 
Facebook.
4
We don't talk enough on Facebook 
about serious things that are 
happening in the world
5
I tend to be more wary about 
commenting on serious issues on 
Facebook.
6
I often feel I need to "dumb down" 
when I write stuff or comment on 
Facebook.
1
When I'm angry or upset about 
somethingin the news I'll usually say 
something about it on Facebook.
2
If a friend makes a good point on 
Facebook about a serious issue, I 
usually Like it or reply.
3
I think it's important to respond 
when someone asks a question on 
Facebook about something in the 
news.
 
Table 2: Control Group answer breakdown to question 16 
 
 
The surveys had been conducted several months ahead of the 2015 general 




exposed to news about it. They were asked about their voting intentions with 64% of 
group JH and 61% of the control group saying they intended to vote. However, 32% 
of the control group and 13% of group JH were clear that they did not intend to vote, 
citing a variety of reasons, including:  
I feel I have more important things to think about 
 
I wouldn’t vote without knowing what I’m voting for, and I don’t have time 
to research 
 
Not really bothered 
 
I don’t feel I know enough about politics to make an informed enough vote 
Currently at a stage in my life where politics has little impact upon me 
Among the 23% of group JH who said they were not sure whether they would 
vote, most of the reasons given also related to lack of knowledge about the issues. 
For example: 
Policies are constantly changing in regards to issues I am concerned about - 
eg family issues, childcare etc. I would vote for the most confident and 
articulate leader. I voted Lib Dem in 2010 and therefore I am more cautious 
of making a rushed decision based on 1 or 2 policies 
 
Feel I don’t have a full enough understanding of each of the main parties’ 
campaigns 
 
I haven’t had a thorough look through policies as of yet. 
 
I like to see what my options are. As there is still months left, I am currently 





I want a strong effective centre left government to implement realistic policies 
for improvement. I don't know yet if the current Labour administration are 
capable of doing that. I might vote for the Green Party instead who represent 
things that I am passionate about and have more integrity than the mainstream 
parties. 
Of those who said they had already decided who to vote for, the results were 
markedly similar to the final election results. Of the JH set, 46% said they already 
knew who they would vote for, with 33% intending to vote Labour, 16% 
Conservative, just 4% Liberal Democrat, 31% Green party and 13% saying they 
intended to vote UKIP. Within the Control Group, albeit a smaller number set in 
comparison, 88% said they had already decided who they would vote for, with the 
majority (33%) saying they would vote Green Party, followed by Labour on 20%. 
According to Ipsos MORI,93 there had been a similar swing from Liberal 
Democrat and Conservative to Labour among 18 to 24 year-olds, with 43% of young 
people voting Labour in 2015 against 27% Conservative and just 5% for Liberal 
democrat. Analysts noted that the collapse in the Liberal Democrat vote share had 
been across the voting pool but fell sharpest among under 34s, which was seen as a 
reaction to the Liberal Democrats U-turn on tuition fees, and among private renters, 
who are the most likely to vote Green (Ipsos MORI). 
However, despite the expressed concern for issues that might matter most to 
them, young people did not turn out to vote in significantly greater numbers in 2015. 
The importance of the student vote in relation to the election predicted by analysts 
 
93 ‘How Britain voted in 2015’ Ipsos MORI news report: https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-




(Fisher and Hillman, 2014: 84), may have played its part in the loss of votes to the 
Liberal Democrats but it was not otherwise significant, with 43% of young people 
likely to have voted in 2015, against 44% in 2010.  
The collapse seen in the youth vote since the Millennium, from 60% in 1992 to 
around 40% in 2001, 2015, 2010 elections had continued into the 2015 General 
Election (Sloam, 2017). It was not until the Referendum on European Membership, a 
year later, that young people in the UK began turning out to vote in larger numbers. 
A survey by Populus (see Sloam, 2017) noted that 18-24 year-olds were more likely 
to vote in the 2017 election than they had been in 2015, with 57% saying a month 
before the 2017 election that they would vote compared to 46% in 2016 – the same 
figure as the JH students’ survey.  
A combination of disappointment with the EU Referendum result (around 
threequarters of young people voted to remain); the rise of Corbyn and the emergence 
of clearer ideological divisions between the Labour and Conservative parties had 
galvanised younger voters. All of which made it even more interesting to monitor 
changes between the 2015 and 2017 elections on Facebook in this research. 
Unfortunately, as noted on page 129, ethically and technically it had not proved 
possible to follow the same young people from the JH/CG surveys through the 2015 
election and the 2017 election. To be able to see material posted on their Facebook 
page by the survey respondent and their Friends would have required access to that 
student’s Facebook page. Privacy concerns meant that Facebook in 2015 (and much 
more so in 2017) was becoming more ‘locked down’ by for instance switching from 
the default ‘public’ setting which meant anyone could see anything a user posted on 




researcher was accepted as Friend by an individual, it was not possible to see much of 
the material posted.  
In addition, there are significant ethical concerns in asking a student to accept a 
lecturer (whether one of their teachers or not) as a Friend and giving them access to 
all discussions and posts on their Facebook page, including discussions with Friends 
who may also be students. Whilst the intention may be to only gather evidence of 
debate on political and social issues, all material posted over the research period – 
including conversations with people who are close to the individual – would be seen 
and logged. The voyeuristic element was a significant concern. 
Further, because such “watching” of conversations would not have been possible 
without the knowledge and agreement of the survey participant, the likelihood was 
that data would be compromised because the student would know that their Facebook 
conversations were being monitored and would consciously or subconsciously adjust 
what they said or did on their Page. 
Whilst several of the respondents said they would be willing to be contacted for 
follow-up surveys or activities, the decision was taken that follow-up material should 
be limited to screenshots of content they saw in their Facebook News Feed on 
election day and which they self-selected as interesting or typical posts around the 
election.  
The emphasis on young people and the link with students’ views in Stage One 
data collection was however followed through into the next stage in informing the 





4.2 Data stage two: The 2015 online ethnographic study 
The next stage of the research focused on the election itself and how individuals 
discussed the election, the issues and the candidates on Facebook. During the period 
April 27th to May 13th, over 50 hours were spent in closely observing the Facebook 
pages of candidates contesting four selected constituencies. This included following 
discussion threads and looking at the Facebook Profile pages of individuals involved 
in relevant discussions.  
While this was not 24/7 immersion in these online communities, in the classical 
ethnographic sense (Wolcott, 1995; Whitehead, 2005),94 it represented a substantial 
period of time spent in the ‘field’. On average three hours at a time was spent with 
each candidate’s Facebook page and discussion threads, before moving to the next 
candidate, and pages were visited at different times in the day and evening. Most 
days around six to seven hours was spent watching and noting activity on candidates’ 
pages, following comment threads, and looking at Profile pages of the commenters.  
None of the candidates or individuals thus “watched” were aware of the research – 
the researcher role was as non-participant, focused observer. 
In all, around 3,500 posts and comments were scanned in looking for evidence of 
political talk. Debates were monitored and recorded but also interrogated in relation 
 
94 In ‘Basic Classical Ethnographic Research Methods’ (2005), Whitehead argues that 24/7 
immersion is not necessary, or even practical, for fieldwork but that: “Spending long periods of time in 
the field is considered the crucial aspect of the classical ethnographer’s ability to comprehensively 





to how people began, continued or ended debate within social norms that might be 
specific to Facebook and its architecture. 
Finally, all the candidates who had been active on Facebook during the election 
were approached afterwards and invited to comment on their use of the social 
network. While only a handful responded and agreed to answer questions or be 
interviewed, this was none-the-less useful material. That low response also perhaps 
justified the earlier decision to abandon the politicians’ survey (see page 136). 
 
Four constituencies were selected for monitoring - Bristol West, Brighton 
Pavilion, Stoke-on-Trent Central, and Burton & Uttoxeter, selected for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, because the stage one data collection had focused on students, it was 
felt that youth element should be carried through to stage two data as far possible. 
Research published around the same time for HEPI, the Higher Education Policy 
Institute,95 (Fisher & Hillman, 2014) suggested that the student vote would be 
particularly important in the 2015 General Election. Thus, constituencies identified in 
the report as likely to be affected by the student vote became the starting point for 
selecting which constituencies to focus on.   
The Fisher and Hillman research had argued that students and young people, 
would turn their backs on the Liberal Democrats in favour of Labour as a result of 
tuition fees policies96, and that the resulting switch of votes could determine the 
 
95 http://www.hepi.ac.uk/2014/12/01/hepi-students-tip-balance-power-2015-election-long-register-
vote/ (accessed November 10, 2018). 
96 The Liberal Democrat Party had repeatedly promised to vote against rises in university tuition fees. 




outcome in around 10 constituencies – including Bristol West and Brighton Pavilion. 
That research suggested two constituencies would flip from Liberal Democrat to 
Labour (including Bristol West); two from Lib Dem to Conservative and six from 
Conservative to Labour. The prediction was part correct - the Conservatives held 
onto five of their six seats predicted to swing to Labour, with increased majorities, 
but the Liberal Democrats did see double-figure collapses in their share of the vote. 
The four constituencies were also selected to reflect potential voting intentions, 
with each one having been previously held by one of the four parties the student 
survey respondents had said they were most likely to vote for. In voting intention 
order: Labour - Stoke-on-Trent Central; Greens - Brighton Pavilion; Conservative - 
Burton-on-Trent; Lib Dems - Bristol West. There was also a convenience factor. 
Burton-on-Trent and Stoke-on-Trent, while they were not identified in the 
HEPI/Fisher/Hillman research as constituencies likely to be affected by the student 
vote, did have a location link to the researcher and it was assumed therefore that that 
may make it easier to be accepted as a Friend by those candidates and thus gain 
access to their Pages and content. 
Bristol West was one of the seats the HEPI report had predicted would swing 
away from the Liberal Democrats to Labour as a result of students voting for the 
party they felt would be most likely to support them. The Bristol West seat had been 
chosen for this research on the basis of that prediction - if students and young people 
are more likely to be users of Facebook, and they have more influence on a local 
 
tripling of tuition fees. That ‘broken promise’ was widely believed to have led to collapse in young 
people voting Liberal Democrat in 2015. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-19646731 and 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/12/nick-clegg-university-tuition-fees-norman-lamb 




result, candidates in that constituency might be expected to be more active in trying 
to engage with young voters via Facebook and other social media.  
However, that was not in evidence. None of the four constituencies looked at had 
all candidates using Facebook as part of their campaign. The one that came closest 
(with all but one candidate using Facebook to reach voters) was Burton and 
Uttoxeter, the constituency that had been chosen as the “control” because it did not 
have a particularly youthful demographic and was not identified as likely to be 
affected by changes in the youth vote. The higher Facebook activity in Burton and 
Uttoxeter must therefore have been for different reasons – perhaps the personal 
experience of candidates of Facebook and therefore being comfortable using it; or a 
response to the high Facebook activity of the incumbent MP Andrew Griffiths and a 
perceived need by his competitors to respond in kind97. 
There were two preliminary steps to beginning this stage of the research. First, 
researching whether each candidate had a Facebook Profile or Page – either personal, 
campaign or both. This took some time as the information was not readily available 
 
97 A potential area for future research would be to compare the active use of Facebook by an MP to 
their use of other communications media. Auel and Umit (2018) looked at take-up by MPs of the 
Communications Allowance and found that the MPs who spent most on communicating with their 
constituents were those who a) planned to stand for re-election, and b) represented urban and densely 
populated areas, and c) were active MPs (described as workhorses in the study) who attended more 
votes in Parliament and rarely rebelled against their Party. They argued that for an MP to invest the 
time in communicating with constituents (give that financial resources were made available through 
the Communications Allowance), it had to be in the interest of the MP to make that investment. Thus, 
MPs who most needed to signal trustworthiness to their constituents in order to be re-elected – those in 
marginal seats, or in urban areas with more fluid populations, or in junior roles – were more likely to 




for independent candidates or candidates from fringe parties. Such candidates also 
tended not to have administrative support or central services to call on which meant it 
was also difficult to find email addresses, contact details and, in several cases, 
initially difficult to even pin down who was standing. 
In total, 27 candidates stood for election across the four constituencies and 31 
Facebook Profiles and Pages were found that linked to them98. While this may sound 
promising, in fact only 13 candidates (48%) had personal campaign Profiles or Pages 
(or both). Rather than have their own campaign Pages, five candidates only used their 
local party campaign Pages for election posts (i.e. their posts grouped with other 
candidates in an area), and nine candidates - one third - did not use Facebook at all as 
part of their election campaign. 
In 2017 (the final data stage), there were fewer candidates standing – 21 across 
the four constituencies, but a higher percentage - 66% (14 candidates) had personal 
campaign Profiles or Pages. The lower number of candidates seemed to be a 
combination of parties deciding to make way for other candidates (UKIP stepping 
aside for the Conservatives in Burton & Uttoxeter and Bristol West; the Liberal 
Democrats deciding not to stand against Caroline Lucas in Brighton Pavilion), and 
perhaps smaller parties having insufficient funds to fight another election so soon 
after the 2015 General Election and the 2016 EU Referendum campaign. Indeed, two 
of the Green party candidates Followed – Adam Colcough (Stoke-on-Trent Central) 
and Simon Hales (Burton & Uttoxeter), were running Kickstarter campaigns to fund 
their election costs. 
 




What was interesting (and discussed further in the following chapter) is that all of 
the 2015 winning candidates, and three out of four of the second-placed candidates, 
were in that first group: i.e. candidates with active personal campaign pages on 
Facebook. That is, candidates who did best in the 2015 election in the four 
constituencies studied were the candidates who also – personally or through their 
agents - were most active on Facebook. For example, Andrew Griffiths (Burton and 
Uttoxeter): 
“On a day-to-day basis [Facebook] has become my primary way of 
communicating with people. I have a good team of supporters but as people’s 
interest in party politics wanes, the potential reach of social media is greater. 
There’s no way a campaign can reach people now through traditional leaflet 
drops but you can through social media.” (Interview with Griffiths, July 2015) 
Access to candidate pages was gained via a “clean”99 Facebook personal Profile 
(hereafter the Researcher Profile or RP), set up specifically for this research project 
and with no pre-existing Friend or Group links.  
In some cases, a request to Follow or Friend a candidate had to be made in order 
to see their campaign or personal Profile or Page where that Page had not been made 
Public.  Setting up a personal Profile page was important therefore not only to gain 
access to the candidate and material on his or her site, but in order to monitor whether 
Facebook’s architecture positively or negatively affected the Friends, Pages, 
 
99 In that there was no pre-existing Facebook site or Profile; no Friends or Groups already attached, 
and information limited to geography (location of where I lived and where I worked), but not my job 
or interests, and no indication of political affiliation. In 2017 however, the Profile did include some 
political information in order to test whether this made a difference to candidate Friend response. In 





Comments and news prioritised in a Feed, as an indicator of how Facebook’s 
algorithm may be operating to deliver content to a user’s News Feed.  
Facebook Pages100 were monitored in a structured way with ethnographic (or 
netnographic - Kozinets, 2002) data collected in field notes for each constituency, 
detailing what content was showing on arrival at the Researcher Profile (i.e. what 
Facebook’s architecture selected to show101) and what was showing on each 
candidate’s site.  
The 20 most recent posts made by each candidate were logged as either local 
campaign (LC); national campaign (NC); local news (LN); national news (NN), or 
unrelated to the campaign. The number of Likes, Followers or Friends each site had 
accrued was noted, as was how many Likes, Shares or Comments each post had 
attracted at that point (updating these figures in subsequent days if they changed 
markedly). 
Comments on posts and in timelines were opened and scanned (in the case of 
Caroline Lucas, Brighton Pavilion, this was often in the hundreds of Comments) 
looking for debate, or invitations to debate issues, and for questions directed at the 
candidate from citizens. Where any of these were found, the personal Facebook 
 
100 For convenience, the term Facebook page is being used to collectively refer to Profiles, Pages or 
Groups belonging to candidates, political parties or groups, and to individual users, including the 
researcher. 
101 The issue of how Facebook selects what content to show each user, out of a possible 1,500 items, 
has been the subject of controversy and is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. (See: “The 
filtered Feed Problem”: http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/03/the-filtered-feed-problem. Accessed 




Profiles of the individuals involved were investigated for further evidence of interest 
in politics and/or in debating political issues.  
In around half of these cases102, the individual’s privacy settings prevented access 
to all or most of their posts. Where an individual had not changed their privacy 
settings, their site was treated as if public and the last 20 posts scanned for political 
content or debate. In addition, the list of Groups the individual had joined and Pages 
they had Liked were scanned for evidence of ongoing interest in political or social 
issues.  
Detailed field notes were made, jointly collecting, comparing and analysing data 
(Glaser, 1965, 1967), and screenshots of particularly interesting posts or discussions 
were taken and saved. Overall, 170 such screenshots were saved for further analysis. 
In defining categories against which to compare data (the Facebook posts and 
comments) other research studies that had categorised content against political talk, 
in particular the work of Jackson et al (2013) and Graham et al (2015), Gerhards & 
Schafer (2010)103 and Schudson (1997) were used. Schudson’s definition of political 
talk as essentially public, problem-solving, reasoned and reasonable became a key 
definition: 
…democratic conversation is conversation not among intimates nor among 
 
102 By 2017, this had increased to the majority of Profiles, reflecting a change in Facebook’s 
architecture to encourage privacy controls; in itself a response to criticism of Facebook’s prior default 
‘public’ setting. 
103 Gerhards and Schafer used one topical subject of content – human genome research – to compare 
old and new media in relation to Habermas’ concept of an open public sphere for debate. Using 
quantitative content analysis methodology, they coded content into 85 elements: “ideal-type 




strangers but among citizens who are acquainted by virtue of their citizenship.... 
Democratic conversation.... is a facility of public communication under norms 
of public reasonableness, not simply a facility of social interaction. (1997:306) 
That concept of public reasonableness, of conversation aiming at communication 
rather than of oratory or soapboxing was core to assessing whether debate was 
happening and whether that debate was representative of a Habermasian public 
sphere. 
While Jackson’s work (2013, 2015) sought to discover political talk within 
everyday conversation, the target for this research was places where political talk was 
likely (i.e. on candidate campaign pages in the days before a general election) in 
order to determine whether, given all these positives – shared interests, network links, 
public political spaces – political talk would be supported and encouraged by being 
on Facebook. Jackson was looking for evidence of political talk within everyday 
conversations at a non-election time, this research went further in looking for 
evidence of political discourse that led to, or invited, reasoned, public debate.  
Just as the survey had selected young people who might be expected to be more 
likely to engage in political debate, so public spaces within Facebook were selected 
on the basis that political debate might be more likely among people defined by 
Schudson (1997) as “acquainted by virtue of their citizenship”, or by Eliasoph (1996) 
as the sociable “civic practices” whereby citizens create context and etiquette to 




While Zhang et al (2010) had found reliance on social network sites encouraged 
civic participation but not political participation104, they (and before them Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, Eliasoph, and others) found that one-to-one discussion did encourage 
political action. The issue then becomes not the effect of Facebook’s loose ties and 
bridging capital on political engagement, but Facebook’s effect on interpersonal 
communication and bonding capital in encouraging political and civic engagement.  
In short, if millions of people are choosing to interact through Facebook and more 
interpersonal interaction is taking place as a result by a combination of scale and 
Facebook’s cultural architecture, it would be reasonably to expect that interaction to 
include political discussion to a similar level and extent as in the offline world. The 
question then becomes one of whether Facebook is enabling such discussion and 
whether, because of scale or by virtue of Facebook’s unique corporate cultural and 




4.3 The search for enabled political talk  
Returning to both Schudson and Habermas, what this research sought to 
identify was evidence of political talk that was public, participatory and reasoned 
 
104 The researchers defined civic participation as activities that address community concerns through 
non-governmental or non-electoral means such as through voluntary or community work. Whereas 
political participation was activities aimed at directly or indirectly influencing the selection of elected 




debate rather than oratory; that circulated ideas or information with the aim of 
helping form opinions; that was indicative of a process of opinion formation of pre-
voting democracy (Jacobs, Cook & Carpini (2009); Chambers, 2003). The task 
therefore was to code content in ways which would distinguish between political talk 
that invited debate and talk that was simply opinion sharing or airing105. 
The starting point was to code each candidate’s Facebook page on the basis of 
how public it was – i.e. how easy it would be for any Facebook user to see the 
content. Candidate pages were coded across three levels from Level One open-public: 
no action or only minimal action in the form of Follow the page necessary to see 
content; Level Two monitored-public wherein content is only available to Friends but 
the Friend request is easily accepted106; Level Three - not public; either clearly a 
private, personal page unrelated to their candidacy, or researcher’s Friend request is 
rejected or ignored107. 
 
105 It is acknowledged that the sharing of well-argued opinions can also influence the reader and may 
also affect political actions. However, for the purpose of this research, a stricter focus on the idea of 
discussion, deliberation and reasoned debate – as argued in the literature review - was adhered to.  
106 The ‘test’ being whether a Friend request to a candidate was accepted within 72-hours, based on the 
candidate having no information about the researcher other than where I lived and worked. For three 
of the constituencies studied, this would make clear the researcher was not a local voter. In all cases 
there were no pre-existing personal links with the candidate or prior engagement with them on social 
media. Because the Researcher Profile (RP) was set up as a new Facebook account, the RP also 
showed no Facebook Friends and, until candidates began accepting Friends requests from the RP, no 
Friends in common. The candidate would have no reason to accept the researcher as a Friend unless 
they had an open-to-most-of-the-public policy on accepting Friend requests. 
107 However, it may be the case that requests were ignored because the researcher was not seen (by the 
Profile) as an obvious supporter of that candidate or Party and/or was not living in the constituency, 
and thus of no interest to the candidate and their agents. During the 2017 research, I sought to make 
my position more obvious by posting information about the research on the page and adding a picture 
of me engaging in political action in order to assess whether that influenced which candidates accepted 




The assumption was that the majority of content on a candidate’s Page was likely 
to be circulating political ideas and/or information, but it was also important to 
consider whether the “local-ness” of that content was a factor in engaging Followers 
and Friends and in encouraging debate – an issue that was tested further in the 2017 
data collection stage. 
In addition, the level of participation by citizens in a candidate’s page was 
assessed in terms of actions taken by visitors in the form of Likes, Shares or 
Comments. Wherever possible, comments participating in or instigating debate were 
investigated further in order to assess whether they were made by local or non-local 
citizens, or by party workers or activists – that is, links were followed through to the 
commenter’s own Facebook page and, if visible, to Groups they supported or other 
material they had posted. 
Finally, comments posted by Followers/Friends on a candidate’s page were coded 
according to whether they seemed to invite participation in political debate or 
information sharing, and whether comments were expressed as reasoned and 
reasonable debate, i.e.  was this simply oratory or was it a public invitation to debate?  
Comments were thus coded as O, D or S. S being comments that only expressed 
support for the candidate, or added their agreement to a comment made by someone 
else; O being comments that were oratory with the commenter simply wanting to 
have their say or make their point rather than invite debate or ask a question 
(Schudson’s “declarative views” (1997: 300)). While D were comments which were 
either couched in terms that invited debate or asked a relevant and reasonable 
question in the expectation of a response, or which led to a debate. O and S 




of political conversation. 
In all, around 3,500 comments and posts were read and among these, around 170 
threads (5%) showed evidence of reasoned debate. Of the rest, the majority were S - 
people positively expressing support for the candidate or for comments another 
contributor had made. It was also noted that O - oratory - was more common on the 
UKIP Pages looked at; that D - debate - was more common on the Green candidate 
Pages; and S - support - more common on the Conservative Pages.  
In many cases, comments had elements of S and O and a judgment had to be 
made on which code primarily applied. The conversation pictured at Fig. 6 was one 
such example, as described in the excerpt below from the Field Log of 28 April, 
2015, noted at 5.30pm on Brighton Pavilion UKIP candidate Nigel Carter’s page 
(Level One open-public): 
Both commenters [Brigitte108 and Margaret] shared UKIP and other 
campaigns on their own FB [Facebook] feeds. Brigitte posts comments on 
several other posts, usually is only one commenting. The mention of her case 
being “so very wrong” could be seen as an invitation (i.e. to ask her what was 
wrong about her case) but I felt it was not a direct enough invitation to count 
this comment as D. Similarly, while both comments are supporting the party, 
 
108 The thesis acknowledges the recommendations of the Association for Internet Researchers 
(https://aoir.org/ethics) in choosing to add a level of anonymity to individuals, despite those 
individuals having commented or posted on a public Facebook page, acknowledging that: “People may 
operate in public spaces but maintain strong perceptions or expectations of privacy” (2012:6). 
Balancing the need to indicate who was being quoted in respect of flow of conversation and the gender 
of each speaker with that potential expectation of privacy, the decision was taken to use only first 
names (or chosen first names) from posts/comments. This is also the case in the screenshots of actual 




they do not relate directly to each other or the news story. Both comments 
therefore classed as O 
By contrast, an earlier thread from Brighton & Hove UKIP’s campaign page (see 
below) began as O – oratory (Fig. 7), but was eventually counted as D - debate – 
(Fig. 8) because participants’ comments related directly to the issue being discussed 
(UKIP’s manifesto pledge on animal welfare) and, while there was grandstanding, 
participants did engage in conversation in a reasonable way and appear to invite 
debate by asking questions. From the Field Log notes of 28 April, 2015: 
Overall, I counted this thread as D - debate - for these reasons: most of the 
comments directly related to the original post (a meme about UKIP’s animal 
welfare policy); several commenters either responded directly to another 
commenter or invited a response with a question (eg the exchange between 
David and Gillian).  
This exchange demonstrates not only the difficulty in making an assessment of 
whether online conversation is debate, but of dealing with conversations which – 
because of architecture or culture – tend towards discursive rather than deliberative. 








Figure 6: Screenshot of the conversation between Brigitte and Margaret 
 
 






Figure 8: When comments from non-UKIP supporters were noted, the conversation code was 
changed to D - debate 
Alongside the detailed analysis of conversations and debates outlined in the next 
chapter, this stage two data collection showed the following in relation to candidate 
activity. 
1. The candidates most actively personally109 using Facebook to engage with local 
voters in each constituency were: 
Brighton Pavilion: Caroline Lucas (Green) 
Bristol West: Stephen Williams (Liberal Democrat) and Thangam Debbonaire 
(Labour)  
Burton & Uttoxeter: Andrew Griffiths (Conservative) 
 
109 Candidates responding directly to comments or participating in debates on their Facebook page (or 




Stoke on Trent Central: Ali Majid (Cannabis Party) 
2. The most popular candidate pages in each constituency in terms of volume of 
Likes or Friends: 
Brighton Pavilion: Caroline Lucas (Green) 
Bristol West: Stephen Williams (Lib Dem)110  
Burton & Uttoxeter: Andrew Griffiths (Conservative) (on Personal campaign 
page111) 
Stoke on Trent Central: Tristram Hunt (Labour) 
3. The candidate pages showing most activity (engagement) from site 
visitors in each constituency: 
Brighton Pavilion: Caroline Lucas (Green) 
Bristol West: Darren Hall (Green)112 
Burton & Uttoxeter: Andrew Griffiths (Conservative) 
Stoke on Trent Central: Tristram Hunt (Labour) 
 
110 However, the volume of Likes for Williams stayed relatively constant at around 200, whereas other 
candidates showed evidence of growing support - eg Debbonaire going from 955 to 1,086 Likes and 
Hall from 1,651 to 1,879 during the 16 days their sites were studied. It should also be noted that 
Independent candidate Dawn Parry had 1,911 Friends on her closed to the public Facebook profile and 
attracted just 204 votes (0.3%). 
111 Griffiths actively ran two pages - his personal profile and his campaign page. The campaign page 
had a top figure of 3,280 Likes during the research period, while his personal page had 1,742 Friends. 
112 Activity in the form of Likes, Shares and Comments on posts was generally two or three times that 




4. The candidate pages in each constituency showing most activity from 
site visitors who also appeared to be local voters113: 
Brighton Pavilion: Caroline Lucas (Green) 
Bristol West: Darren Hall (Green) and Thangam Debbonaire (Labour) 
Burton & Uttoxeter: Andrew Griffiths (Conservative) (on Personal 
profile page) 
Stoke on Trent Central: Ali Majid (Cannabis Party) and Paul 
Toussaint (Ubuntu Party)114 
5. Candidate Facebook pages in each constituency showing with debate (D 
content): 
Brighton Pavilion: Caroline Lucas (Green) 
Bristol West: Stephen Hall (Lib Dem) and Thangam Debbonaire (Labour)115 
Burton & Uttoxeter: Andrew Griffiths (Conservative) (on Personal profile 
page) 
Stoke on Trent Central: Paul Toussaint (Ubuntu Party)116 
In Bristol West, the three frontrunners for the student vote - Labour, Green Party 
and Liberal Democrat candidates, were using Facebook (three out of the seven 
 
113 However, in many cases it was not possible to see enough information on a user’s personal 
Facebook page to be able to work out whether they lived in the constituency. These figures therefore 
reflect those users commenting on or Liking posts on candidate pages that could be determine as 
definitely local, measured against those as definitely not local. 
114 On numbers, Hunt was highest but the percentage of people from Stoke-on-Trent Liking or 
commenting on posts on his site was low - around 20% of all activity. 
115 While Darren Hall had the most activity in terms of comments, the majority were S - supportive. 
116 However, it was a particularly poor field in Stoke-on-Trent with so few of the candidates (three out 
of eight) actively using Facebook. It must also be noted that, because Majid and Toussaint (unlike 




candidates). Brighton Pavilion also had three out of seven candidates using Facebook 
for their campaign (Green, Labour and UKIP), while Stoke-on-Trent Central, despite 
having a university in the constituency, had the lowest ratio with three out of eight 
candidates using Facebook and only one of the three from a mainstream party 
represented in parliament (Labour - Hunt). 
Nor were the concerns of young people - and students in particular - a particular 
factor in the debates. Only a handful of posts seen appeared to be from, or about, 
students. On the candidate sites that had the most active users (Griffiths, Lucas, Hall, 
Hunt) there did seem to be evidence that people in their 30s were more likely to 
comment, however the issues they discussed were wide-ranging (i.e. not specifically 
student or youth orientated) and only one instance was seen of debate about tuition 
fees - that on Williams’ page (Bristol West, Lib Dem) (figs. 7 and 8). 
That discussion was interesting. Sparked by a post from Williams linking to a 
feature from a student writing about why students should vote Lib Dem, it involved 
three protagonists none of who were local voters according to information on their 
own Facebook profile. 
What is also interesting is that the only woman in the three stepped out of the 
debate at an early stage. Her point: “Labour introduced tuition fees, Torys [sic] were 
only prevented from unlimited tuition fees by the Lib Dems and the Greens are lucky 
if they get one MP, so the option is??” isn’t directly responded to. In fact, Kevin’s 
“Alas Nardia” reply and swift return to his own point about why students should not 
vote Liberal Democrat undermines her and dismisses her question. The two men then 
continue the discussion, albeit with little debate on the issue, more attempts to argue 





Figure 9: The three protagonists in the student fees discussion 
 
 




The issue of people coming together to debate, or perhaps to look for debate, on a 
page belonging to a candidate they were not able to vote for was something seen 
often during this research and is dealt with in more detail in the next chapter. 
The debate thread is also an example of how “public reasonableness” is 
demonstrated in choice of language and willingness to reply to the point being made. 
There is civility in the language (“You can’t make any argument for the Tories I’m 
afraid mate” – Kevin, Fig. 9), even when civility is edged with sarcasm: “Well you 
have your view mate and I have mine and never the twain shall meet.” The blokey 
use of “mate” is an invitation to talk and a signal that no offence is intended but can 
also be sarcastic as in ‘you will never actually be my mate as long as you hold 
opposing views to me’. 
The conversation between Kevin and fellow protagonist Mark showed further 
evidence of this civility through their willingness to respond directly to the point each 
was making. Holding opposing views on increases in tuition fees, they none-the-less 
manage to discuss the issue without becoming argumentative. Mark’s misuse of the 
ellipsis at the end of posts (“student financing…”, “in the future…”) could be read as 
an encouragement to Kevin to follow on with a point of his own, to continue the 
unfinished thought thread - which he does. For example 
Mark: Voting labour as a student simply doesn’t make sense at all – you can 
make an argument for the other parties…sort of… 
 
Kevin: You can’t make any argument for the Tories I’m afraid mate. Labour 




unjustifiable and if you support that policy mate then I’m afraid mark I 
couldn’t possible agree [continues] 
Mark and Kevin were not people looking for an argument; they were people on 
opposite sides of the political fence but “acquainted by virtue of their citizenship” 
and, whether they actually hoped to change each other’s mind through their 
reasoning, they were willing to engage in reasoned debate. The language, the use of 
“mate” and addressing each other by their names – all of these signaled a willingness 
to debate and, alongside use of other social language (including more specifically 
social media emojis and ‘LOLs’117) were devices seen in use time and again during 
the field work.  
The ways in which debaters used language to signal their willingness to debate is 
dealt with in more detail in the next chapter, but the use of “irony, personal narrative, 
aesthetic interventions, theatricality and visibility” had been identified by Kohn 
(2000:425) as indicative of discursive, rather than deliberative democracy and as 
more reflective of real-world political talk than Habermasian bourgeoise debate 
ideals or the deliberationists – the champions of deliberative democracy – of the 
1990s and early 2000s.118 
 
117 LOL (short for laugh out loud) is also an example of language that has migrated from text and short 
messaging systems (SMS) into written speech, particularly on social media. As an area for future 
research, the ways in which emojis and acronyms such as LOL are used in social media 
communication is interesting. This ‘text speak’ moving into posts on Facebook and other social media 
may help in creating a comfortable participatory space. By giving permission to use language which is 
less elitist, more inclusive; signifying that using the correct spelling and grammar is not important, 
what matters most is the sentiment. They represent a personalisation of language. 
118 Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini (2009) provide a succinct summary of the flowering of deliberative 




Another reference to tuition fees was seen in screenshots of material on election 
day sent in by volunteers but did not include any debate. The self-selected nature of 
the material sent by the volunteers also made it difficult to see the context of the 
comments from Andrew and Rob (figs. 11 and 12) in arguing that the Liberal 
Democrats had been “tarnished” by their tuition fees U-turn, despite the Party having 
done “good work” and a “decent job”. 
The final set of 2015 data used to inform the research was the material submitted 
by 15 Facebook users from within the target “more likely to be engaged with 
politics” group. This consisted of screenshots, such as figures 11 and 12, from their 
personal News Feeds of comments and conversations that took place on election day. 
Because this material was self-collected and to an unknown degree self-selected,119 
and because it was sent in after the event, it was not possible to follow debates or 
gather information about the debaters in the same way as in the fieldwork. None-the-
less, the screenshots did help in reinforcing observations about language used, gender 
and age differences in how debates are conducted. For example, the exchange below, 
submitted as screenshots by a woman in West Yorkshire, between two other women 
in response to a news story about David Cameron’s positive election Exit Polls: 
 
saw citizen deliberation as a process of elevating citizen political understanding, citizen power, and 
partnerships between citizens and officials to deliver improved accountability and shared governance. 
119 They were given a brief by email which asked them to check into their Facebook account on May 
6, 7, and 8, 2015 (the election was May 7) and if they saw any election or politics-related 
conversations in their timeline on those days, to screenshot the thread and email it back. They were 
told that it did not matter who was posting or commenting, but that what was being looked for is 




Tracy: Dan has just had a meltdown after seeing the final count when he got 
in from school…cheers Cameron you absolute arse! Now you have got an 8 
year old boy worrying about the NHS…[Fist punch emoji] 
Louise: I’m seriously worried about the NHS…He’s not alone [Sad emoji] 
xxx 
Tracy’s anger is real, but she ameliorates it with the use of the emoji and the 
displacement to her son. Note also how Louise’s response to her Facebook Friend is 
thoroughly supportive of the political comment. Not only agreeing with the sentiment 
but supporting Tracy as a mother (your son is “not alone” in being upset) and 
wrapping up the post with an emoji and kisses. As noted several times in this thesis, 
women were much more likely to offer personal support120 and to respond to what 
was actually said (they “listened” more), and to signal that support through the use of 
emojis, kisses and emollient language. 
 
120 Jackson et al (2015) noted a similarly supportive discursive culture in the “less macho” public 






Figure 11: Start of conversation (note: Facebook mobile phone view) 
 
 




The interviews conducted with candidates after the election result were also 
helpful in understanding what they or their team had set out to achieve in terms of 
reaching potential local voters through Facebook, and gave some insight into their 
viewpoint, as participants in the public sphere, on political debate on Facebook. From 
Andrew Griffiths (Conservative, Burton & Uttoxeter) who spoke about Facebook 
becoming an “integral part” of his campaign in 2015, to Darren Hall (Labour, Bristol 
West) who used a mix of campaign volunteers and, in the last few weeks an 
experienced social media expert, in a social media campaign designed to be 
“upbeat…engaging and provocative”, and Mike Green (UKIP, Staffordshire) who 
saw social media as “like screaming in a vacuum” but none-the-less a “powerful 
tool” for the future that he actively engaged in. 
 
4.5 Data stage three: The 2017 intervention 
On April 18, 2017, Theresa May called a General Election – a so-called “snap” 
election in that it was to happen earlier than expected (a General Election was not due 
until 2020) and with no procedural need to call an election. She did so for political 
reasons, as was widely reported at the time, to capitalise on what was perceived as a 
weak Labour Party in opposition and, according to Theresa May121, to counter 
“division in Westminster” causing “damaging uncertainty and instability to the 
country” and to Brexit negotiations. The date set for that snap election was June 8, 
2017. 
 
121 Full announcement speech by Theresa May on the BBC website https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-




The result of the election is part of history, with Theresa May and the 
Conservative party losing 13 seats against their pre-election total and having to 
negotiate a deal with Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party in order to 
maintain a parliamentary voting majority sufficient to stay in power. The longer-term 
result, in relation to negotiating Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union; 
Theresa May’s longevity as Prime Minister, and the strengthening of the Labour 
parliamentary base, is still being played out as this thesis is being written. 
However, the announcement of the June 2017 election provided an opportunity to 
gather more data in relation to this thesis and a number of steps were taken in order to 
determine what form that additional data might take. 
The first step was to resurrect the Facebook account used for the 2015 election 
online ethnographic research and to clarify which, if any, of the candidates in 
constituencies studied in 2015 were also standing in 2017 and whether they were 
using the same Facebook candidate pages. There had been significant changes. One 
2015 candidate had died122; one had resigned soon after being re-elected MP123; 
thirteen new candidates were standing in the constituencies against three MPs elected 
in 2015; and a number of candidates from fringe parties had decided not to stand 
again. In addition, UKIP had decided not to field candidates in all constituencies, 
with the Party saying at the time that the decision was taken to assist Conservative 
 
122 David MacDonald, Liberal Democrat candidate for Burton on Trent & Uttoxeter, died suddenly, a 
few months after the 2015 election: http://www.burtonmail.co.uk/tributes-paid-future-star-liberal-
democrat-party/story-27559643-detail/story.html  
123 Tristram Hunt (Labour) had retained his seat in Stoke-on-Trent, then resigned as an MP, forcing a 
by-election in 2016 (heavily contested by UKIP’s Paul Nuttall) and re-won by Gareth Snell for Labour 




candidates. Consequently, there was no UKIP candidate in 2017 in two of the four 
constituencies studied – Burton & Uttoxeter and Bristol West.  
There had also been changes within Facebook which had affected both the look 
and feel – the experience – of the content delivered, and the way its algorithms 
assessed users and the links between users. For example, the excerpt below from the 
Field Log of April 20, 2017, and the screenshot (Fig. 13) taken at the time. 
I noticed that FB’s understanding of who I am had changed markedly. Whilst 
previously it showed me pictures of [my] Staffs uni students, this time it also 
showed me pictures of former, non-uni colleagues – in particular Saima Mir, a 
journalist I worked with at the Bradford T&A [Telegraph & Argus 
newspaper]. Whilst it was nice to see her … I was a bit taken aback – I had a 
different name then and my FB profile includes no mention of Bradford or the 
T&A (actually my profile is deliberately empty – it doesn’t even say where I 
live), so where did FB gather that information from – and within minutes of 
my logging in for the first time in two years?? It also showed me friends I 
hadn’t seen in years (Jane Arnold) and current friends (Margaret Taylor), and 
current colleagues and friends (Jo Goodall). I did wonder whether this was 





Figure 13: Screenshot of resurrected RP Page, taken April 20th, 2017 
 
 





By contrast, the RP from 27th April, 2015 (Fig. 14) shows a Facebook less able to 
make those links – none of the suggested “People you may know” were known. The 
associative link appeared to be only through Facebook’s algorithmic assessment of 
possible mutual friends on Facebook itself, rather than – as in 2017 – looking for 
clues in material posted across the web. Because, to make the link with current or 
previous workplaces, Facebook would need to be doing the equivalent of a Google 
search on the user’s name (to bring up information posted to LinkedIn, blogs, etc,) 
and/or – as suggested in the Field Notes – draw in all the people who might have 
searched for that user on Facebook in the past. 
Note also how the 2015 Profile page is more focused on content – Trending 
News, the News Feed, the lists of suggested groups etc. While the 2017 Profile page 
focuses the user on adding more connections, and thus more weak tie links. 
As well as those design changes, Facebook had also made significant changes to 
its News Feed algorithms in 2016, announcing124 (in response to criticism) plans to 
do a “better job of filtering out false information or clickbait” 
Facebook had also tightened its privacy procedures by removing the default 
“public” setting for personal pages and posts, in part in response to growing criticism 
of the site in the intervening two years. And the company had introduced additional 
 
124 In a blog post to mark the 10th anniversary of News Feed (6 September, 2016) Zuckerberg 
responded to criticism about the volume of “fake” news and information, including from partisan 
political actors, and the role of Facebook in creating “filter bubbles” of ideas (see page 69) by quoting 
research from Pew to argue that people were exposed to a larger and more diverse set of opinions 
because of social media, but none-the-less the company would work harder to filter out false material 




emoji-responses (not emoticons125): as well as the thumbs up to Like a post or 
comment, there was now a heart (“love”), laughing face (“Ha Ha”), angry face, and a 
thumbs down.  
Issues around so-called “fake” news were beginning to emerge, as were concerns 
around the way political and governmental agencies had been able to “game” the 
algorithms to deliver false or polarised political content to users, potentially affecting 
voting behaviours in both the US and UK (an issue returned to in the next chapter). 
The result of all this change, in particular the tightening of privacy controls, made 
it much more difficult in 2017 to monitor users and to follow conversations out from 
a candidate’s page onto the commenter’s page. Facebook had become even more 
locked down as a data resource. In addition, because the majority of candidates in the 
four constituencies studied were new, many of them either had no candidate page on 
Facebook or had pages that had only recently been set up and consequently there was 
very little activity to see. By May 2017, it had been possible to Follow or Friend only 
a handful of candidates. Only four individuals had accepted a Friend request, and it 
had been possible to Follow just eight candidates’ official Pages (from 21 candidates 
standing across the four constituencies). It had become clear that the approach to 
 
125 Although both emoji and emoticon are often used interchangeably to describe the little icons 
(emotion icons – emoticon) added to emails and messages, according to Encyclopaedia Britannica 
there is a difference. Emoticons are the older form – the letters, numbers and punctuation marks found 
on keyboards and used to create, for example the sideways winking or smiling face added to an email. 
While emojis are the more recent invention (1999, by Shigetaka Kurita) and are complete pictographs 
(i.e. rather than keyboard characters) to signify particular emotional responses. Emojis are Unicode 
creations which enables them to be shared across different formats, including whether the Facebook 




data-gathering that had been used in 2015 may not be possible or relevant in the 
Facebook of 2017.  
As has been noted, scrutiny of how Facebook selects content to show a user has 
become a developing area of research - both for academics and for news 
organisations seeking to reach their audience on Facebook. While working on this 
study, I had also been involved in other research126 which had included interviewing 
news organisations about how they reach an audience which increasingly accesses its 
news and information via social media. That project noted that whether a story or 
piece of content is seen by a user depends on Facebook’s own algorithms – their 
understanding of what content might interest that user, based on knowing who they 
are (demographics); what they appear to be interested in (Liked, shared and time 
spent with a piece of content); what Friends of that user appear to be interested in; 
and of course, the advertisers seeking to reach that user.  
There is no guarantee for the news or information provider that any particular 
Post will make it into a particular Facebook user’s News Feed. Constantly 
tweaked algorithms select what Facebook believes will most interest each 
user – from Posts by favoured Friends to news stories more of your Friends 
have shared, to paid-for content Facebook believes is more likely to be 
relevant to you. It prioritises “engagement” – content that will keep you 
coming back and spending more of your time in Facebook. Because if the 
algorithm can’t do that; if it keeps showing content you’re not interested in or 
Posts from people you don’t care about, you’ll visit Facebook less often. 
(Greenwood, 2018) 
 
126 The research was published as a book: ‘Future Journalism: Where we are and where we’re going’ 
(2017, Routledge) investigating and analysing where journalism has come from, where it is now and 
where it might going in the future, through a range of case studies and interviews with individuals and 




This had already emerged in 2015 when, in Field Logs of the time spent gathering 
data on Facebook, (see section 5.6.1) a mismatch was frequently noted between the 
content that would appear at the top of the News Feed and the content that 
Facebook’s algorithms should have recognised as being of more interest.  
This issue of what content is prioritised in a user’s News Feed, as the next chapter 
explores further, became even more relevant in 2017 as Facebook’s place in both 
Russian government-backed “trolling” and accusations of Cambridge Analytica-led 
“data farming” began to come under investigation. In the period between the 2015 
and 2017 elections, the company had come under increasing criticism because of the 
way its algorithms may, or may not, have influenced voters in both the UK and US 
elections.  
Taking these changes into account: Facebook’s changing algorithms and tighter 
privacy controls; the number of new candidates with “young” Facebook accounts and 
the low number of candidates giving RP access to their campaign page, it no longer 
made sense to follow the same data-gathering pattern as in 2015.   
 
Coincidentally, an opportunity had arisen to become directly involved in a 
candidate’s page and to produce content for it. This created a scenario for direct 
intervention to look at whether feeding particular political content into News Feeds 
could influence political actions – analogous with the projects by Adam Kramer 
(2010, 2014) and his team at Facebook in testing the effects of exposing Facebook 




• Creating a number of political posts targeted at voters in the Burton-
on-Trent & Uttoxeter and posted to the (new) Labour candidate’s 
Facebook Page127;  
• using Facebook paid advertising tools to “Boost” some posts in order 
to reach voters who had not supported the candidate’s Page (i.e. had 
no Facebook link to the candidate);  
• monitoring the effect of the Page administrators’ active engagement 
with people posting comments on the candidate’s Page. 
In total, 23 posts were written and added to John McKiernan’s candidate Page 
(Labour, Burton-on-Trent & Uttoxeter) between May 28th and June 7th, 2017, with 
the majority of the June posts Boosted128, plus comments, stats and discussion on the 
 
127 Disclosure: It must be noted that I had joined the Labour Party in 2016 and was a voter at the 2017 
election in this constituency. My decision to volunteer to write this content for my local Labour Party 
candidate was driven by a personal desire to see Labour win more votes in the constituency, as well as 
by my interest as a researcher in monitoring the effect of this content on Facebook users who saw it. It 
should also be noted that my husband also became involved in the campaign at the same time and was 
one of the four page administrators and took a key role within that team in responding to and 
encouraging comments. However, while I produced the posts I deliberately did not get involved in the 
page, Facebook administration, in handling comments, or in the decision on which posts to boost, all 
of this was left to the team. I choose, because of this research, to limit my own role to producing 
content (posts with images) designed to encourage interaction. 
128 Part of Facebook’s commercial offering. It enables a user to pay a fee to Facebook to have their 
Post pushed out (‘boosted’) to users across selected target demographics and locations (ref: 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/240208966080581?helpref=page_content, accessed 
November 11, 2018). It is a simple level of commercial engagement with Facebook and basically 
pushes a post out to people who are already Friends or Followers of a particular Facebook Page, or 
have a connection to Friends or Followers of that Page. As an advertising tool it may appear simplistic, 
but its effectiveness is based on being able to make use of the complex web of connections and links 
between Facebook users – to tap into that “trusted” Friends network while also segmenting that 
network by demographics and interests. As such it is another aspect of what The Guardian called the 
“dark art of political advertising online” (2018) and a successor to the first online political ads - banner 




page were monitored over the 12 days, pre- and post-election, during which the 
intervention took place. 
Posts were sometimes suggested by the candidate, for example a Post about 
cutbacks to rail services prompted by a “model” press release sent by the central 
Party administration to local candidates. However, the majority of posts and subject 
matter were decided either by me as the post writer or suggested by the small group 
of three Page administrators (volunteers) leading the social media campaign. These 
administrators also made some posts themselves, as did the candidate, although these 
largely took the form of reposting national party material from Labour. In the week 
before the election, a Facebook strategy was also produced with day-by-day 
suggestions on subjects to focus Posts on; agreeing how the volunteers would 
encourage Comments and engagement by visitors; and how to deal with negative 
comments. 
As example a series of Posts were produced on projected cuts to teaching staff 
at local schools (using graphs and data supplied by schoolcuts.org.uk), which proved 
particularly successful in attracting Likes and Comments, were also geographically 
Boosted to target Facebook users living near to those schools. Despite being a series 
of Posts, each was written in a different way so that Facebook users who saw more 
than one of the schools Posts, perhaps because of geographic overlap in the Boosts, 
would not see the same text. For example, this more general Post: 
Independent research has exposed the reality of the Tories pledge to cut £8.9 





In Burton, Abbot Beyne High faces losing 11 teachers, Paulet High seven 
teachers and Rykneld Primary five. Check how many teachers your kid’s 
school will lose if May’s Tories get back in at schoolcuts.org.uk 
And this location-specific Post (also see example at Fig. 15): 
Do you live in Rolleston? This independent report* shows that Theresa May’s 
education plans will mean the loss of four teachers at John of Rolleston 
Primary School.  
Rolleston Primary will have £330 less to spend per pupil if the Tories are re-
elected. That’s on top of taking away the youngest children’s right to a free 
school lunch and replacing it with a 7p breakfast. If you live in Rolleston, 
please think about these issues and ask yourself whether you can honestly 
vote for cuts to your school’s budget? 













Every Post included an image; a link to the source of the data and, particularly in 
later posts, hashtags and some sort of sign-off “call to action”. This varied and was 
not consistent, as in the examples, encouraging people not to vote rather than vote 
Conservative: “No vote is better than a bad vote”, or encouraging people to think 




The first school funding cuts post produced used comments that the headteacher 
of a local school had made to a national newspaper129 to highlight the issue. It was 
also the most successful of the interventionist posts, reaching 27,400 Facebook users 
(4,500 through paid Boosts). To put that reach figure into context, the candidate at 
the stage the Post was published had only 685 Followers (albeit up from 113 on May 
16th, when Mckiernan’s Page was first noted in the Field Log) and yet the William 
Shrewsbury School Post reached over 25,000 people. That only 4,500 of them were 
reached via paid Boosts means that the majority of people were reached because a 
Facebook Friend had Shared, Liked or Commented on the Post, or because 
Facebook’s algorithms had selected to serve the Post into their News Feed. 
That latter point is interesting in itself. Did Facebook serve the Post into 
thousands of users’ News Feeds because its algorithm determined; perhaps because 
of user geography, perhaps because of interest in key words in the Post text, that this 
was something those Users would be interested in? Or did it serve the Post to users 
because of links between Friends (the “people you may know” factor)? Or did 
Facebook serve the Post to more people simply because it happened to be from an 
organisation that was paying to boost some of its posts? All of these options are 
likely and all of them are likely to have been at play within Facebook’s myriad 
algorithms. In addition, it would make sense for Facebook, as a commercial 
organisation, to build into its algorithm a reward for organisations paying to promote 
 
129 Bernadette Hunter, headteacher of William Shrewsbury High School at Stretton had spoken to the 
Mirror newspaper about a potential loss of £100,000 from her budget, describing it as “devastating” 




content for the first time by inflating the effect of Boosted Posts through “extra” 
network circulation. 
Around one-quarter of the total traffic on the two Facebook pages (the candidate’s 
campaign page and the constituency Labour Party page) gained in the three weeks 
running up to the 2017 election came from paid Boosts, however the overwhelming 
majority came from organic (not paid for) traffic. That suggests that a key driver was 
not the campaign paying Facebook to Boost Posts (albeit that may have been a factor, 
as noted above), but the quality of the message in the Post. Posts that chime with the 
reader are more likely to be interacted with (e.g shared or Liked by them) and that 
activity is picked up by Facebook’s interaction-first algorithm and pushed out to 
more Friends in that user’s network. 
Taken as a whole, the 2017 data collection took the form of a case study focused 
on activity on a candidate’s page and the opportunity to explore how content quality 
might affect engagement. However, the difficulty is that, while it is reasonable to 
assume that well-written content, crafted to encourage debate and interaction, is more 
likely to be shared on Facebook, it is not possible to determine with certainty whether 
or by how far paying to Boost some Posts caused Facebook’s algorithms to Boost 
unpaid Posts too. This would be an area for further investigation in the future. 
What was seen, and is discussed further in the next chapter, is that a combination 
of the quality of the Post and the enthusiastic engagement of the local social media 
team in the News Feed in responding to Comments, did encourage more debate, more 




Another example (Fig. 16, and Post in full at Appendix 5) targeted Mckiernan’s 
Conservative candidate rival, Andrew Griffiths, the Post designed to attack him by 
using his Parliamentary voting record on key issues to suggest Griffiths was an 
uncaring MP. It linked to a screenshot of results searchable and available through 
TheyWorkForYou130.  
It was deliberately written as an attack Post to test the response to negative 
posts about rival candidates, and it attracted a great deal of engagement. The Post 
attracted 75 emoji responses (the majority positive), 47 Shares and dozens of 
Comments, many of them separate conversations happening on the individual’s 
Facebook Page but visible on Mckiernan’s Page because of the way the social 




130 A website, launched in 2004 by the charity mySociety, aimed at making democracy more 
accessible. It takes data from parliamentary schedules and sources and adds tools to make it easy for 
citizens to navigate the information to find, for example, how their MP has voted on key issues, or 
speeches s/he has given in parliament, or mentions of particular topics, by any MP, in parliament back 











This is because the Post was Boosted for each of the towns the two MPs were 
contesting in the constituency, so the majority of people were seeing the Post in their 
own, or a Friend’s, News Feed, not on the candidate’s Page. That is, the Post was 
being seen by people outside of the candidate’s page and who may never have visited 
the candidate’s page. Which is the likeliest explanation for why Gareth (Fig. 17) can 




yourself tall” and Steven can ask: “But seriously, who are the other mps [candidates] 
for burton?” and the comments are seen on Mckeirnan’s Page. 
That discussion continued, with one participant submitting a link to a story in the 
local newspaper (the Burton Mail) introducing each of the four candidates for the 
constituency adding: “Hope this helps”, and others arguing that Griffiths’ record as a 
hard-working local MP was founded on good PR. 
Anna: Andrew Griffiths is, quite simply, very good at PR. He’s become 
experienced at getting his face in the paper giving people the impression that 
he’s doing good for the town. But his voting record – which is fact that can be 
denied by nobody – tells a different story. Anybody who votes to reduce 
benefits for the disabled is not someone who has his constituents best interests 
at heart 
 
Gareth: Anna [surname deleted] I agree he is very good at PR which is why 
everyone is aware that he is always out and about doing something. Is it a bad 
thing to try and show that you’re at least attempting to earn the salary the 
public pay for? I have also seen his voting record. Do I agree with every 
decision he’s made? No of course not but that’s life. If we all agreed with 








Figure 17: Some of the critical responses to the Griffiths attack Post 
 
 
The debate continued in a similar vein with a number of participants. At times it 
became soapboxing but most of the time the thread showed Labour supporters 
responding with pertinent points and addressing criticism.  
Over the period of the Stage four data collection, the number of people who had 
Liked Mckiernan’s candidate page rose from 111 on 16th May 2017, to 238 on May 




– a five-fold increase in supporters in 12 days for a candidate largely unknown 
outside of the Burton Constituency Labour Party. This rapid rise did not continue 
after the election (which Griffiths locally and the Conservatives nationally) won – as 
of August 9, 2018, the page had just 679 Likes. 
The increase might also be attributed to the ‘Corbyn bump’ (which saw a rise in 
interest in and support for the Labour Party nationally, building towards the 2017 
election131). While the slow-down post-Election might be attributed to a natural 
tailing off of interest in someone who may or may not be the local Labour candidate 
for MP at an as yet unknown future election date. 
However, other data is more significant in terms of the intervention and its 
focus on engaging content and proactive interaction. The number of people who 
engaged with the Page in a day by clicking on a story or responding to it rose each 
day a new post was released (understandably so) but increased significantly in the 
last days of the campaign as the volume of posts and of Boosted posts increased. So 
that, on 16th May, 2017, 54 unique users engaged with content on the Page; on May 
28th, 279 users engaged but on May 29th, the day the first post in the intervention was 
published, 640 people engaged with the candidate’s Page.  
 
131 The Labour Party saw a surge in support in the weeks preceding the vote. By election day, Corbyn 
had over one million likes on Facebook compared to just over 400,000 for May, with videos of Corbyn 
rallies attracting millions of views. As Shephard notes (2017): “Online the public seemed more 




In the last three days of posting, unique user engagement132 was in three figures, 
with the largest number – 3,108 on 7th June; the day that also saw the biggest spike in 
new users Liking the Page (111), and the highest number of impressions (views) for 
people who had seen content associated with the Page. On that day, 35,622 unique 
users saw content from the candidate’s Page. Of those 35,622 views, 13,494 – just 
over one third - came from paid views, i.e. users saw a Boosted Post including a link 
to the candidate’s Page, with the rest coming from organic views. By contrast, the 
user engagement figure for May 29th, the day the first Post in the intervention was 
published, was 6,403 (albeit that figure was itself three times the figure on any 
preceding day). 
What all these figures reinforce is that positive engagement with a candidate’s 
Facebook Page can be relatively easily manufactured. The hypothesis is that 
engagement is created by a combination of factors: positive content written or 
otherwise produced to encourage support; active management of Comments with the 
aim of encouraging further responses; paying to Boost Posts beyond the candidate’s 
Page to target user groups. 
As caveat, the data on views and engagement is supplied by Facebook as part of 
the commercial package of paying to Boost content. It should therefore be looked at 
in the light of a commercial company with an interest in persuading an advertiser to 
buy more advertising. However, while that may undermine the validity of individual 
 
132 Defined by Facebook as the number of people (unique users) who have seen any content associated 
with the page. That will include any post or comment on posts which appear on the user’s own 




figures, the data pattern as a whole is one of sustained and significant growth in both 
content views and engagement over the period of the intervention and not only for the 
paid Boosted posts. 
Those record figures for the page on June 7th were the result of a number of 
elements coming together. Firstly: a carefully written Post designed for emotional 
engagement; secondly a Boosted post to maximise reach; third timing – this was to be 
the last Post before the much-anticipated election result. And finally, a Post coming 
towards the end of a frenetic increase in engagement with Page visitors through 
responding to comments, encouraging local Party members to share content, and 
increasing the volume of content by re-posting and re-sharing older Posts. 
As the next chapter explores further, the content produced over the 28 Posts of the 
intervention varied from attack posts against rival candidate Andrew Griffiths, to 
negative stories about Conservative policies, to positive stories about Labour policies 
or the candidate’s values, and while attack posts tended to attract most comments, 
they also attracted most criticism, particularly when Boosted outside the candidate’s 
network. For that reason, the final Post (see Fig. 62 in Appendix 5) was written to be 
a positive, Henry V-esque133 ‘call to arms’ from the candidate to Labour supporters 
and voters to do everything they can to get out the vote in the final hours: “Post 
leaflets, chip in on the phone bank, drive a neighbour to a polling station, Facebook 
 
133 As in Shakespeare’s Henry V Battle of Agincourt St Crispin’s Day speech: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11946012/Henry-V-St-Crispins-Day-speech-in-full.html 




friends, workmates, children, parents and ask them to vote tomorrow for the Britain 
we need.” 
 Overall, this final stage of data collection was a useful test both of how Facebook 
might be ‘gamed’ to produce more particular responses – something that had raised 
concerns among media analysts such as Craig Silverman (see page 70), but also of 
how human intervention in the form of content written to engage (aware producers) 
and the positive handling of Comments (supportive policers) could encourage 






Chapter five: Analysis and conclusions 
5.1 Introduction 
Taking as its theoretical underpinning Habermas’s grand theory of the public 
sphere and its importance to democratic society, this project set out to consider the 
place of Facebook within the public sphere by focusing on how people engaged in 




The mixed methods data gathering included surveying Facebook users on how 
they think they use Facebook; using online ethnographic study to watch how people 
used it; and direct intervention to study the effects of particular uses, all within a 
fixed political context of the run-up to a UK General Election. 
The thesis posed two inter-related questions – is Facebook, as phenomenally 
successful new communications medium, new public space or new public sphere? 
And, as phenomenally successful commercial communications medium, is Facebook 
capable of delivering the civic interaction necessary to an effective public sphere? 
Over the following sub-sections, these two questions are tackled alongside deeper 
investigation of the research results in relation to how people engaged in political 
talk. 
The original contribution of this research is therefore not just to consider whether 
Facebook has the capacity to create a new public sphere, but to test whether, given 
the convergence of political time and space around a UK General Election, will the 
things that make Facebook attractive as a communication medium for two-billion-
plus users also make it attractive as a space in which to engage in political talk? 
The study hypothesised that Facebook’s corporate ambition and its global scale 
and dominance of online social debate potentially created a new form of social public 
sphere - one that is the product of today’s more horizontal networked society 
(Castells, 2010). As chapter one outlined, the company has set out to create not 




communication medium, built to encourage everyone over the age of 13 to 
communicate with each other on and through its services134. 
Talk, including political talk, is thus connected, is public (to degrees) and is 
social. Facebook, as one MP interviewed for this thesis noted, is with its users when 
they are at their most relaxed “on their sofa…in their own home” and thus primed to 
listen and engage with him and each other. It is this social aspect coupled to 
Facebook’s commercial focus on what an individual may be (or should be) interested 
in that has the potential to effect change in public opinion. It is this potential that 
prompts the question of Facebook as public space or public sphere. 
However, the counter to that potential is Facebook’s cultural architecture. It may 
have been built to connect the world, to “give everyone a voice” as its executive 
officers are fond of saying, but it was not built to give them a voice to say anything in 
particular. Facebook’s architecture (as chapter three detailed) encourages weak tie 
links between people who know each other in the offline world but who may not 
know each other well. It is designed to encourage people to make connections with as 
many people as possible, in order that the information data underpinning those 
connections (who knows who and how, what and who they have in common, what 
interests them, and so forth) can be mined and sold on. Further, Facebook’s corporate 
concerns drive content algorithms which tend towards the creation of filter bubbles, 
and bias that can be bought by third party influencers. 
 
134 References throughout this thesis to Facebook “services” are, as previously clarified, references to 
the social media services operated by the company, Facebook Inc. These are Facebook predominantly 
but also WhatsApp and Instagram – all social network services bought by the company and integrated 




The connectedness of Facebook is to people users know of but not necessarily to 
people they know well or trust. This is not a safe space for open debate or dissenting 
opinions because it is a space shared not only with close friends and family, but with 
a great many people users may know but do not particularly care about, or even like. 
That creates a number of behavioural barriers for the user wanting to engage in 
political debate. Firstly, the risk to the group equilibrium of close friends and family 
and the fear of upsetting the people who matter most to the user135. There is a cost in 
disagreement. So, Facebook encourages normative behaviour (Miller, 2011) with 
language, including emoji and visual prompts, designed to ameliorate and soften the 
political argument being made.  
Secondly, the reputational risk to the user in being seen as “too” political (“I’m 
not one to comment on my Political Views via social media but…” a user warns his 
Friends). In this, Facebook may simply be reflecting a continuing decline in the value 
placed on politics and political action (Dahlgren, 2003; Eliasoph, 1997; Couldry 
2005) and a fashionable cynicism towards political institutions and elites. 
And thirdly, the discomfort risk of finding oneself in argument, rather than 
debate, with people the user may not trust or know well or may even not know at all. 
Facebook’s architecture, as this chapter explores further, means a Post made on a 
user’s own Page, or in a “safe” space such as on a candidate’s or a political group’s 
 
135 Concern around upsetting group relationships by discussing politics was noted back in 1963 by 
Almond and Verba who, in surveying American voters on their civic and political attitudes, found that 
the main reason given for avoiding political discussions was that it was unpleasant or disturbed 




Page, may travel outside of the space and time in which it was posted and be seen by 
unknown people in their own “homes”. 
Unsurprisingly then, most of the 253 people surveyed in the stage one data 
gathering said they deliberately avoided talking about “serious” issues on Facebook, 
regardless of whether these were issues they cared about. And time and again in the 
online ethnographic study and supporting material, people expressed their reluctance 
to debate politics, or to raise political points, even when in an overtly political space 
such as on a candidate’s Facebook page. Across the 3,500 conversation openings 
seen, only 5 percent included reasoned political debate, with most other comments 
and posts simply expressing support for a candidate or a point made.  
For all the opportunity presented by Facebook’s global connectedness and unique 
scale as a public space, the reality shown in this research is that it is ineffective as a 
Habermasian public sphere. Users are more likely to avoid debate than to engage in it 
via Facebook, particularly when that five percent is compared with the seven percent 
of explicitly or implicitly political online conversation seen by Jackson et al in their 
2013 study, or eight percent of everyday conversation noted by Almond and Verba in 
their 1963 seminal work on civic culture, or the 15 percent of British voters and 13 
percent of American voters claiming to discuss politics most days in Bennett et al’s 
multi-election research (1995, 2000), or the one fourth of Americans engaging in 
face-to-face forums and public meetings in Jacob et al’s survey (2009: 26).  
While the scale and connectedness of Facebook has enabled protest or political 
movements to quickly gather momentum (see chapter two and next section), its 




within the context of the public sphere. Rather, Facebook’s architecture has multiple 
chilling effects on political talk, and on debate in particular.   
Further, this thesis concludes that Facebook’s architecture may undermine the 
public or civic sphere not only by discouraging reasoned debate but by making it less 
likely that users will be exposed to opposing views or new ideas with which they 
might want to engage. A network designed to link people through shared connections 
– people and interests in common – will tend to create pools of the like-minded.  
There is a multiplier effect at play among Facebook users. Normative behaviour 
offline in which people will avoid political talk is increased online because of the 
public risk to group norms or individual reputations136. And political debate that does 
happen is further truncated by Facebook’s technical architecture which favours 
expansion-to-most over creating a “safe” space for person-to-person 
communication137. 
 
  5.2 Facebook as new media paradigm 
 
136 Ofcom, in its 2017 survey into Adults’ media use and attitudes noted that 44% of the social media 
users they questioned agreed that they were put off from posting content because of the potential for 
abusive comments or responses. Some of the older participants in the qualitative element of the Ofcom 
research also expressed concerned about the impact of sharing content on their reputation among 
friends and family, and some of the younger people about the impact on future job prospects. 
137 See also research by Rowe (2015) and Halpern and Gibbs (2013) which argued that the lack of 
anonymity on Facebook had encouraged more civil, normative behaviour among posters of comments 




Chapter two’s literature review began by identifying Facebook’s place within a 
technological shift that saw personal computing reborn as personal communications, 
through the development of the internet as new communications medium. 
The internet created a further shift, from traditional and top-down mass media to 
the horizontal communications media of Castell’s “network society” undermining 
nation-state controls. With the rise of social network sites, the internet became an 
increasingly social space, a mirror of offline social networks but also a space for new 
networks to form based around shared content and shared interests.  
Whilst not the first online social network site, Facebook’s founders were the first 
to see their service as creating a “social graph” articulating the real-world links 
between its users. Who people are, what they do, what they say, who they know, who 
they care about most, who they listen to most; the articulation of these links, this 
graph, became an information resource to be mined by advertisers and other third-
party Facebook clients. In return, Facebook’s users gained bonding (emotional) and 
bridging (informational) social capital through using the network, and access to a 
service which was equal parts entertainment media and useful technology. 
That latter point is important in understanding the ubiquity of Facebook. That it is 
not only new media but is also information technology. It not only broadcasts to users 
what people they more-or-less know are doing or saying, it stores a record of each 
user’s life in pictures, video and words. It is the networked archive of over two 
billion people’s lives in status138 updates and Posts. Facebook’s legacy may be its 
 
138 A user’s Facebook status is a small piece of information posted by the user on what they are doing 




witnessing of what people have done and said, rather than its ability to change what 
they do. 
We have reached the point where Facebook may be regarded as providing a 
crucial medium of visibility and public witness. It gives us a moral 
encompassment within which we have a sense not only of who we are but of 
who we ought to be. (Miller, 2011: 180) 
One early question posed in this thesis was whether Facebook, because of its 
scale and reach, represented a new technological paradigm; a significant step change 
on an information technology trajectory that saw the internet evolve into the social 
web and social media sites develop common standards and a common outlook (Dosi, 
1982). Certainly, Facebook would seem to display the core elements of an 
information technology paradigm as defined by Castells (2010). It acts on the 
information provided by its users; it is pervasive in scale and use; it has grown 
through strong networking logic in its focus on real-world relationships and weak 
ties; it is flexible in having given access to third party technology providers and 
buying up and absorbing rival social network services; it is a convergent, integrated 
system which operates on multiple devices and formats.  
But in each of these areas Facebook is also limited. Its corporate culture is one of 
driving network expansion in order to mine ever more valuable data from its users. 
Its technological flexibility is also focused on network expansion both through 
reaching new users (seeking to connect people in offline parts of Africa to the 
internet, for example) and through developing ways to win more of the attention of 
 
information could be the same. The difference is that status updates are normally notified all Friends in 




existing users (developing new tools for live video streaming, virtual reality, and so 
forth). Similarly, openness and flexibility are skewed to and limited by its 
commercial interests, there is a pay-to-play factor for advertisers and developers 
wanting access to Facebook’s users or their data. 
Whilst Facebook displays some of the technology push and demand-pull factors 
of technology paradigms as identified by Dosi (1982, 1988) and Rosenberg and 
Mowery (1979), it is also a technology built on pre-existing technologies (and rival 
services) and little changed from its inception. It is still about the content users post, 
and is still primarily about the words and pictures they post, despite the more recent 
growth of video in posts (in itself driven by a corporate decision to target video as 
being something users tend to give more time and attention to).  
Facebook is part of the still-developing technological paradigm that is online 
social media, but this thesis concludes that it is not a paradigm in its own right. It has 
been able to make best use of technological shifts, such as the easier uploading of 
photographs or the rise of smartphones but becoming the market leader – even the 
runaway market leader – does not of itself represent a paradigm shift in the 
technology. The question therefore should perhaps not be whether the emergence of 
Facebook represents a new technological paradigm on the information and 
communications technologies trajectory, but whether Facebook represents a new 
media paradigm and a shift in mass media communications which is shaping society.  
Moving away from technological determinist theory to the media determinism of 
McLuhan (1964), Postman (1992), Havelock (1982) and others, posits Facebook as a 




it is Facebook’s strength of scale and network effects, rather than the uniqueness of 
its technology, that is driving societal change. 
Whether through Facebook’s architecture encouraging Pariser’s “filter bubbles” 
(2011) or Kahneman’s “cognitive ease” (2011), or Cadwalladr’s exposure (2017, 
2018) of the company’s culpable negligence in enabling extremist groups to 
manipulate public opinion and subvert the democratic process in the US and UK - or 
all of these. The point remains that Facebook’s one-to-most architecture, creating 
connections through people and interests in common, creates pools of the like-
minded.  
So, regardless of whether the user seeks it out, they will be shown more of the 
material they appear to like by Facebook. More Posts on subjects they have 
previously spent time reading; more Posts by people they have Liked or responded 
to; more videos on subjects that have held their attention to the end, or that they have 
Liked or shared with Friends. Facebook’s architecture is weighted to show more of 
the subjects a user is already interested in; it is weighted to create cognitive bubbles. 
Except when, as the final research stage of this project demonstrated, it is paid to 
deliver new material. 
It could equally be argued that this is no different to other mass media in that, as 
argued further in section 5.4.4, the audience has always picked their side. A Daily 
Mail reader or a Guardian reader; a Radio Four listener or a Smooth FM listener; 
Channel Four News or The One Show; Swapshop or Tiswas139. Postman (1985, 
 
139 Rival Saturday morning UK children’s TV shows in the 1970s, BBC’s Swapshop 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0236914/ and ITV’s Tiswas https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0071061/ 




1992) is one of many media theorists to link the desire to be informed by the news 
with the need to be entertained by it - and people are rarely entertained by things they 
fundamentally disagree with140. 
It is therefore likely that, even had Facebook’s architecture not encouraged users 
to stay within their cognitive bubbles, users would elect to do so. Indeed, Zuckerberg 
himself had said it was human nature to “gravitate towards people who think like we 
do”141, while insisting that because of Facebook people were exposed to a broader 
range of people and ideas than pre-internet. The pity is that Facebook does not 
encourage that diversity. The company could elect to “tweak” its News Feed 
algorithms with the aim of encourage more interaction through broadening the 
material a user sees so that those bubbles are more frequently popped.  
This research set out to examine how citizens engaged with each other in political 
talk on Facebook. As communications phenomenon – with over one-in-four people 
across the globe actively using it – it is crucial to investigate not only how people 
engage in political debate on Facebook, but whether Facebook’s architecture is able 
to encourage reasoned debate.  
 
140 Indeed, van Zoonen argued that Conservative and Labour parties in the late ‘90s and early 2000s, 
supported by the mass media, had incorporated the soap opera format and characters into political 
campaigns and coverage, including soap opera style election broadcasts and soap opera stars backing 
campaigns. The soap opera had become an “ubiquitous” frame of reference for presenting and 
understanding politics (2003: 100). Bennett too (2003: 144) noted that politicians and interest 
organisations had adopted highly-personalised rhetoric of choice and lifestyle values (rather than old 
values of sacrifice and collective good) to communicate their political messages to citizens.  
141 Source: Buzzfeed, original Zuckerberg post can only be viewed through a Facebook account: 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/zuckerberg-said-facebook-could-be-better-at-filtering-




This is the single largest mass media in the world. Facebook alone has as many 
daily active users as YouTube and Twitter combined (source: Statista, July 2018). 
During the week of the 2017 General Election, 48 million people visited the BBC’s 
website or news app (source: BBC Annual Report) a record number for the 
broadcaster. But over 15 million Facebook users shared or engaged with content 
posted on the Labour Party’s Facebook page alone (Lilleker, 2017).  
Facebook is central to the political media landscape and a media which is not 
simply reflecting how citizens engage in political talk, but is changing the nature of 
that engagement.   
 
5.3 Facebook as new (social) public sphere 
Transcending the original purpose of a commercial public space such as Facebook 
to deliver something capable of influencing democracy through civic action depends 
both on what users choose to discuss in that space and on whether those discussions 
affect their thinking and actions. In addition, for that public space to enter the public 
sphere in the Habermasian tradition, what people say in it and what they may do as a 
result has to be noticed by the state, either directly or mediated by the media.  
As chapter two outlined, there are a number of academic theories and assumptions 
underpinning the concept of the public sphere and, in order to apply those ideas to 
Facebook it was necessary to look at what might constitute a public sphere “test”. 
The elements are broadly structural, representational and interactional (Dahlgren, 
2005a), with the interactional dimension key to a functioning democracy. Thus, a 




type and quality of interaction among its users, but Facebook itself would also have 
to pass structural (architecture, accessibility of technology) and representational 
(publicness but also corporate control, legal framework, etc.) tests.  
Are people discussing matters of public interest, politics or civic issues on 
Facebook? Is that debate reasoned, unfettered and (reasonably) public? Is it leading 
to the changing of minds or the development of opinions and ultimately to the 
formation of public opinion? Is that public opinion being passed on to the institutions 
of state and governance (regardless of whether it is heeded by them)? These are the 
questions that would determine whether Facebook is operating as public sphere, 
rather than a public space in which debate may sometimes happen. 
Further, what is meant by “reasoned” debate in this context? As outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter, there was very little debate at all and what there was 
tended to be short-lived. The literature is unclear on what constitutes “reasoned” in 
terms of quality and even less clear on what it constitutes in terms of quantity – four 
back-and-forth exchanges? Eight sentences exchanged? Conversational threads on 
Facebook tend towards discursive rather than deliberative for reasons that, as already 
outlined, have much to do with the architecture. Responses to a Post can be split over 
time and spaces – carried from one person’s Facebook Page to a Friend’s News Feed, 
to a Group Page, and the discussion picked up again by new people several days 
later. The ability to respond to a counter-argument is impeded. 
The complexity of this “test” of Facebook’s public sphere worth, lay behind the 
decision to focus on the 2015 UK General Election in terms of data gathering. 
Broadly speaking, the research sought to analyse whether, given the confluence of a) 




comfortable communicating on Facebook; and c) a major political event (the UK 
General Election) seeking their attention, would reasoned debate happen on 
Facebook. By focusing on this confluence, the public sphere ‘test’ became a search 
for process of conversation, echoing Eliasoph: 
Focusing on the public sphere transforms the search for a static product – that 
laundry list of [democratic] facts or beliefs – into a search for a process, a 
process of conversation that cultivates or impairs citizens’ abilities to talk, 
think, and imagine together. (1997: 606) 
While other research has looked at Facebook’s role in substantial democratic 
events such as the so-called Arab Spring (e.g. Markham, 2014), or the 2008 anti-Farc 
protests in Columbia (Kirkpatrick, 2010), the question is whether Facebook enabled 
the debate that caused minds to be changed or opinions to be formed, and thus 
precipitated the democratic actions, or simply provided an accessible 
communications tool for organising actions. However, while Facebook’s network 
scale may have enabled such protests to quickly gather momentum, the evidence 
from this research project is that the combination of architectural and corporate 
limitations on the technology with the self-censoring behavior of its users, means 
Facebook is not able to sustain reasoned debate leading to democratic action, within 
the traditional context of the public sphere. 
Rather than look at seismic democratic events, this research project focused on a 
significant yet comparatively mundane political event - that of a UK General 
Election, in which two-thirds of the electorate were expected to participate (British 
Election Study, 2015). The 2015 election (unlike 2017’s “snap” election) was part of 




talk in the run-up to an election which pundits had predicted would be a close-run 
result.142 
However, in the research surveys, people said they avoided discussing serious 
issues on Facebook. In the emails and screenshots sent in by volunteers, people said 
they avoided Facebook at election times, in the thousands of posts read on political 
pages, people demonstrated how they generally avoided debate, choosing either 
simple messages or actions indicating support, or engaging in rhetoric or polemic. 
Which leads to a further problem. Facebook may not be part of the traditional 
public sphere, but it is part of democratic change. There may be very little reasoned 
debate, but the scale of Facebook means very little may still be a substantial amount. 
And, whatever the final effect might be of Facebook’s tendency to create pools of 
like-minded people and filtered opinions143, the capacity for political ideas and 
memes to reach massive audiences “on their sofa” is influencing democratic actions. 
It could be argued that Facebook as public space is little more than the successor 
of the town square – the place where any person might come to shout out their views, 
whatever they may be, and be heard by whoever was interested enough to listen. It is 
simply the largest town square in the 21st century’s interpretation of free speech. And 
yet, if a person were to walk to the centre of their home town and argue loudly that 
 
142 ‘Britain’s election surprise’, The Economist, May 8, 2015: https://www.economist.com/the-
economist-explains/2015/05/08/britains-election-surprise (accessed November 12, 2018). 
143 As caveat to this, the research of Bakshy et al (2015) which examined how over 10 million 
Facebook users interacted with socially shared news and information, concluded that users were 
exposed to material shared by Friends with ideologically opposing viewpoints and it was the action of 
users in choosing their Friends and in choosing what material from their Friends to read or respond to 
that had the greater effect on limiting their exposure to cross-cutting content. That is, their argument 




the Apollo 11 moon landings, or indeed the Sandy Hook massacre, were faked; or 
that childhood measles vaccinations cause autism; or that senior Washington 
Democrats are running a paedophile ring, that person may find a handful of people 
gathered in that square who listen to and agree with their conspiracy theory. But s/he 
would not find 40,000 people who agree144. 
Facebook’s scale means a vast number of people could crowd into that virtual 
town square, while its algorithms ensure that those people who believe, or have the 
potential to believe, in a crackpot theory will get to hear of it and will have their 
sympathy towards that idea reinforced by hearing from many other supporters. 
Schumpeter145 perhaps pre-empted this chaotic demi-democratic state in describing 
the political “will” of citizens as composed of a “bundle of vague impulses loosely 
playing about given slogans and mistaken impressions.” (1976: 253) 
[E]ven if there were no political groups trying to influence him, the typical 
citizen would in political matters tend to yield to extrarational or irrational 
prejudice and impulse…Moreover, simply because he is not “all there”, he 
will relax his usual moral standards as well and occasionally give in to dark 
urges which the conditions of private life help him to suppress” (1976: 262) 
Facebook as media paradigm has produced a shift in the type of information, 
including the type of news, users have access to. In controlling what users get to see, 
 
144 See this 2018 article for a recent outline of why conspiracy theorists find it easy to grow large 
groups of supporters on Facebook – including the 40,000 members of the largest of the QAnon 
conspiracy Facebook group : https://qz.com/1348635/facebook-is-a-perfect-home-for-conspiracy-
theories-like-qanon (accessed November 12, 2018). 
145 Schumpeter (1976) was generally scathing in his criticism of citizens as well as their “will”, 
arguing that the typical citizen had neither intelligence, nor interest enough to make rational political 
judgements. Whilst ‘Capitalism, socialism & democracy’ is an important work of social theory, there 




including what they get to see from traditional news media organisations, Facebook 
is exerting control over the mass circulation of ideas which may influence public 
opinion and thus democratic actions. In that sense it is part of the public sphere. 
However, this thesis has already argued that Facebook is not able to operate 
within the grand theory of the Habermasian public sphere because it is not able to 
sustain reasoned debate as precursor to democratic action. The question then perhaps 
for future investigation would be to ask how necessary is reasoned debate to 
democracy? For Facebook to be seen as part of the public sphere there needs to be a 
re-thinking of what the public sphere is, rather than what it should be. The scale of 
use of social media means that debate between citizens is mostly taking place on 
social media, rather than in pubs and workplaces for example. Yet that debate itself 
is, as this research has shown, more limited or truncated than it might be between 
colleagues in the workplace or neighbours in the pub. 
Social media, particularly Facebook and its subsidiary Instagram, are increasingly 
visual rather than literate media. Ideas are presented as picture memes or GIFs146 and 
it is the process of acting on that idea – sharing it, Liking it, commenting on it, adding 
it to a Post on the subject, that has become a new visual language of debate. 
Facebook’s limitations in relation to enabling reasoned debate may have given rise to 
the “clicktivism” of low input democratic action (Gladwell, 2010), but that is to 
presume that a user sharing a political meme within the fluid borders of her/his 
 
146 A format for sending images, particularly moving images, as a compressed file to save memory and 
speed but without loss of quality. Created by a team at CompuServe, led by Steve Wilhite, in 1984. 
GIF stands for Graphic Interchange Format but the word itself has come to define the type of funny, 




Facebook page does not carry risk and therefore a personal cost. As section 5 of this 
chapter explores further, the need to mitigate that personal risk has encouraged the 
greater use of images, GIFs and emoji and changes in the way people “speak” to each 
other on Facebook. It has shifted how people interact socially and that includes how 
they engage in political talk.  
It may therefore no longer be relevant, or as relevant, to argue that democracy 
resides with “citizens who engage in talk with each other” (Dahlgren, 2005: 149), but 
to focus on Dahlgren’s wider concept of the public sphere as “constellation of 
communicative spaces” in which information, ideas and debate circulate (2005: 149). 
It is the reciprocal dynamics in the exchange of that material that matters (2005: 159). 
Similarly, as Bennett (2003) notes, while the personalised, what matters to me, 
politics of the late modern period has created distance between individuals and 
conventional political systems, looking beyond government we find new forms of 
“sub-politics” including large-scale actions, anti-globalisation protests and 
politically-motivated consumer choices (2003: 139). 
   Habermas too (1996) began to see the public sphere as a shifting and evolving 
constellation of communicative spaces delivering conversational webs of political 
talk and information sharing as underpinning potential future political action. 
To accept Eliasoph’s argument that “feelings” of political concern expressed 
publicly, even when expressed “without a language for giving those feelings socially 
recognizable meaning” are the substance of political life (1990: 465) repositions 
Facebook as part of a more ephemeral social public sphere. A constellation of online 




level, and which enable the expression of political and civic concerns, ideas and 
information intended to be shared publicly and with the hope of reciprocation. 
The material shared may be images or video rather than words and the 
expectation of reciprocation – Likes, Shares, comments etc. is the political dynamic 
at work, rather than the expectation of debate. The ability of those ideas or 
information to travel further and faster because of Facebook’s architecture and 
corporate ecology is what may ultimately lead to political action or democratic 
change. 
These, however, are areas for future research and, as chapter six discusses further, 
areas that may only be provable through the collection of a great deal more data on 
the dynamic movement of ideas across Facebook and into the offline political world. 
It is not yet possible to say what part the movement of ideas on Facebook played in 
the “surprise” election of Donald Trump or the vote on Brexit, compared to the also 
surprising election of Barack Obama as America’s first black president, or the 
unexpected surge in young people voting in the 2017 General Election147.  It is 
possible however to say that Facebook is enabling people to express and share their 
political concerns, opinions and ideas, rather than to debate them, and that the 
dynamic nature of that expression on Facebook represents a new, social public 
sphere. 
 
5.4 Facebook and political talk 
 
147 Analysts put the number of 18 to 24-year-olds voting in the 2017 election at 72 percent, compared 




At the 2010 General Election, Facebook was six years old, still a private company 
and, with just under 500 million worldwide users - one-fifth of its 2015 size. In 2010, 
Facebook had an estimated 26 million active users in the UK148 and by the 2015 
election there were around 32 million UK users149 - a figure worth noting against the 
30.7m votes cast150.  
By the 2017 election, growth was slowing with some analysts suggesting 
Facebook use was leveling out in the UK, although Facebook itself said that 30 
million people in the UK were visiting Facebook every day via their mobile phone 
alone.151 Most analysts accept that half the total UK population, around 33 million 
people, have a Facebook account. Whilst it would have been wonderful to be able to 
monitor 33 million Facebook user’s News Feeds in the weeks before the two 
elections to gather data on political talk that, as previously explained, is neither 
possible (through Facebook) nor ethically desirable.  
What this research project was able to focus on was capturing a snapshot of 
political talk by focusing on public spaces on Facebook – the Pages of a 
representative sample of election candidates – where political talk might be more 
likely. The focus on candidates’ pages also meant that it was possible to observe the 
effect of candidate interaction with page visitors in the enabling of debate, and to 
 
148 Sources: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-10713199  and http://newsroom.fb.com/company-
info/ (access to both checked November 12, 2018). 
149 Facebook does not release country-by-country statistics and numbers of users tend to be estimated 
and based on sample surveys, and therefore vary. UK user statistics for 2015 varied from 30 million to 
35 million across different sources. 
150 Source: Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (2015), ‘The 2015 General Election: aspects of participation 
and administration’, Elections Centre report, Plymouth University. 
151 Source: Facebook press release for advertisers: https://www.facebook.com/business/news/summer-




note the correlation between that activity and the final election result for the 
candidate. As already noted, of the 27 candidates across the four constituencies 
studied, all of the winning 2015 candidates152 and three out of four of the second-
placed candidates were also the candidates who had the most active personal 
campaign Pages. That is, candidates who did best in the 2015 election were those 
who – personally or through their agents – were seen to be most active on Facebook.  
This echoes similar research by Williams and Gulati on the 2006 Midterm 
election in the US, which saw a similar correlation between activity on a candidate’s 
Page and the result of the vote.  
Active engagement by the candidate and a well-maintained site can make the 
candidate more accessible and seem more authentic. It also can encourage a 
more professional discussion among supporters…. Facebook puts a face on 
the other supporters and facilitates interpersonal connections around activities 
other than politics. (2007:19) 
Williams & Gulati noted, however, that that link may also be a reflection of 
enthusiasm for a candidate in the offline world, in terms of on-the-ground activity by 
supporters and increased media coverage around the most popular candidates. None-
the-less, their research echoes feedback from candidates in interviews for this thesis 
that Facebook had helped to make a personal link between the candidate, the 
potential voter, and that voter’s social network. Andrew Griffiths, Conservative 
 
152 It should be noted that, while the wining candidate for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) had 
an active Facebook page, he did not appear to take part himself in the activity on the page. As noted on 
page 282, the activity was by-and-large from people – perhaps Party activists or workers – outside the 





candidate for Burton and Uttoxeter, was very active on Facebook both in the 2015 
and 2017 election (and won the seat both times). It had been a conscious decision to 
make Facebook an integral part of his 2015 campaign and to build that more 
authentic profile: 
What Facebook allows us to do is to become more human. Because its peer-
to-peer, friend to friend, neighbour to neighbour, it makes it more human. I 
always write and do things in good humour on Facebook, just sharing. 
(Griffiths interviewed July 2016) 
Williams and Gulati focused their 2006 research on Facebook because those 
midterm elections in the US were the first in which Facebook became directly 
involved by setting up profile pages for candidates and encouraging users to visit 
them. The prompt may have been commercial – at a time of heightened election 
interest it makes sense for Facebook to find ways to encourage people to engage with 
or find out about candidates on their media platform.  
By the 2015 UK general election, Facebook was being actively used by 
candidates, parties, lobbyists and government offices to mobilise voters: a campaign 
between the Electoral Commission and Facebook prompted users to register to vote 
on national voter registration day, while Facebook’s “I voted” button was clicked by 
200,000 voters an hour on May 7th.153  Over one million extra people registered to 
vote between December 2014 and May 2015, although no information was available 
at the time of writing as to whether the register to vote campaign running on 
Facebook UK on February 5th, was a factor. 
 
153 Source: The Independent, May 7, 2015 ‘I’m a voter: Facebook and Twitter launch buttons to allow 




In 2017, Facebook’s involvement was – at least on the surface – limited to 
pushing out that “I voted” prompt button. However, it should be noted that whilst the 
concept of a prompt to vote may seem an innocuous and perhaps even a positive 
move by the company in encouraging democratic actions, the use of the button has 
attracted criticism154. It represents direct involvement in elections by Facebook (as 
opposed to its indirect involvement by for example, giving access to organisations 
seeking to influence the outcome of elections). The button’s effectiveness has only 
been analysed by Facebook, and only Facebook knows who saw the button. And only 
Facebook controls who gets to see the button and which version they see. Evidence 
released by Facebook showed a positive effect on voter turnout (see page 91), but the 
converse of that is that a bump in voting could be influenced by Facebook selecting 
who to feed the button to.  
However, while a campaign to encourage people to register vote may be 
measurable in terms of effectiveness by Facebook, in the same way the company 
might measure the effectiveness of an ad campaign for a customer, being able to 
measure whether Facebook is able to encourage people to engage in politics is a 
much more difficult proposition.  
Thus, this research sought to focus on whether people who might reasonably be 
expected to be pre-disposed to debate issues155 were more or less likely to do so on 
 
154 For a good outline of concerns about the button, see Hannes Grasesegger, writing in The Observer, 
April 15, 2018: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/15/facebook-says-it-voter-button-
is-good-for-turn-but-should-the-tech-giant-be-nudging-us-at-all (accessed November 12, 2018). 
155 Either because they had shown interest in politics by visiting a candidate’s Page (the ethnographic 
study) or because they had said they were concerned about serious issues and interested in debating 




Facebook. Because if being on Facebook is a disincentive to engage in political 
debate, the positive democratic effect or otherwise of that “I voted” prompt is more 
of a concern. Actions that are focused only on the casting of a vote, rather than on the 
process of deliberation in choosing how to vote, limit and potentially weaken 
democracy. 
As the following sections detail, a number of issues emerged from the research in 
relation to whether and how people engage in political talk on Facebook. The data 
showed that people are unlikely to engage in political talk on Facebook, even when 
visiting the page of a political candidate. However, what was also noted is that debate 
can be encouraged by the actions of the candidate and his/her supporters or agents on 
Facebook.  
In summary, the conclusion from the research is that the likelihood of debate 
comes down to the positive actions of individuals vs the restrictions of Facebook’s 
architecture. The five key enabling factors are: 
1) the visibility of the candidate or influencer on the Page (visible 
leaders);  
2) the visible management of debate (supportive policers);  
3) material (posts, videos, comments) produced to encourage debate 
(aware producers);  
4) more young, female visitors and/or liberal thinking visitors to the 
Page or thread (engaged openers);  




Zuckerberg was echoing Katz in reminding his advertisers156 that people 
influence people and that may often be the case in the decision to vote or buy or share 
a meme, but the higher personal risk involved in engaging in debate means trust and 
visibility are equally key to whether debate happens. Thus, whether this a 
comfortable space in which to debate, managed by supportive policers and with a 
visible leader reduces the personal risk of engaging. 
Whether debate happens depends on the right people being involved. The right 
people are trustworthy – Friends, candidates, Page managers who are visible and 
exhibit the behaviour visitors want to see. The factors outlined above and below do 
not have to all be present at all times on a Page for debate to happen, but any one of 
the factors being present makes debate more likely. 
The right people may be the visible leader, the candidate or other influencer on 
the Page who shows themselves to be both open to debate and also open to hearing 
different opinions to their own – as long those opinions are expressed politely.  
The right people are also the supportive policers who, whether or not they initiate 
debate, are open to encouraging participation and to managing ‘wrong’ debate. They 
are mindful of netiquette and normative behavior in that space as supporting 
contributors and want to create a safe space for engagement.  
Graham et al (2015) saw similar effect at work in their four-year research project 
looking at political talk on (non-political) online forums. They noted that political 
 
156 Quoted from techcrunch.com: ‘Liveblogging Facebook advertising announcement’, November 6, 
2007. https://techcrunch.com/2007/11/06/liveblogging-facebook-advertising-




talk was significantly more likely to lead to political action on forums157 where there 
was an active forum management team, and who occasionally encouraged or 
facilitated political action, on a forum which emphasised helping and supporting 
participants. 
The aware producers are also the right people - purposeful, they have a reason to 
be there and to engage in or initiate debate. They are the sharers of challenging 
memes and videos, the raisers of key issues (often personalised with “I” and “we” 
and “you”), the responders to requests for information, and the challengers that 
respond to negativity with positive information, rather than barbs. They know they 
are addressing the people watching, rather than the people engaging in debate. 
The engaged openers may play the same role as the aware producer or the 
supportive policer, but frequently move between those roles. They are there as 
curious and engaged citizens, either initiating debate or joining in, but clearly 
signaling how the debate should proceed – light, non-threatening, clear netiquette. 
The comfortable space and lowered risk of being with like-minded people is not 
always essential. That space can be very temporary – comfortable for just this debate 
and while just these (right) people are involved, or it may be the longer-term space 
provided by special interest Group pages, such as the 48 percent group that 
blossomed after the Brexit vote.  
 
157 Specifically, NetMums and MoneySavingExpert which have a culture of sharing information and 
giving advice and support to members. The research project focused on how such help and support 
linked to discussions around personal experience of austerity might lead into political talk around the 




Facebook creates opportunities that should make it more likely that the right 
people are there – its scale, the connectedness of its network, its ability to link people 
to what may most interest them. Those same elements also make it easier for like-
minded people to find each other and to converse in those safer spaces. 
However, while Facebook’s architecture might help the right people to get 
together, it tends to work against them in then engaging in debate (rather than 
oratory) because people are not conversing face-to-face158 or necessarily talking to 
each other in real time. As previously outlined, people and threads are split by time 
and virtual geography. Debate may start one day but not be seen in a newsfeed until 
hours or days later, making conversation between two protagonists less likely. Debate 
may start on one page or even in another technology (eg in Instagram) but be seen on 
an entirely different page or geography.  
Thus, debates are short on Facebook because either netiquette, or the loss or lack 
of right people, and the time and geography limitations of its architecture, limits the 
length and depth of engagement and tends to focus contributions to debate on oratory. 
The following sub-sections focus on aspects of the elements that enable debate, 
weighed against these limitations on debate. In spaces that should be comfortable, 
provided by and policed by political candidates and their supporters, at a time when 
those candidates would particularly want to present themselves as trustworthy and 
open to voters, and a time when people pre-disposed to be interested in politics would 
 
158 As noted by Jacobs et al in their surveys of people engaging in the public deliberation, face-to-face 
discussion tended to be more tolerant and reason-based - geared towards discussion based on expert 




be expected to seek out such safe spaces in which to engage in politics, is debate 
happening? 
5.4.1 Want to talk, daren’t talk 
One element that emerged strongly in the early part of the research was people’s 
unwillingness to engage in discussion about political and civic issues on Facebook. 
Young people in particular who self-identified as interested in serious issues and keen 
to debate issues, none-the-less said they were reluctant to do so on Facebook. 
The research had looked at whether young people in particular - those aged 18-24, 
who make up both the bulk of Facebook users and the group least likely to vote in a 
General Election159 would make use of the new arena presented by Facebook in 
which to engage in political talk. The majority of survey participants (58% 
Journalism and Humanities and 75% of the Games Design student groups) said they 
were aged 18-24. This age group was also active on Facebook, with 95% of the 
Journalism and Humanities students and 100% of the Games Design students saying 
they spent between 30mins and two hours on Facebook every day. 
 Across the survey groups, the results also showed that these were young people 
who said they were interested in local and global issues and wanted to debate them. 
Asked whether they got upset about some of the things that were happening in the 
 
159 The British Election Study predicted a turnout in the 18-24 age group of 58% against 70% total 
turnout (the 2010 18-24 figure was calculated as 44%). However, despite the expressed concern for 
issues that might matter most to them, young people did not turn out to vote in significantly greater 
numbers in 2015, with 43% of young people likely to have voted in 2015, against 44% in 2010, 
according to IPSOS Mori: http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/uncategorized/will-younger-voters-




world, 65% said they did, while 59% said that what politicians have to say matters to 
them, and 66% said that they really enjoyed taking part in a good debate about 
serious issues. Thus, the surveys had accurately identified a target group of young 
people pre-disposed to be interested in political and civic issues and comfortable 
communicating on Facebook. The question became whether Facebook was enabling 
that communication to become political talk. 
The stage one research – the surveys - showed that even young people who were 
interested in politics and in debating serious issues were wary about doing so on 
Facebook. The stage two field research indicated that, even when people interested in 
politics come together in political spaces on Facebook (i.e. candidate’s sites) they 
will none-the-less normally avoid debate. Across the 3,500 posts and comments seen 
on candidate's sites during the period, only in 170 posts did citizens attempt to initiate 
debate by asking a question, or actively engaged in debate.  
Asked whether they tended to be wary about commenting on serious issues on 
Facebook, 56% of the journalism and humanities students said yes, they were wary 
(see table 1) as did 57% of the games design students (table 2). The ‘wariness’ factor 
was actually higher among the students who wanted to debate serious issues – 60% of 
those students who said they enjoyed debating, said they avoided doing so on 
Facebook. Among the Journalism and Humanities students who strongly agreed that 
they enjoyed debating serious issues, 67% were wary about doing so on Facebook.  
Asked whether, if they were angry or upset about something in the news they 
would generally say something about it on Facebook, 69% of the journalism and 




The surveys had shown that these were engaged young people, two-thirds of 
whom wanted to debate socio-political issues, yet they routinely avoided commenting 
on issues on Facebook – even when moved by an issue or news story that they cared 
about. However much they might enjoy taking part in a “good debate”, and however 
much they might want to reward friends who talk about serious issues160, they were 
not comfortable starting debates with their Facebook Friends group - they were ‘want 
to talk, daren’t talk’.161 
The issue then becomes whether this response is specific to Facebook or 
reflective of other social forums, such discussions in a pub or in the works canteen. 
Academics have pointed to people’s unwillingness to discuss politics – with a big or 
a small ‘p’ – in social forums. Eliasoph (1996) in her study of public meetings and 
civic groups noted that people were more willing to express views and deeply held 
beliefs than to debate them (p282), further that people often worked hard to 
deliberately appear political disconnected and focused only on their own, or their 
family’s interests (1997: 640). 
Bohman (2004: 136) wrote about the need for the social space to be a mutually 
accountable forum in which the speakers show themselves to be willing to hear each 
 
160 Overall, 53% said that if a friend made a good point about a serious issue on Facebook, they would 
usually Like it or reply. While, it could be argued that the question itself was skewed, in that the 
respondents might think “it depends” in relation to the point being made, none-the-less actions such as 
Like are rewards which may reinforce bonding social capital (see page 38).  
161 A similar effect was noted by Vraga et al (2015) who in their research with young people around 
the 2012 US elections found a reluctance to engage in political debate on Facebook because of an 
association with “ranters” and seeing political provocateurs deliberately stirring up trouble, coupled 
with wariness about who might see material posted on Facebook. These factors contributed to 
discomfort around politics on Facebook for all but the respondents identified as having low conflict 




other and to listen with equal respect. The indefinite space offered online negates 
against that; the speaker becomes accountable to an indefinite audience and the 
greater risk that presents162. In an earlier treatise, pre-Internet as public forum, 
Bohman argued that public deliberation succeeds when participants in it feel they 
have contributed to and influenced the outcome, “even when they disagree with it”. 
(1996:33) 
Facebook is an online social space wherein its users share information on their 
day-to-day life, friendship groups and social events. It is about presenting aspects of 
oneself, rather than the entirety; about fitting into a median behaviour level. 
 
The ‘Why We Post’ anthropological survey in global use of social media (2016) 
found a similar reticence around discussing politics on Facebook. Costa, one member 
of the research team, found that even when social media users lived in a politically 
contentious geographic space (the Kurdish town of Mardin, in Turkey on the 
contested Syrian border) and at a politically contentious time (the 2014 local 
elections), people still avoided discussing politics on Facebook. However, this could 
 
162 Conversely, work by a number of academics writing in the 1980s (see Rowe, 2014:124 and van 
Dijk 2006: ) tied the relative anonymity of computer-mediated communications (CMC), including 
email and the early worldwide web, to increased anti-normative behaviour, arguing CMC was liable to 
produce more self-centred, un-self-regulated and less social acceptable behaviour (Sproull and Kiesler, 
1986) because of the protection afforded by anonymity.  
However, a decade later this “deficit approach” to the affordances of CMC had been replaced by a 
more positive, people-focused view of academics who saw users compensating for CMC’s technical 
limitations to produce information-rich social environments online, linking and building online and 




be as much a reflection of fear over who, from state agencies, might be watching as 
an indication of users avoiding upsetting social norms by introducing political talk. 
The researchers found that, across all the geographic sites studied, political talk 
was less likely to happen on social media than offline. Concerns with maintaining 
relations with their social media networks, coupled with (in locations such as Mardin) 
fear of state monitoring of the social media, meant that social media became a 
conservative space for expressing shared political values and social norms, rather 
than for debate. (2016: 146) 
But for the young people surveyed for this research, the fear of who may see what 
they post is more about who among the people they know will see it. Miller (2016) 
spoke about how the people he studied were most concerned with avoiding posting 
anything on social media that might offend relatives and friends, it was just “not 
sensible [for them] to talk about politics in such a contentious space” (Borgerson and 
Miller, 2016: 4). 
Perhaps the issue is one of privacy. Almost all the survey respondents (91%) 
agreed or strongly agreed that it was important to manage their privacy settings on 
Facebook, and 79% said they did not post anything on Facebook without thinking 
about who might see it. There is a self-censoring of what is and is not posted; what is 
and is not revealed about the user’s “true” life and feelings. And within that, one of 
the things these young people choose whether to reveal or not to reveal to their (on 
average) 300 Facebook Friends, is their political thinking. 
Albrechtslund (2008) wrote of the “participatory surveillance” embedded in 




awareness, he suggested, could be empowering with users choosing what and how 
they presented themselves to that online gaze. Knowing they are being watched, they 
may construct or reshape their online identity, meet people, and gather information to 
reflect an online persona. 
But this awareness of online surveillance and people’s readiness to accept it in 
return for the usefulness of social media, may also induce a readiness to accept 
increased surveillance in the offline world by police and security forces. The 
necessity to provide a safe space online, managed by those supportive policers of 
debate, is in that sense no different to feeling able to raise an issue in a comfortable 
offline space, whether that be the home, workplace, or the local pub. The wanting to 
talk and the likelihood of talking is tied to the perceived safety of the forum, and the 
safety of the forum is tied to who is present. 
These young people are interested in issues, sometimes passionate about them, 
and keen to debate serious topics, but who spend a great deal of their day-to-day life 
within Facebook and other social media. If, within that space they are, as the survey 
results suggest, continually self-censoring what they choose to comment on, then the 
online world they are building will necessarily become more a surface, ephemeral 
and politically disengaged world than they actually want. 
 
5.4.2 We’re all Friends here (comfortable spaces) 
Between the 2015 and 2017 elections, there was a shift in the creation of those 
online safe forums, with an increase in the compartmentalization of social media by 




bought by Facebook, almost doubled its active monthly users between April 2015 
and July 2017 – from 200m worldwide to 1300m (Statista).  
By 2017, 44% of UK adults were regularly using WhatsApp, against 69% using 
Facebook and 29% Twitter163. A similar report by Ofcom, in 2017, noted that while 
the number of adults with a social media profile had not increased between 2015 and 
2016, the number of site or apps on which they had a profile had increased markedly, 
with an increase in the social media users who had a profile on six sites or apps – 
including  45% of users having a profile on WhatsApp, up from 28% in 2015, and 
31% on Facebook-owned Instagram (up from 22%).164   
The ability to tightly control who was in a WhatsApp group, and to belong to 
multiple groups for different purposes, may have created safer spaces in which debate 
might happen. However, the nature of WhatsApp and similar services such as 
Facebook Messenger (also with 44% UK market penetration) is short messages and 
therefore short conversations. Future research might determine whether the ability to 
hold conversations in closed messaging groups of friends or relatives enables debate. 
People may be part of multiple WhatsApp groups, use message boards, online 
forums, Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook as communicative spaces and the audience 
within that particular space determines the content that is shared. The spaces and the 
content are compartmentalized.  
In the “polymedia” (Madianou & Miller, 2012) world of multiple social media 
spaces and new media communication services, users are able to create or find safer 
 
163 Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Digital News Report 2018 




spaces in which they might – might – feel freer to raise the sociopolitical issues they 
care about. Madianou and Miller gave the example of users moving from the 
indeterminate publicness of Facebook to a private messenger group if a quarrel 
began, or if they wanted to raise personal or emotional issues. This choosing of 
different interpersonal communicative media – this polymedia approach – 
represented, they argued, a shift towards a more socialized and holistic conception of 
media. 
The caveat to that is Dahlgren’s point that whilst it is understandable that groups 
may want to coalesce internally before presenting their ideas to the broader public 
sphere, such “cyber ghetto” may threaten the shared culture and integrative societal 
function of the public sphere (2005: 152) 
Political action as a result of such interpersonal communications depends not on 
volume (how many people support a candidate) but on who is supporting that 
candidate. It is not enough that a user is notified by Facebook when one of their 
friends has voted, or Liked a candidate’s Page, or joined an issue Group. What 
matters more is whether that is a trusted friend.  
Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955, 1957), in their research into who influences decision-
making within personal social networks, noted that the flow of political messages 
was more effective when communicated via a trusted friend. Those influencers are 
not necessarily obvious (e.g. close family members, best friends) but the people 
whose opinions are trusted most. 
In the surveys for this research, the students were asked whether they “look out” 




it”) and 79% said they did so. While this response is a reflection of who they were 
interested in as individuals – i.e closest friends, partner, class mates, etc., the research 
by Katz, Lazarsfeld, Bond et al (2012) suggests these could also be the people likely 
to have most influence on a Facebook user.  
As an avenue for potential future research, that link between “favoured” 
Facebook Friends and the sharing of socio-political views would be worth exploring. 
If Facebook offered mechanisms to more effectively “sort” and prioritise friendship 
groups (in the way, for instance, that its subsidiary service WhatsApp does) rather 
than only focusing on building one-to-most networks, then users may be more willing 
to engage in political talk. 
However, Schudson (1997: 299) spoke of the need for democratic debate to 
happen in “profoundly uncomfortable” public spaces, among people of different 
values and backgrounds. The process of being exposed to and willing to debate 
differing views is key. 
Facebook Friends are not generally homogenous; as well as having varying values 
and backgrounds, around 23% will have an opposing political ideology (Bakshy et al, 
2015). It is, as previously outlined, an uncomfortable semi-public space and if, as 
Schudson suggests, uncomfortable is necessary to democratic debate then sorting 
interpersonal groups into comfortable and uncomfortable spaces for political talk 
would not deliver the open arena of an effective public sphere. 
Zhang et al (2010) echoes this sentiment, concluding that to stimulate civic and 
political participation “we need to focus on encouraging citizens to engage in 




Schudson spoke of the need for truly democratic conversation to be among 
heterogeneous, rather than homogenous, groupings of people (1997: 302) where 
participants had equal access to the ‘floor’, but also: 
equal participation in setting the ground rules for discussion, and a set of 
ground rules designed to encourage pertinent speaking, attentive listening, 
appropriate simplifications, and widely apportioned speaking rights. (p307) 
Could that ideal be applied to Facebook? Certainly, individuals have equal access 
to the ‘floor’, in the sense that anyone can join Facebook and create their own social 
group – their Friends – with whom they might discuss issues, and those Friends 
might participate equally in any discussion. However, as this chapter has argued, that 
space is an indeterminate and often unmanageable space and one in which the young 
people surveyed for this research do not feel encouraged to exercise their speaking 
rights.   
Stage one of the research had suggested that young Facebook users who were 
predisposed to debate politics were generally uncomfortable doing so on their 
personal Facebook Profile. Therefore, the second research stage investigated whether 
users were more comfortable debating issues on public Facebook sites which were 
clearly political, i.e. would those Facebook users predisposed to engage in political 
talk seek out like-minded strangers on the site? And, when they did engage in debate, 
what was the quality of that interaction – were these citizens engaging in the reasoned 
and reasonable political talk of the public sphere? 
As previously mentioned, one thing that proved to be ethically and technically 
impossible in this next, online ethnographic, phase of the research was to follow the 




also proved difficult was trying to target the same demographic on the public 
(candidate) political Pages. The fieldwork - looking at candidates’ Facebook Pages 
and some of the visitors to those Pages - was dependent on who appeared in the 
timeline or message thread on each visit. Further, it was difficult to identify the age 
and background of the visitors. Information about the identity and social group of a 
participant in a debate was largely only available via their personal Facebook Profile 
and, depending on that individual’s privacy settings, was frequently restricted to a 
profile picture, location and a few posts.  
It was not possible to filter Comments and Posts by age group, and the only way 
to tell whether an individual was more generally interested in politics was whether 
their privacy settings allowed enough content through to see evidence of that interest 
– for example in Groups they belonged to, or other posts and comments they had 
made. However, it is reasonable to assume that for someone to visit a political 
candidate’s Page and post a Comment, then they were likely to have an interest in 
that candidate or their Party (supporting or opposing); or in civic or political issues; 
or in the General Election itself - i.e. they were ‘want to talk, here to talk’ in a space 
they may expect to be more comfortable. 
And, as the following section details, these were not necessarily people coming 
together to debate with like-minded people. The issue of people engaging in debate 
on a Page belonging to a candidate they were not able to vote for, or even a candidate 
they did not plan to vote for, was something seen often during this research. What 





5.4.3 Politics over, nothing scary happened (engaged openers and 
supportive policers) 
The fieldwork stage focused on looking for political talk. In particular, looking 
for political talk indicative of the open debate among citizens on which public 
spheres theory is focused. Thus, when the ‘predisposed to talk’ groups debated 
political or civic issues, did they do so in a way that was public, reasoned and 
reasonable, with the aim of forming or informing opinions? As chapter three outlined, 
the data gathering focused on looking for debate rather than oratory, even though the 
latter might also have the aim of informing others or directing opinions on an issue. 
By extension, it was not relevant for talk to be coded as explicitly, implicitly, or 
not political - the assumption would be that the majority of talk within these political 
online spaces would be explicitly or implicitly political. The content therefore needed 
to be coded in a much more direct way in order to distinguish between political 
statements (oratory) and political debate (discussion). The research was focused on 
debate – the reasoned exchange of views – not simply the airing of them. 
As example, a thread on the Stoke-on-Trent UKIP Page began as oratory from 
Facebook user Jason about local councils, the EU, multinational companies and 
perceived preferential treatment for migrants (“whilst we are in the EU we are seeing 
local people put at the back of a housing waiting list that is seeing hundreds of 
migrants pushed right to the front”). But, rather than a racist tirade, Jason ends his 
oratory with the conciliatory “Rant over” – a signal that he recognises others may not 
agree with him. That recognition acts as an invitation – to which Rich responds (see 




Jason: [continues] and we have the local Labour party to thank for the neglect 
towards local hardworking people. Rant over. 
Rich: You’re right of course in some ways Jason but you need to articulate the 
message properly if we’re going to take it to the bleeding edge…[continues] 











Essentially, Jason and Rich are on the same political side, but the exchange 
becomes a debate as Rich responds to Jason, by trying to persuade him to become 
more engaged in debate and a stronger advocate for UKIP policies. 
Jason opens a sentence with “I understand [however]”, Rich with “I agree [but]” 
and in doing so, both signal willingness to continue the debate. Then, whether to 
challenge Jason or having tired of the discussion, Rich veers from reasonable debate 
towards personal criticism (“essentially spouting lefty lies”) and back to oratory 
(“We need everyone to stand up now…”). Jason does not respond and the discussion 
ends (Fig. 19).  
Note, in Figure 18, that almost apologetic sign-off to making a political point 
from Jason of “Rant over”. This ameliorating of the expression of strong political 
opinion was seen frequently during this second stage research. Another example is 
pictured in Figure 20, from the Facebook page of Jason P, ending his passionate 







Figure 19: Screenshot of end of debate 
 
Figure 20: “I’ll step off my pulpit now” 
Willingness to be “reasonable” in debating on Facebook was frequently signaled 




talk typical of online forums (Jackson et al, 2013). Saying what s/he might think 
about a political issue - even when writing on an overtly political site – takes what 
Eliasoph defined as “cultural work” (1997: 607). The task of transmuting the 
citizen’s feeling of powerlessness against the weight of powerful elites into 
expressions of self-interest on an issue. Producing political apathy takes work too, the 
culture of pervasive political avoidance Eliasoph noted needs to be maintained by 
hard work and peer reinforcement. Thus, when people do engage in political talk, 
however tentatively or briefly, how they talk to each other matters. 
If we recognize that producing apathy takes a great deal of work, then we may 
find an unnoticed reserve of hope; we may begin to draw out the 
contradictory, tangled, democratic impetus embedded in citizens’ everyday 
interactions – and also the impetus toward self-enclosed, narrowness 
embedded in these same interactions. (1997: 606) 
Expressions such as “rant over” or “step off my pulpit now” signal reasonableness 
by undermining the importance of what is being said – the suggestion that this may 
be political talk, but it is couched in terms of political apathy. This is only “my 
pulpit” and it won’t change a damn thing. A signal of reasonableness and an 
invitation to others to step in by implying “it’s ok, the politics bit is over, nothing 
scary happened”. 
So, Michelle feels it necessary to temper her strong views (“if Labour get in 
omg God help us”) in consciously chatty language and a visible willingness to listen 
to opposing views (Fig. 21). Writing on her own Profile (and picked up by Burton & 
Uttoxeter Conservative candidate Andrew Griffiths because of the hyperlinked name 
check in her Post) she is happy to debate with her non-Conservative-voting “girlys” 




because she is comfortable talking with this particular group of Facebook Friends, 
happy to encourage them to participate in the election: 
“don’t want to get in to a row over politics Hun you can vote who like. I’m all 
for free speech and free country just as long as people vote can’t do with the 
moaners then they don’t vote [smiley]” 
The netiquette is particularly interesting – the women in this conversation called 
each other “Hun” (short for honey) and acknowledged the other’s opposing view – 
reassuring themselves that the friendship (at whatever level it was on Facebook) 
would not be adversely affected by their debating from opposing political sides. 
Michelle, like Jason earlier, is an engaged opener. Curious and engaged citizens, 
often young and/or female and/or liberal, who either initiate debate or join in, but 
clearly signaling how the debate should proceed through light, non-threatening 
language and clear netiquette. Engaged openers may move between that role and the 
role of the aware producer or the supportive policer in continuing to set the terms or 
standards for the debate.165 
When another Friend, Rockin Ratbags, joins this debate and also disagrees with 
Michelle’s political position (Figs. 22 and 23), he eventually signals an end to the 
discussion with an invite to his gig – an olive branch she happily accepts (Fig. 24). 
 
165 Graham and Wright (2014) wrote about “superparticipation” by what they termed as superposters, 
agenda-setters and facilitators observed on the online forum moneysavingexpert.com, and who 
similarly might move between the categories and influence debate. While largely focused on volume – 
the superposters who dominated the forum by quantity of posts (primarily, the researchers note, as 
replies to other posters), the agenda-setters and facilitators they suggested may have greater influence 




Michelle and Ratbags are the debate leaders and once this transaction happens they 
stop, ignoring the more strident points made by the newcomer Matt (Fig 24). 
There is reasonable debate here but no changing of minds and fairly short-lived 
reasoning at that, perhaps because the participants are too quick to end discussion if it 
seems to be getting too serious and therefore a potential risk to the equilibrium of the 
Friends group. Michelle as engaged opener has initiated the debate, been visible in 
encouraging participants, but also visible in policing how the debate should be 
conducted and when it should end. 
 
 





Figure 22: Progression of debate and risk to group equilibrium 
 





Figure 24: The “olive branch” ending of the debate 
 
Alongside the “hun” and “girly” and addressing each other by name as signaling 
respect and therefore intended reasonableness is the use of irony, jokes and emoji. 
Kohn (2000) wrote of “irony, personal narrative, aesthetic interventions, theatricality 
and visibility as indicative of discursive, rather than deliberative, democracy and 
more reflective of real-world political talk than Habermasian bourgeoise ideals 
(2000: 425). Thus, in the conversation mentioned on pages 175-8, Kevin brings to a 
close a similarly limited debate (because he and Mark are too entrenched in their own 
point of view) with his final and ironic use of “mate”: “Well you have your view 
mate and I have mine and never the twain shall meet”.  
There were many similar examples of people apologising ahead of making a 
political point or tempering their views in order to mitigate risk to themselves or the 




opens with the apology: “I’m not one to comment on my Political Views via social 
media but…”, before showing his hand holding a UKIP poster he’d torn down; one 
of “14 or so”. Then, like Ratbags and Jason, he wraps up with his own version of 
‘politics bit over, nothing scary happened’ with this reassuring invitation: 
“Now what’s everybody wearing to the Polling Station? I’m going with 
brogues, skinny black jeans, and a white grandad collar shirt.” 
His Post attracted several replies in kind: “Cowboy boots, black slim boot cut 
jeans, blue collarless Indian Cotton shirt. Obvs” from Emily; “Daisy Dukes and a 
bikini on top #californiagurrrrrl” from Michelle B; and “Work uniform, sadly” from 
Cathy. Note the willingness of women to engage in replying, they may not have 
initiated the debate but they joined in as engaged openers, following and continuing 
the netiquette path begun for them. 
The research of Miller et al (2016) suggested that most users avoided debate and 
serious political comment on Facebook, but might share humorous political memes as 
a means of entertaining friends or reinforcing group norms.  
Serious memes and comments are mainly found either among the highest 
income groups who favour green issues or among the lowest income groups 
who live in social housing and promote nationalist causes such as supporting 
the army or banning immigrants. (2016: 147) 
Whilst the use of memes was noted in the online ethnographic research stage of 
this project, and appeared to be particularly prevalent on the Facebook page of the 
Brighton & Hove UKiP group, there was no particular pattern noted. This was in 
large part because of the technical and ethical limitations in being able to look at the 




any pattern in relation to who more typically posted memes. For example, this 
excerpt from the May 7, 2015 log, looking at the personal Facebook page of a Green 
party supporter who had participated in a debate on Brighton Pavilion Green 
candidate Caroline Lucas’s Page: 
Decided to look at sample of commenters who had replied to others in thread. 
Sue 166 (replied to Jan) – not local, but Talitha is. 
Talitha [her Facebook Page]: 
200 friends. 
Last 20 posts, 15 political (mostly Green-party related); 5 not political (mostly 
memes). Lots of posts from her giving advice and info on voting tactically 
and vote swapping, plus plugs for campaigns for more independent press. 
And a similar excerpt looking at the participants in the Michelle/Rocking Ratbag 
debate seen on Conservative candidate Andrew Griffith’s Page and mentioned 
earlier: 
Looked at debate participants – six involved in debate, plus the candidate. 
Two of six had other political content on their personal page (mostly viral 
memes etc) but didn’t belong to any political or campaign groups, four had no 
political content or I was barred from seeing posts. 
The sharing of memes, GIFs and videos may be perceived as less threatening to 
group norms than words written in a post or comment. It is less personal, less 
“owned” – produced by someone else and shared as in part to entertain Friends and in 
 





part to share ideological “badges” as tribal identification – every Like from a Friend 
is signal from a like mind. 
Facebook began as a medium designed to use words. The ability to share photos 
was not added until 20 months after the site launched (see page 31), but it is a 
communications medium that has become increasingly visual, not least with the 
company’s buying of photo-sharing site Instagram and the launch of Facebook Live 
video. Sharing a well-crafted meme by someone else is an easy and less personal way 
to participate. That visual communication also makes it easier for people who may be 
uncomfortable with their use of written language, particularly to deliver socio-
political opinions, to participate in a visual sharing of ideas. The sharing of visual 
memes etc. is one way to reinforce tribal identification, but political talk can also 
become a tool for reinforcing the socialness of the group by restating generally 
shared attitudes using humour. So, Sam tells his Facebook Friends (see Fig. 25): 
As an active participant in our government and democratic process for five 
minutes today, I would like to claim expenses for the twix I ate on the way to 
the polling station 
“Seems fair” replies Simon. 
This willingness to engage in politics and make a serious point while couching it 
in terms designed not to prompt argument - an apology, a humorous sign-off - was 
seen to happen more often on Posts by women and by younger people.  
Stacey does not “normally mix social media with politics but…” before urging 
her Facebook Friends (via Instagram, linked to her Facebook feed) to vote to save the 
NHS. She adds hashtags (Fig. 26) showing her awareness of how messages are 




political point on social media, as in many of the examples shown, but none-the-less 
she uses SEO tools such as the hashtag to help her point reach a wider audience 
beyond her own Facebook Friends. 
 
Figure 25: Use of humour to maintain group equilibrium 
 




And in the following exchange (copied below and pictured at Fig. 27) the use of 
emojis, “lol” and “X” are used to keep the debate reasonable and maintain group 
norms, while the discussion is brought to a halt by Michael’s “never use Facebook on 
election day” sign-off: 
Ryan: If you don’t vote you have no right to complain [smiley] that’s how I 
see it lol 
Hannah: Also one other little thing that bugged me but may have changed not 
sure… from 16-18 you have to pay taxes yet cant vote? Think that seems a bit 
wrong.. X 
Ryan: I think it’s where you can register to vote at 16 but can’t actually vote 
till your 18 that’s all I know 
Michael: Election Day, never use Facebook on Election Day. On that note 
bye! 
That “never use Facebook on Election Day” exhortation appeared frequently 
during the field research. This comment, from (non-Staffordshire University) 
Journalism student Alessandro, who sent the screenshot of that exchange: 
A majority of my friends did not have anything to do with the election on 
their Facebook. Only a couple of dozen posted anything throughout Friday. 
What was interesting is that I was on Twitter and my friends who did not 
comment on Facebook, were commenting a lot more on Twitter. Using 
hashtags e.t.c. I was on Twitter more during wed-fri as I was live-blogging it 
and I saw a lot more commentary by my ‘twitter’ followers (Many of them 
also my friends on Facebook) than I did on Facebook. 
I spoke to some people and a lot of people on the 7th turned Facebook 
off effectively because they were fed up with the 'I voted in GE2015' 




Despite this reticence to engage in debate on Facebook, when debate did happen 
it was seen to be almost always polite and civil. Among the 3,500 posts read during 
the research period, only one debate (between a small group of older male 
Conservative and Labour supporters) became a full-blown argument. This echoes the 
findings of Papacharissi (2004) who, in her study of 300 online debates found posts 
to be predominantly civil, and Halpern and Gibbs (2013) who found people tended to 
be more civil with each other on Facebook than on YouTube, even when discussing 








167 The study looked at 7230 posts made on the public Facebook and YouTube channels managed by 
the White House. It found that user-to-user posts made on Facebook (versus posts made on YouTube) 
tended to be longer; more polite; less frequent (that is, poster may only make one comment rather than 
several comments in a thread. A factor the researchers interpreted as more egalitarian in that users 
were ceding the floor to each other. However, this could have been a factor of the architecture of 
Facebook in breaking threads by time and space, as discussed in this thesis in section 5.6, and that 
users who engaged in discussion on sensitive topics tended to do so in a more reasoned way - 






Figure 27: Discussion with “never use Facebook on Election Day” sign-off 
 
 
By-and-large, when an individual made an aggressive or personal remark it was 
either ignored, or other people – the supportive policers - would deliberately try to 
move the discussion on to a more civil level. For example, a debate on Caroline 
Lucas’s Page (Brighton Pavilion Green Party candidate) began with participant 
Oliver trying to rile (trolling168) Green supporters by questioning whether they had 
 
168 Trolling, or to troll, is a process of online goading of (generally) individuals by other individuals. 
Defined by the Oxford Dictionary as making a deliberately offensive or provocative online post with 




read the manifesto of “this looney party” (excerpt copied below and see Fig. 28). The 
tetchiness almost turns to argument at several points: 
Neville: Whom do you intend to vote for, Oliver? What are the top three 
reasons?...Oh wait, I’ve seen the poppies and England flag on your page. Let 
me guess, Sun reader? UKIPer at heart but voting Tory? 
Oliver: I haven’t decided although I won’t be voting for a party which 
welcomes a recession and thinks it’s ok to be a member of a terrorist 
organization…Yes the poppies are very important. They represent those who 
gave their lives for this Country… if the likes [sic] of the Green party which 
hates this country. 
Emma: Oliver you sound like a Britain first member. Take your fascist views 
and express them to people that are interested. 
Jordan: [in two posts supporting Oliver] It’s like you only have to mention the 
word ‘immigration’ to the Green party and other political parties and you get 





Figure 28: “Tetchy” debate seen on Caroline Lucas’ Page 
 




The ‘debate’ is eventually brought onto a more reasoned and reasonable footing 
by the intervention of Green Party supporters. Stephen exhorts debate participants not 
to make assumptions about people based on their profile pictures adding: “Oliver 
clearly has concerns and we’d do better to address them rather than attack him”, 
before addressing Oliver (and his concerns) in a long and detailed reply (Fig. 29). 
Neither Oliver nor Jordan reply to Stephen, and the discussion moves on to other 
subjects. 
It is one of many examples witnessed not only of ‘netiquette’ in action but also of 
how supporters of a candidate (some of who may be party workers or activists) will 
intervene to keep debate civil and maintain engagement – defined here as the 
supportive policers. 
Another example from Lucas’s Page is a debate sparked by a Comment from a 
local resident169 that “Lucas and her party of protest have achieved very little for 
Brighton”. Corinne and Tessa respond by pointing out that “the council & our MP are 
separate entities”. And when Peter says a Green vote is a wasted vote “almost as bad 
as UKIP”, Tessa jumps in again: 
It’s nothing like UKIP, and all votes do count. You elect local MP’s [sic] to 
make a difference in your local area. That is how you get things changed. 
This willingness to engage in debate with strangers was particularly evident on 
Lucas’s Page, and even more so after the election result. Unlike the Pages of other 
winning candidates (e.g. the Conservative candidate Andrew Griffiths in Burton & 
 




Uttoxeter) Lucas’s Page showed evidence of supporters of different parties coming 
together to debate the election result, rather than to simply congratulate the candidate. 
This is not necessarily surprising - after all Griffiths was also in the overall 
winning Party so one might assume the hundreds of supporters who added their 
congratulations to his Page and Profile on May 8th were also happy with the election 
result overall. However, Lucas’s Page seemed to act as a magnet for left-leaning 
voters, whether they voted Green or not and whether they lived in Brighton or not, to 
come together in order to debate the election result. 
The two strongest themes to emerge on the Lucas’s Page post-election were a call 
for unification of opposition, and discussion of the perceived unfairness of the voting 
system. As examples: 
Doug: Worthwhile unifying the left on mainstream values – come up with 
viable alternatives. Don’t just go banging on about anti-this or that… 
Gill:….I feel we need to have serious discussion about a system where 10 
million people get to decide the fate of a total population of 64 million...  
The prompt to debate seems to have been a post by Lucas, on 9th May, on her 
blog (and promoted and linked to on her social media) arguing for cross-party 
progressives to work together in opposition. But the debate on her Facebook Page, 
and which continued across the 124 Comments read (attracting 1,978 Likes and 474 
Shares), was dominated by people who were not in Lucas’s constituency, according 
to what could be viewed on their Profiles, yet had engaged in her Page. 
As previously explained, a large number of them may not have actually been 




Friend’s Page and thus on their own Page. Without help from Facebook (and perhaps 
even with the company’s help) it is impossible to say what percentage of the people 
contributing those 124 comments, 1,978 Likes and 474 Shares were doing so on 
Lucas’s Page and who had come across the posts or its comments on another Page. 
Architectural issues aside, it can be assumed that a percentage of them had 
engaged directly with this Post on Caroline Lucas’s Page. And for those who saw the 
material via a Friend, they still chose to engage with the thread even when it was 
prompted by a candidate they could not vote for. They had no reason to visit Lucas’s 
Facebook Page, or to engage with what people in her constituency might have to say 
about the election. But by choosing to visit and/or comment it is reasonable to 
assume most of them were looking to engage with like-minded people (in some cases 
opposing views were seen but the overwhelming majority were participants agreeing 
with each other). Being there would validate their own thoughts on the election; offer 
new insights; and offer the opportunity to debate in a space more likely to be 
reasonable. They were seeking debate with strangers, but specifically with like-
minded strangers.  
 
 
5.4.4 Like-minded strangers 
Between 2015 and 2017, that desire to find like-minded people led to the rapid 
rise of quasi-political, single issue Facebook groups such The 48% and We Are The 
48 – two of the largest UK Groups set up on Facebook after the Brexit election (48% 




Group, launched the day after the vote to leave the European Union, had 5,000 
members by the end of its first day and 25k members within six weeks170. It became a 
closed group171 as its membership grew, in order to better control debate and 
membership.  
But this enabling of like-minded groups by Facebook is double-edged. On the one 
hand, thousands of people were able to find each other within a comfortable space in 
order to debate an issue – Brexit – in greater depth and detail than they may have 
been comfortable doing in their family/friends personal Facebook group. It thus made 
such debate more likely172. But on the other hand, this ghettoization of debate and 
opinion reinforces cognitive bias and, as Dahlgren (2005a:152) highlights risks 
undermining the integrative societal function of the public sphere; encouraging 
fragmentation between groups; further polarization of opinions; and disconnect 
between communicative spaces and political decision-making processes. 
However, that desire to find like-minded people in terms of political or issue-led 
affiliation is key both to feeling able to engage in political talk on Facebook and to 
developing the knowledge and/or opinions necessary to productive debate. Dahlgren 
(2005) noted that political apathy did not necessarily mean political disinterest and 
that for many citizens, disenchantment with established political systems had led 
 
170 Source: The Group’s public-facing website at http://the.48andbeyond.co.uk/p/blog-page.html  
171 This means material is not openly public and membership applications have to be accepted by an 
administrator/Group controller, and there may be other restrictions. In the case of The 48%, posts are 
moderated and have to be approved by an administrator before being published and posters are 
discouraged from sharing material seen within the group unless they get permission from the 
originator. See: http://the.48andbeyond.co.uk/2018/01/normal-0-21-false-false-false-de-ja-x.html 
(accessed November 12, 2018). 
172 See also Savigny, 2016: 148-150 on the importance of resistance as a form of political 




them to refocus their political interest into more fluid social movements and para-
political groupings. 
Politics becomes not only an instrument activity for achieving specific goals, 
but also an expressive activity, a way of asserting, within the public sphere, 
group values, ideals, and belonging. (2005:155)    
This sense of belonging delivers a sense of commonality within the group, a 
feeling that, despite their individual differences, they belong to the same social and 
political entities (Dahlgren, 2005a: 158). Ancu and Cozma (2009) in their research 
into US citizens Friending the MySpace sites of election candidates similarly 
concluded that voters were drawn to candidates’ pages largely in order to interact 
with like-minded supporters, rather than to gather information. 
 The desire to seek out like-minded people was also looked for within the online 
ethnographic research stage by checking for membership of issue-based or political 
Groups on Facebook among participants in the debates witnessed. Such membership 
was viewed as a potential indicator of willingness to debate. For example, Daniel 
who initiated a debate (engaged opener) on Burton and Uttoxeter candidate’s 
Andrew Griffith’s Page (copied below and see Fig. 30), had belonged to 46 different 
Facebook Groups, including ones on running, sports, local groups, and one political 
issue-led group - Disenfranchised Shrewsbury Residents (with 2,888 members at the 
time). Daniel visited Griffith’s Page in order to address him directly: 
Made my mind up. I abhor your party’s leader, and in no way do I want to 
vote Conservative (nor Labour for that matter). 
That being said, you’ve clearly done a lot of work for Burton over the years, 




reasons, I will be voting for YOU in two weeks. I hope you storm it [smiling 
emoji, ballot cross emoji] 
Daniel’s post sparks a flurry of supportive messages (24) and Likes (92), 
including replies from Griffiths, but no debate. However, the thread (Fig. 31) is 
interesting for two reasons: first the role of the candidate in encouraging more 
supportive comments by replying to and addressing commenters, and secondly as an 
example of why people visit a candidate's site if not to debate politics.  
Daniel had previously (March 30th, 2015) posted a similar supportive message 
about Griffiths on his own Facebook Page. Naming Griffiths in the Post created a tag 
(the blue text in the image) which meant it would be seen by Griffiths. Griffiths is 
then able to join in the debate thread, which is running on Daniel’s Page (Fig. 32) and 
is therefore seen by his Friends, several of whom join in the debate he has opened: 
Daniel: I wish Andrew Griffiths was running as an independent. I’m actually 
happy with how he’s represented Burton, it’s his boss I want nothing to do 
with. Ive still no idea who I’ll go for. 
Andrew Griffiths: Thank you David. Well that’s a challenge to me! I’ve 
worked hard for the last 5 years. But I’m going to use the next 5 weeks to 
convince you Im worth your vote! The challenge is on! 
Daniel: Well, that’s not the best of starts… Regards, David [winking emoji] 
Richard joins in to explain why Labour isn’t for him (his assumption perhaps that 
Labour had been ‘for’ his Friend Daniel in the past) – Labour “got us [into] a mess 
and as for Ed millipede as a leader. No thank you.” But despite his negative response, 




point about Miliband: “The wrong brother was picked and none of their policies 
seem, well… logical”. 
Note that, in those examples, Griffiths has replied to direct messages of support 
for his candidature but does not engage in the discussion about Labour’s policies or 
the strength of its Leader or the local Labour candidate. Interviewing Griffiths after 
the 2015 election, he said that he deliberately avoided contentious issues on his page, 
adding:  
I think people get turned off by party politics and the ‘yahboo politics’. If you 
look at the Labour party page they often have a conversation with themselves 
without realising that the general public sees that and it turns them off. 
 





Figure 31: Responses to Daniel’s Post 
 





Figure 33: His support for Griffiths is responded to by his Friends 
So, Daniel uses his own Facebook Page to air his dichotomy – his support for 
Griffiths set against his antipathy towards the political party Griffiths stands for. 
Then, perhaps having found his views echoed by like-minded Friends (Garry writes: 
“I have to say I agree with your view. Andrew has been a superb MP just a shame 
about the boss.” (Fig. 33), he makes his voting decision and seeks out Griffiths on his 
campaign page to tell him so (Fig. 30). His decision is then further reinforced by 
supporters of Griffiths who echo his assessment of Griffiths as a particularly hard-
working local MP who therefore is deserving of Daniel’s support and change of 
allegiance. 
That one expressed idea (basically: ‘I’m thinking of voting Griffiths, am I right to 
do so?’) began in one place, on Daniel’s own Page, was seen by Griffiths because he 
was tagged in the Post and was then taken onto Griffith’s Page to be seen by his 




Griffith’s two Facebook pages, or Followed him – also happened to be Friends with 
Daniel, that would make it more likely that Facebook’s algorithms would use that 
connection as reason to make sure that they, Griffiths and Daniel saw the posts and 
comments in the thread. 
Which necessitates a return to the question of why Facebook users would visit the 
Page of a candidate? Furthermore, why would people visit the Facebook Page of a 
candidate they do not intend voting for or could not vote for because they were not in 
that constituency (such as many of those commenting on Caroline Lucas or Tristram 
Hunt’s Pages)? And why would they – like Daniel – visit the Page of a candidate they 
had already decided to vote for, just to announce that? There is cultural work (see 
page 249) involved in going to the Page and addressing the candidate, therefore there 
must also be a benefit to be gained from that effort. 
Those Facebook Pages of Andrew Griffiths, Conservative candidate Burton & 
Uttoxeter, helped in answering these questions. He was personally very active on 
Facebook and both his personal Profile and campaign Page showed significant 
activity from users. Indeed, across the four constituencies monitored in 2015, his sites 
were the second most active (Lucas’s Page was first). Posts normally attracted 
comments in the double figures, however the overwhelming majority were messages 
of support. In the 300+ comments read, the only debate seen was the one initiated by 
Michelle (as mentioned earlier) which ran on her own Profile page but was cross 




Tagging is the feature of Facebook structure that creates links between user 
accounts173. By correctly naming Griffiths he is tagged (linked) and this is evidenced 
by his name appearing as blue hyperlinked text. Facebook may send him a 
notification so that he can see the post and, depending on his account settings, the 
post (and comments attached to it) may appear in Griffith’s Timeline as well as 
Michelle’s174. It may then also appear in both sets of Friends’ feeds, creating more 
links and potentially drawing more voices into the conversation. It is this ability of 
Facebook’s architecture to use the connections between users to bring a conversation 
in one place to the attention of people in another place that makes it so effective as a 
communications media. 
“[I]t is genuinely a way for people to have a conversation with their friends. 
That’s when it works is when people share things about you on their own 
Facebook page. It’s a dumping of people’s instant reaction to things.” 
(Andrew Griffiths, interviewed July 2015) 
However, tagging also makes it possible for strangers (i.e. people outside his/her 
Facebook Friends) to see what a user has posted and therefore adding to the social 
risk in them raising contentious issues in a public space in which they can only share 
control over its boundaries. 
But it is the socialness of the social network that matters most to its users - it is 
why they use Facebook; it is why its business model is successful - and it is also why 
users would gather on a political Page but not necessarily to debate politics. They are 
there to see the candidate; to verify that they care about the same local area or issues 
 
173 More at: https://en-gb.facebook.com/about/tagging (accessed November 12, 2018) 
174 There are some limitations, depending on the privacy settings for a user’s Page or a Group. See 




as they do, and to see his/her supporters. They are there to be sociable, whether by 
showing support to a candidate; to gather information or to ask questions. It is about 
affiliating to a tribe (or occasionally picking a fight with them), but it is primarily 
about socialness. They want social networking to be a pleasant experience shared 
with like-minded people. 
This may be the case even for those non-participants in debate. Jones (1997) was 
writing well before the advent of Facebook but in his work looking at social use of 
the Internet, including Usenet groups175, he noted a parallel between online “lurking” 
in such online groups – reading and watching rather than participating in discussion – 
and offline reading in the way both activities isolate individuals, encouraging them to 
be “among but not with” other people (1997: 14).  
We are struck, as we use the Internet, by the sense that there are others out 
there like us. (1997: 17) 
Reinforcement of that “like us” feeling comes from people making similar 
comments – echoing each other’s points, particularly when supporting a candidate or 
a message, and being seen to do so by the non-participants – Jones’ “lurkers”. 
Positive responses reinforce the group’s understanding of its identity. It is not 
coincidental that users are invited to ‘Like’ a post, nor that the majority of such 
interactions are affirmative – with smiling rather than angry face emojis. 
 
175 Usenet newsgroups are thousands of open access, virtual bulletin boards on a wide range of 
subjects. Anyone with internet access can post a message to a newsgroup, read a message, and post a 
response to a message. They form the organisational structure of Usenet, a peer-to-peer online network 
for exchanging information and files. Source: https://www.livinginternet.com/u/u.htm (accessed 




The majority of comments and posts on Griffiths’ sites were supporting the 
candidate. Even when a contentious issue was being discussed, comments would 
generally support Griffiths and each other (further supportive policing). For example, 
a thread begun by Griffiths in response to a newspaper article about East 
Staffordshire Borough Council Leader Julian Mott prompts a string of Comments 
from supporters (Fig. 34), mirroring Griffith’s anger about the issue, of which this 
excerpt is typical: 
Sue: Not surprised – Frank Bather’s family deserve more respect [2 Likes] 
Matty: It’s a joke. He should be fined the cost of today’s hearing [3 Likes] 
Jan: What a disgrace! Certainly the man has no manners…[continues] [5 
Likes] 
Ed: No honour, no decency and no respect shown…[continues] [3 Likes] 
Matthew: As someone who could certainly be described as left of centre, this 
above story embarrasses me as its clear it’s an effort to stall till post may 5th. 
IF this was an attempt to collude…[continues] [2 Likes] 
Gary: This is disgusting and dishonourable behaviour which should be taken 
as further evidence of his unsuitability for office 
Note in the screenshot how Matthew introduces his point “as someone who could 
certainly be described as left of centre...”. Another example, perhaps, of someone 
visiting a candidate’s Page or joining in a debate linked to a candidate’s Page even 














However, it is impossible to know whether all the Comments in the conversation 
thread above came from via direct visits to Griffith’s Page, or indirectly by a user 
picking up the debate in their own News Feed. Facebook, as explored further in 
section 5.6, is built on making as many links as possible between users and the 




their Facebook profile or page will, according to Facebook, contain material from 
multiple sources direct and indirectly connected to the user: 
Posts that you see first are influenced by your connections and activity 
on Facebook. The number of comments, likes and reactions a post 
receives and what kind of story it is (example: photo, video, status 
update) can also make it more likely to appear higher up in your News 
Feed. 
Posts that you might see first include: 
A friend or family member commenting on or liking another friend’s 
photo or status update. 
A person reacting to a post from a publisher that a friend has shared. 
Multiple people replying to each other’s comments on a video they 
watched or an article they read in News Feed.176 
 
 
5.4.5 Visibly there 
Griffiths’ sites show that he is seen by his supporters as both a hard-working local 
MP177 and someone who is visibly ‘there’. They comment frequently on things he has 
 
176 Source: Facebook Help Center ‘How News Feed works’ 
https://www.facebook.com/help/1155510281178725/?helpref=hc_fnav accessed 17 September, 2018. 
177 In July 2018, the Mirror newspaper published a series of articles exposing Griffiths as a “sex pest” 
who had sent hundreds of lewd text messages to young women in his constituency, some sent from the 
Houses of Parliament, prompting an investigation by the Conservative Party and Parliamentary 




done for them, events they have seen him at, and as someone who “does put himself 
about locally”. His presence on social media is important to reinforcing that 
viewpoint - you always know where you can “see” him, as in Christine’s comment, 
after the election: 
Rob: Well done Andrew, thanks for all your hard work 
Christine: Well deserved win. I’ve never felt so compelled to vote and that is 
down to you and your hard work. You offered to help my friend re 
undeserved parking ticket at the hospital, your reply meant such a lot. Being 
able to follow you on twitter and friends on Facebook means anyone can see 
how hard you work and also contact you easily if need to. (fig 12) 
For both Rob and Christine, Griffith’s visibility on and off social media was 
important. Rob addresses Griffiths directly, knowing he will be “there” to see his 
supportive comment. He even addresses Griffiths by his first name, reinforcing that 
he believes himself to be in a social space. While Christine comments directly on 
how being able to connect with the candidate on Twitter and Facebook gives her the 
power to “see” him, to watch him work and to feel he is visibly there for her to 
contact and connect with.  
To stress again, out of the 27 candidates across four constituencies studied, all of 
the winning candidates and three out of four of the second-placed candidates were 
also the candidates who had the most active Pages. Aside from one anomaly178, the 
candidates who got most votes in the 2015 election were those who were seen to be 
most active on Facebook. They were visibly there and, while more research would be 
 
178 As previously mentioned, Stoke Central candidate Tristram Hunt had an active Facebook page in 




needed to determine the strength of the link between candidate visibility and votes 
won, there was a link in these four constituencies. 
Interviewing Griffiths after the election, he said that it had been a conscious 
decision to be personally more visible on Facebook this time and to manage his own 
Pages. 
Facebook is a great app for me to just engage people in my work, for people 
to see what I’m doing - the number of appointments and the engagements I 
do. Particularly to the individuals concerned with those issues. It might be 
about a pothole or something really local but it’s really important to them. I 
use it very much as a notice board. 
He said that a member of staff had previously handled his Facebook page but 
then, about 12 months before, he had had “an epiphany”: 
Jim Messina179, who was President Obama’s campaign manager, came and 
spoke to some of us at Conservative Party Office and he asked: ‘What’s the 
first thing you think about in the morning and the last thing at night?’ I said 
the answer was sex but it was my smartphone! It’s the first thing I reach for in 
the morning and before I go to bed is to check my phone.  
Until that time, I always viewed Facebook as a free add-on to my campaign. 
In the course of this election campaign it became an integral part of my 
campaign and for the first time I spent money on it, on buying ads on 
Facebook. 
 
179 Gaber (2017) in alluding to massively increased spend by the Conservative Party on Facebook 
advertising, also quotes Messina in saying that Facebook was critical to communicating with voters 




Griffiths (who increased his share of the vote in a constituency with 65% turnout) 
added: 
This was a watershed in terms of politics and the potential of social media, 
but I think in five years hence it will have moved on again - five years hence 
it will be something else. But the core strategy of engagement with people 
socially, of pavement politics, is there now. It’s an integral part of 
engagement so that we don’t even think about it any more. 
Stoke Central had the lowest turnout of a constituency at the 2015 election.180 
This was also the constituency in the group in which none of the candidates for the 
major parties chose to personally engage with voters via the electronic doorstep of 
Facebook. Just two of the eight candidates had their own campaign Page. Three 
candidates shared local party pages, and others either had no involvement in 
Facebook, or only had a personal Profile (which did not reference the local 
campaign). 
Pages in which the candidate took no active part - such as Tristram Hunt’s Page 
(Labour, Stoke Central) - showed very little involvement of local voters. As outlined 
in chapter four, Hunt’s campaign Page (his personal Facebook Profile was closed to 
the public) saw the most volume of Likes and Friends and activity from visitors 
against his rivals’ Pages, however not the most activity from local voters. This in 
itself is interesting as it suggests that the Likes and Friend/Follower requests were 
delivered as part of a centralised (rather than local) push to boost the reach of content. 
Given that activity on a post or comment in the form of Likes and Shares made it 
more likely that Facebook’s algorithms would “reward” the poster by pushing the 
 
180 At 51.3% it was not only the lowest in England, but the lowest across the UK, according to 




material out to more people, central supporter banks or coordinated work by party 
volunteers could be an effective way to naturally boost reach. 
Posts on Hunt’s campaign page very often had double-figures of Likes, 
sometimes in the hundreds, but comparatively few comments (less than ten on each 
post viewed). Sampling three random sets of Likes on Hunt posts, it was found that in 
each case almost all Likes were from non-local voters, including people from 
overseas (according to information on their Profiles). For example, a posting of 
photographs from a local campaign event had one of highest number of Likes (133), 
but only 16 could definitely be linked to people based in Stoke-on-Trent. The 
comments on that post (copied below and screenshot at Fig. 35) reinforced that Hunt 
and his team were not actively managing his Facebook Page: 
Paul: Should women not be on the right segregated from the men  
Jon: Bloody hell somebody finally [put] a stoke postcode into his sat nav 
Ian: Have you seen Liam Ascough anywhere, because we haven’t seen him in 
Crawley 
David: Ukip 
Jon was the only local voter in that exchange and his jibe about Hunt went 
unanswered - as did all of the criticism and negative comments seen. Reasonable 
points addressed to the candidate were also ignored, such as these from women 
voters: 
Donna: Hmmm. Having read it [a Sunday newspaper column written by 
Hunt], I agree tentatively but, given some of the things you’ve said in the 





Karen: What about children with autism? 
Philippa: So where are the jobs and education? Education for the elite and 
jobs for people prepared to work below the minimum wage doesn’t seem fair 
to me Tristram. Skills are essential but need to be available. 
[and later in the same thread] Tristram, could you tell us how you are going to 
tackle education (including special needs) Don’t waffle just lay your plan out. 
I do believe you are of good intention but can you do it on a people’s level? 
Other posters chipped into the thread with criticism of Hunt (Fig. 36)  as a 
“champagne socialist” (Gary), “a joke…posh useless toff” (Will) and “posh snob” 
(Banaris) – again, indication that Hunt’s Facebook feed was not being managed 
(Hunt did not reply to requests for an interview in relation to the research). 
Philippa (Fig. 36) was one of a handful of local voters in this thread and her 
own Facebook Profile showed an interest in political and civic issues.  She had been 
involved in Human Rights International, belonged to a Facebook Save the NHS 
Group, and Liked dozens of Pages related to anti-poverty and pro-NHS campaigns, as 
well as various media Pages (Manchester Gazette to Jerusalem Post). She would be 
an example of the research target group of individuals predisposed to debate. 
However, what was interesting is that not only did she not get a response from Hunt, 
but no one else engaged in debate with her. This thread (which went on for several 
pages) was largely a series of statements by individuals - oratory without the reward 
of positive response from the candidate or other participants; there was no reasoned 
debate181. 
 
181 While focused on candidates’ use of Twitter, rather than Facebook, research by Graham et al 







Figure 35: Evidence that Hunt’s Page was not being actively managed 
 
found that Dutch candidates were not only (then) more active on Twitter but more likely to use it 






Figure 36: Criticism and questions on Hunt’s page went unanswered 
The thread had none of the participatory elements that the research had shown had 
encouraged debate on other candidate’s pages. There was no visible leader - no 
candidate demonstrating openness to debate; no supportive policers encouraging 
participation and managing netiquette to create a comfortable space; no aware 
producers posting content with the aim of initiating engagement, and no engaged 
openers initiating debate and signaling how it should proceed. 
This issue of how far the level of personal involvement of a candidate in social 
media affects voting patterns would be a question worth exploring further in future 
research, as is the effect of candidates managing their social network sites by 
responding to – or even censoring – comments. As noted on pages 279-80, voters saw 
a link between the visibility of the candidate on their social media and the authenticity 




The same effect was seen in 2017, during the run-up to the “snap” General 
Election. In the exchange below, on Burton & Uttoxeter Labour candidate John 
Mckiernan’s page (Fig. 37), local voter Katie comments that she had not known the 
candidate’s name until she saw “the only sign in [T]utbury with your name on it”. 
Her request that voters like her needed to be see and hear more about the candidate, is 
responded to by others (supportive policers) who point out the difficulty in getting 
information out in the short campaigning time allowed.  
Note that the candidate responds directly to Katie, addressing her by full name 
which ‘tags’ her so the reply would appear on her own Timeline: 
John Mckiernan: Katie [name deleted for anonymity] Hi Katie. Virtually no 
time to organise and act. The only real channel was FB to get out there fast. 
And other commenters joined in the thread and referenced the online visibility of 
the candidate, Mckiernan,  as a plus - Leonie: “John did respond to questions (unlike 
Andrew [Griffiths] who ignored me)”; Dawn: “Please stay visible and take every 
opportunity to hold Andrew Griffiths to account”; Ian: “John, I think your 
achievement in the few short weeks that you were able to put together a campaign, 
with just about no support from the national party was incredible”; James: “Well 
done John, keep going. Burton and Uttoxeter need caring, sincere and honest people 
like you. Stay visible and continue to take the fight to them.” 
However, the reply from Mckiernan, like most other Comments from the 
candidate, did not come from him but from one of the team of three local party 
volunteers who were tasked with running Mckiernan’s social media campaign. 
During the case study element of this research, the group were seen to be able to log 




above). They took on the role of proxy visible leader, as well as the roles of 
supportive policers and aware producers, to encourage engagement. They provided 
the candidate visibility that Facebook users were interpreting as candidate 
authenticity.  
The success of that team in using Facebook to raise the visibility of the candidate 
and to develop his campaign Page as a comfortable space for political talk meant the 












The attributes Mckiernan’s Facebook visitors came to see in the candidate, his 
visibility, “caring, sincere and honest”, his willingness to respond directly to 
questions, were developed by his organised and social media-aware proxy group182.  
Thus, while it benefits engagement on Facebook to have the candidate as visible 
leader of their Page, it does not have to be the candidate him or herself. What matters 
is that “the candidate” is seen to take on the visible leader role by responding to direct 
questions and (some) Comments in order to deliver the authenticity that voters seek 
out; the visible evidence that the candidate is interested in them and their concerns 
and willing to put the work into responding to them. 
Mike Green (UKIP candidate for Burton & Uttoxeter) or his colleague replied 
to most questions and comments posted on his Page (Fig. 38), even negative ones. In 
reply to emailed questions about his Facebook strategy, he said: 
 Our local strategy was to try and engage with younger voters and a different 
 audience. We believe social media will be a very powerful tool in the future. 
My impression is that Facebook and Twitter are big, but it is still like 
screaming in a vacuum. Things would be said or posted on social media, but 
my reaction was to look out of the window and ask myself how many of the 
 
182 And from the quality of the material produced by these aware producers and supportive policers, 
including the Post written about (an as if from) the candidate and his values pictured at Fig. 62 




electorate in Burton would know about it. I think it will grow as an election 
tool, but at the moment the answer to [whether it encourages debate] would be 
a minute fraction. 
However, a “minute fraction” in relation to Facebook’s almost two billion users 
could, in fact be a great deal of debate. As this thesis suggested in chapter one, it is 
the scale of Facebook that warrants investigation of its potential as a new space for 
political debate. 
Darren Hall, Green Party candidate for Bristol West, spoke about the need to 
make his Facebook Page “fun” and engaging: 
We had an upbeat positive style and jumped on anyone that was trolling or 
being negative. Content was designed to be engaging and provocative. We 
wanted to make politics a bit more fun, open, so our strategy was to use 
Facebook to invite participation via interesting events such as our Forum is 
Free series of debates, plus a couple of music and art events.   
This encouraging of a sociable space was important. If as Griffiths suggested, 
Facebook is “on the sofa” with users, and by extension in their personal space, they 
are also vulnerable through it. A user who is attacked on Facebook for something 
they say knows that some of their Friends will see that attack too – they cannot easily 
walk away. No wonder then that political points are wrapped with apologies, 
humour183 and ameliorating language. Facebook is not a comfortable space in which 
to engage in debate, because users cannot be certain who will see what they post, or 
 
183 See also Vraga et al (2015) on the use of humour by young people to mitigate anger or aggression 
and create a more supportive environment for political talk on Facebook, and Graham and Wright 





who will respond. But a candidate who is a visible leader on their page – whether in 
person or through a proxy – sets the tone and the normative behaviour that can make 












One interesting side note seen in 2017 compared to 2015, was Griffiths visiting a 
rival’s Facebook page in order to attack them, to effectively “troll”184 Labour 
supporters. From the Burton and Uttoxeter Labour Party Page, screenshot (Fig 39) 
taken on April 27th, 2017: 
Andrew Griffiths: Shobnall is voting for Theresa May & the Conservative 
Party not Jeremy Corbyn and your hard left RMT sponsored candidate. The 
results on the doorstep show that Mr Walker will be the first Labour candidate 
to lose Shobnall 
Griffiths’ comment was in response to a photograph of Labour campaigning in 
the Shobnall Ward local council elections. It prompted some replies (although little 
anger), but what was interesting was that this exchange had not appeared on 
Griffiths’ own Pages. From the Field Log notes of the same day, April 27th: 
I hadn’t seen that last year – candidates commenting on rival’s FB pages. 
Seemed daft – why pick a fight there? Decided to have a look at how the 
exchange had looked on Griffith’s Page. His post/comment wasn’t mentioned 
on his site (or didn’t show for some reason???). The last post was from April 
23rd and of a successful Burton Albion football match – non-political stuff 
that won him 84 Likes and four comments…. 
The League Table photo on that April 23rd Post had been re-posted from 
Griffith’s official Page. On this Page there was a post relating to Shobnall, but in far 
less combative terms to the one he posted on the Labour group page (Fig. 40). Still 
attacking the Labour candidate, but in terms that would be more likely to appeal to 
his Conservative supporter base. 
 




This ran counter to things Griffiths had himself said, in interview in 2015. Asked 
about why his own site was so lively, including debate among his page visitors, he 
said: 
I think sometimes in the naivety of some people they will share an opposing 
view and they think that the way to be successful on social media is to write 
derogatory things on your opponent’s social media page. 
My Facebook isn’t a platform for my opponents to post what they like on. 
Just as I wouldn't let them write on my leaflets, I don’t allow them space on 
my Facebook page to attack me. 
During the 2015 election itself, Griffiths had been accused by Labour supporters 
of removing negative comments from his Pages and blocking dissenting voices. 
However, this was not in evidence during the field work. Negative comments seen in 
both 2015 and 2017 appeared to be ignored by Griffiths or left for his supporters to 







Figure 39: Candidate appearing to “troll” rival Party supporters 
 
Figure 40: Less argumentative version of Post on candidate’s Page 
That policing of a candidate’s Page by his or her supporters was something seen 




on Griffith’s official Facebook Page (excerpt – with surnames removed - from Field 
Log, April 27, 2017): 
Tracy: Did you ask those you spoke to how many are using food banks? How 
many scraping by on the reduced benefits so the rich can pay less tax? Sorry - 
you have actually been good at your job but with the wrong party for my vote 
this time around. 
Daniel: tracy this conservative government are still trying to pick up the mess 
left by the last labour government, they created a benefit culture where people 
think it is acceptable to live off the state. so yes they may be cutting benefits 
but for a good reason, it should only be for people who need it and not those 
who think they are entitled to it for simply not being bothered to go to work, 
so yes the cuts they make to public services and benefits may not be popular 
but it has to happen to end this “something for nothing” culture! i feel as a 
working parent of two that i am in a better place than i was 7 years ago thanks 
to there income tax allowance increases and help to buy schemes. 
What was interesting was that, while both participants’ Profile pages were largely 
locked down under the new, more restrictive Facebook of 2017, Daniel gave his 
location as living in Derby so unlike Tracy he was not a local voter for Griffiths. 
There was no evidence of political interest in what was visible on his Profile but his 
comments about benefits culture and the help-to-buy scheme suggested an interest in 
politics and issues – as did his willingness to engage with Tracy, but he was a 
supportive policer for a candidate he could not vote for.  
The tone of his response – addressing Tracy by her forename, giving facts and 
information as counter-argument rather than seeking to directly undermine her points, 
and offering personal information about himself (father of two) to reinforce that this 




policing of dissent. This is not a counter comment designed to shut down debate; but 
to encourage further interaction, if not a changing of opinion. 
As outlined on page 288, Labour candidate John Mckeirnan benefited from a 
particularly active group of supportive policers during his 2017 bid to win the Burton 
& Uttoxeter seat. 
Local voter Pete responds to a comment thread prompted by a (national) Labour 
Party video by saying he still hadn’t made his mind up who to vote for, blaming it on 
the lack of visibility of the candidate: “I have to say if I had received some literature, 
promotional information or even met someone campaigning on your behalf it would 
probably have helped your cause.” That prompts responses from a number of 
Mckeirnan and Labour supporters in trying to persuade Pete to vote for Mckeirnan, 
including lengthy responses from Greg Finney185 (figs. 41-43) which focus on 
counter facts rather than argument, stay polite, and address Pete directly – all 
elements common to supportive policing. And it works, Pete replies, which prompts 





185 Full disclosure: Greg Finney is my husband and, while I did not have (or ask for) direct access to 
Mckeirnan’s site during the production of posts for the interventionist case study, Greg Finney was 
one of the group of three campaign volunteers who had access and through which I fed material or 















      










Figure 43: Reasoned and reasonable debate prompts further engagement 
 
 
    
Note two things in the screenshots of that debate – firstly the tagging of Pete’s 
name by Finney would push the Comments into Pete’s own timeline, and secondly 
how Pete begins to mirror some of Finney’s language “Finney: Pete [name deleted] I 
hear you”; Pete; “I hear what you’re saying Scott [name deleted]”). The netiquette for 





In the screenshot at fig 41, we see the discussion had begun with another voice – 
that of Jake. He, along with Finney and a local Party worker, Tom, were the group of 
three activists who ran the 2017 election Facebook campaign. Jake and Finney were 
particularly active as supportive policers and were observed spending hours each day 
and evening checking the page; responding to questions and Comments and using 
tags, Comments and Shares to make it more likely that Facebook’s algorithms would 
boost content organically.  
This was a coordinated strategy between the two men, who said at the time that 
their policy was to respond to every critical Comment made against Labour or 
Mckeirnan, even from trolls (as in the exchange copied below, with Matt, Fig. 44); 
seeing it as an opportunity to put counter facts and counter arguments that would be 
seen by many more people outside the thread and outside the campaign Page. 
Jake: I have to post this out an awful lot on here but there was global financial 
crash on 2008. The actual records on Labour vs Tory borrowing is here. It 
puts Labour as the less profligate party actually… See more 
Matt: And if he thinks big business and super rich will stick around to pay for 
it he is a bigger clown than Dianne Abbott [continues] 
Greg Finney: Matt [name deleted] Hey Matt, I suspect there was never any 
chance of you “bringing yourself to vote” for Labour. But welcome to the fold 
for your brief foray here. You’re right question [sic] how the next 12 months 
will play out [continues] 
Jake: Corbyn is going to do everything he can to help smaller businesses 





Matt: And as far as society rebuilding, yes as soon as we rebuild our economy 
money will be available to help the less fortunate. 
Jake: Matt [name deleted] that’s a generation or two lost right there 
[continues] 
The argument continues over 12 posted exchanges between the three men, ending 
finally with Matt’s’ signaling that he’s had enough with: “Anyway we will never 
agree on this one.” At no point does it get angry – tetchy but not angry. And the trio 
by and large address each other directly and respond to each point raised by the other, 
rather than delivering oratory. This is an attempt at debate, albeit between people 
who are entrenched in their own position. The visible management of the thread sets 
the normative standards for discussion. 
Those normative standards also dictate how likely it is that debate will happen. A 
space which is visibly managed by people who respond to, rather than shout down, 












Focusing on counter facts rather than “yah boo politics” sets an intellectual 
standard that may reinforce that ‘people like me’ tribal perception. And using tagging 
and similar techniques to organically push discussion out across the connective links 
between Facebook users means more people may be attracted to the comfortable 





5.6 Architectural bias 
If it is the considered actions of some Facebook users - people acting as visible 
leaders, supportive policers, aware producers and engaged openers, that creates 
spaces in which political debate may happen on Facebook, the counter to that is 
Facebook’s architecture and corporate culture which works in ways that limit or 
prevent such debate happening. 
As previously argued, Facebook’s architecture works against the efforts its users 
might make to engage in debate in two ways. A one-to-most corporate culture that 
needs the architecture to link as many people to each other as possible, and in so 
doing encourages people to collect together through social or tribal (“think like we 
do”186) links.  
And architecture which, in order to reach the most people with content that may 
interest them, splits posts and comment threads across space and time. A 
conversation may open on one day, on one particular Facebook page, but be seen 
hours or even days later in another user’s News Feed. Content may similarly move 
across technologies; be posted on Twitter or Instagram and be seen on Facebook. 
There is no space-time continuum187 in Facebook. 
 
186 Zuckerberg said in 2018 that it was human nature for people to gravitate towards others who think 
the same way: https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/zuckerberg-said-facebook-could-be-better-
at-filtering-fakes?utm_term=.tqgxBJBQq#.xfo0VXVDn (accessed November 12, 2018). 
187 The Grand Theory, first posited by Minkowski, whereby the three dimensions of space plus time 
are linked together as a single, unified four-dimensional object and one continuous reality: 




This encourages disjointed conversation threads. Threads in which comments are 
seen or responded to out of sequence; threads which may not be seen in their entirety; 
comments which may appear in a News Feed without their context. All of this (as 
chapter five detailed) makes oratory more likely than debate and makes user more 
wary of investing the cultural work needed to engage in political talk on Facebook. 
A user adding a comment to a thread on a candidate’s campaign Page may be 
doing so as primary or secondary engagement in that conversation. That is, primary 
engagement by adding their comment to the thread at source; on and from within the 
candidate’s page. Or secondary engagement via a Friend - adding their comment to a 
thread or partial conversation seen in their own News Feed because a Friend is linked 
to the thread in some way.  
And just as the user has only limited control over what they get to see in their own 
News Feed, so they know they have limited control over who gets to see what they 
might post or comment on – and that has a chilling effect on political talk on 
Facebook. 
 
5.6.1 Visibility of content 
Other technical issues also affected what was shown in a user or a candidate’s 
News Feed. Software that enabled candidates to simultaneously post comments made 
on Twitter or Instagram to Facebook, or to link from their blog posts to their 
Facebook feed, sometimes made it difficult to tell whether a post had originated on 




And as previously outlined, because of the way posts can be shared or participants 
tagged, it was not always possible to be certain whether people who commented on a 
post had done so while visiting the candidate’s page or by seeing the post on a 
Friend’s page or in their own News Feed. According to Facebook, the News Feed 
(‘the constantly updating list of stories’ in the middle of a user’s home page) is 
…influenced by your connections and activity on Facebook. This helps you to 
see more stories that interest you from friends you interact with the most. The 
number of comments and likes a post receives and what kind of story it is (ex: 
photo,  video, status update) can also make it more likely to appear in your 
News Feed.’188 
But there was little evidence that Facebook was “influenced” by the researcher’s 
activity during the online ethnographic stage. The content presented in the News 
Feed with each log in appeared to be unrelated to previous activity. Posts from the 
same small number of people and Pages would be delivered with each log-in and it 
was difficult to view others. 
There also seemed to be no rationale for the order posts appeared in, certainly it 
was not related to timeliness, as these excerpts from the 2015 Field Log show: 
8th May, starting 9.17am 
Home page top 5 posts: Darren Hall (1hr189, LC, 241 Likes, 19 comments); 
Ali Majid (1hr, LC, 3 Likes, 5 comms [comments] ); Andrew Griffiths (4hrs, 
LC, 767 Likes, 44 Shares, 186 comms); Caroline Lucas (20mins, LC/NC, 580 
Likes, 27 Shares, 29 comms); Patrone (4hrs, LC, 10 Likes, 2 comms).... This 
 
188 Source: https://en-gb.facebook.com/help/327131014036297/#!/help/327131014036297/ (accessed 
November 12, 2018). 




time decided to click on links in timeline posts, rather than paste URL direct, 
to see if that affected what’s shown on my Home page later. 
Link on Griffiths post took me to his campaign page.... 
 [Later] Back to my Homepage 
Top five posts: UKIP Brighton & Hove (4hrs, NC, 63 Likes, 4 comms); 
Caroline Lucas (20hrs, LC, 444 Likes, 39 Shares, 15 comms); Mike Green 
(LC, 4hrs, 2 Likes, 3 comms); Ali Majid (LC, 23hrs, 6 Likes, 1 comm); UKIP 
Brighton & Hove (5hrs, NC, 85 Likes, 3 Shares, 5 comms).... 
 Returned to my Home Page. Galloway story now third in Trending 10. Same 
 Suggested Groups. 
Top five posts: Majid (1min, adding a Friend); Nigel Carter (yesterday!); 
UKIP Brighton & Hove (5hrs and 8hrs); Caroline Lucas (23hrs!). 
Those examples are taken from a session lasting just under two hours in which 
only Pages and Profiles linked to the Burton candidates were visited. Yet that 
evidence of interest in those candidates was rarely reflected in the posts Facebook’s 
algorithms chose to show during the session. Nor did this vary on other days - 
whichever candidates or constituencies were chosen as the focus in a given session, 
that interest was not reflected in the content feeds. 
Facebook allowed limited options for changing how the News Feed is displayed – 
users could Unfollow groups or people; set the feed to display ‘Most Recent’ instead 
of ‘Top’ stories (but at the time of the research it would automatically revert to Top 




Close Friends given priority in the feed over posts from Acquaintances.190 Users 
could also select to Hide a particular story, or click to ‘See less’ from that Page, 
Group or person in future.  
This is an important issue because, for Facebook to be effective within the public 
sphere its structure must enable debate. If the algorithms are not able to sort the 1,500 
or so content items a user might see into a News Feed that more accurately reflects 
who and what they want to see and which material, by the posts the user reads and 
the links clicked, that user has told Facebook they would be most interested in seeing, 
then the feeling that Facebook provides an unsafe or uncontrollable social space will 
be stronger. If when a user logs in, they see their News Feed filled with posts from 
people they do not know well – Acquaintances - and Pages that only those 
Acquaintances are interested in, then they will understandably be more wary about 
engaging in debate or making serious points.  
The actions taken as a Facebook user – spending more time reading particular 
Posts and Comments or Following or Liking particular Groups or Profiles - are 
measures of engagement that should, according to Facebook, be reflected in the 
content a user sees.  Facebook promises to prioritise the people and types of content a 
user interacts with the most. None-the-less it was noted in the Field Log that content 
from some providers dominated the News Feed, regardless of the interest shown in 
that provider or their material: 
 
190 This particular tweak to Facebook’s algorithm was made in April 2015, after complaints that users 
were finding it less social: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/apr/22/facebook-news-feed-




28/4/15: Session 1pm – 3.34pm 
Overnight I’d had a friend request from someone I know who had found me 
as mutual “Friend” of Burton Conservative candidate Griffiths.  
Wondered if that’s why, when I logged in, the top posts shown were 
comments left 16 hrs ago on Griffith’s page 
After Griffiths, next posts related to Debbonnaire, the Labour Bristol West 
candidate I’d looked [at] in the previous session. Followed by two more Ali 
Majid ones (one several days old), then a 5hrs-old Purna4Pavilion post 
(Labour candidate for Brighton Pavilion). Next few were mix of Purna’s 
posts, more Majid and more UKiP Hove & Brighton, then Socialist Party of 
Great Britain.  
Timings varied, some a couple of days old and some couple of hours old but 
definitely being shown posts according to an algorithm which seems only 
partly based on what I did last, but selection shown is getting more varied. 
Suggested groups partly local to Burton, partly political. 
8/5/16 
2.48pm – started on Brighton candidates again (previously looking at SoT). 
Went to my Home Page first to see if any [Brighton candidate posts] showing 
in top posts. 4 UKIP Brighton & Hove posts in my top five (plus Mark Green, 
Burton UKIP). Still don’t understand why as only UKIP page I’ve looked at 
today is UKIP SoT. 
In the case of Majid (Stoke Central) and Griffiths (Burton & Uttoxeter) appearing 
so frequently in the News Feed, it may have been because it was necessary to Friend 
rather than Like their Profiles in order to gain access. However, in the case of UKIP 




the research) there seemed to be no reason for posts from that page to normally 
appear in the top five posts in the News Feed at each log-in. 
Facebook’s algorithms191 will prioritise different types of content, or different 
subject matter, at different times and as part of normal or test operations. It may be 
therefore that those algorithms were prioritising paid-for content, or prioritising video 
rather than written content, or content from organisations that were generating 
exceptional interest across Facebook.  
The company does not give out information about the proprietary operation of its 
algorithms, but to see them only as bits of commercialised code also undermines their 
importance. Facebook’s algorithms turn Facebook from social network service to 
sociotechnical actor, able to create collectives and steer collective action in ways 
which may be “problematic” (Milan, 2015). And thus, algorithms which prioritise 
time spent watching a video over time spent reading words; or which favour content 
posted by UKiP Hove & Brighton over posts from the Green Party candidate for 
Brighton, are neither technically nor politically neutral. 
This mismatch between action and outcome was not only noted in the Field Log. 
One of the participants who submitted screenshots of their Facebook feed around 
election time also noted that after Liking the Labour Party page, she saw no 
difference in the content delivered in her News Feed or in Trending Topics: 
 
191 It should be borne in mind that there are, at any point in time, multiple algorithms are in operation 
and on multiple versions of Facebook. Facebook is not one site, but a grouping of thousands of 






Sian A: Hello, this is what happened after I liked the Labour party page - still 
no tailored content in Trending. I have a feeling this may be a ‘trend’ in 
itself… 
 
The volunteer continued to see no effect on her News Feed or in Trending Topics, 
however this may not be so unusual. If, as Facebook claim, the algorithm responds to 
levels of interaction by a user and if that user spent longer reading particular material 
from particular people, or watching particular videos, or Liking or commenting on 
content from particular people (for example closest Friends), then the action of 
simply liking one political party’s page may not be enough to move the algorithm 
from a pattern of prioritisation already in place for that user.  
At least not without some additional incentive perhaps, such as that political party 
paying to boost its content – as explored in the final data collection stage. 
However, the principle that Facebook responds only or mostly to the actions of its 
users in prioritising the content they will see is undermined by the Field log for this 
research, which time and again in the Stage Two data collection – and in both the 
2015 and 2017 election logs - noted no link between the researcher’s actions and the 




individual candidates (Majid and Griffiths) appeared to “swamp” the News Feed for 
no obvious reason: 
24/4/15 [c7.30pm] 
When I went back to my own FB page, top posts were from candidate 
Caroline Lucas and Green Party candidate Darren Hall in Bristol West. Top 
post from Lucas 2 hrs ago, followed by one from her posted yesterday, then 
one from Green Party Bristol West candidate posted three hours ago…. Then 
more Ali Majid and UKIP Brighton and Hove! 
When I refreshed the page again – just got Majid and the UKIP stuff 
28/4/15. Session 5.10pm to 7pm 
Logged into FB. Top post on my feed is one from Bristol West Green 
candidate Darren Hall (2 hrs old), then usual Brighton & Hove UKIP (3hrs 
old), then an 11mins old Griffiths post, followed by two 3hrs old posts from 
Burton UKIP candidate. Really starting to wonder why UKIP is dominating 
my news feed when I haven’t yet looked at those candidate’s feeds. 
8/5/15 [day after election]. 11.20am 
Returned to my Home page. No other Bristol West candidates in my feed 
(usual Majid, UKIP, Hall, Griffiths and Lucas). Tried selecting News Feed 
(same). Then tried pages feed. Some posts from Jan Zablocki (15hrs) at top 
but otherwise same people mix as other feeds. Tried scrolling down Pages 
Feed for c30 posts but all I saw was posts shown to me on previous days. 
Can’t find a way to go from FB page to people or pages I actually want to 
look at. 
2.48pm – started on Brighton candidates again (previously looking at SoT) 




4 UKIP Brighton & Hove posts in my top five (plus Mark Green, Burton 
UKIP). Still don’t understand why as only UKIP page I’ve looked at today is 
UKIP SoT. 
There are many more similar references in the 2015 Field Logs. No matter which 
constituency was being looked at and no matter how much time was spent looking at 
particular candidates’ Facebook pages, Posts from Brighton and Hove UKIP 
dominated the News Feed, even before that Page had even been looked at.  
The only explanation could be that the algorithm was prioritising posts from 
UKIP. Perhaps the algorithm determined that interest in UKIP candidates in the four 
constituencies suggested a preference for news from UKIP, and yet not for the other 
parties followed?  
The more likely explanation would be that UKIP, as Brighton and Hove or as the 
national party, had been able to exert more influence on Facebook during the 2015 
election, and the likeliest reason for that would appear to be that the local or national 
party was paying significant amounts to have its material “boosted”. 
 
5.6.2 Pay to play 
Andrew Griffiths, Conservative candidate for Burton and Uttoxeter, was very 
active on Facebook both in the 2015 and 2017 election (and won the seat both times). 
Interviewed for this thesis, he said it had been a conscious decision to make 
Facebook an integral part of his 2015 campaign, including spending “hundreds and 





I was able to use Facebook as a way to bolster and add to the conventional 
campaign. That way I was able to engage with other Facebook Pages in 
Burton - SpottedBurton and JasonGreenwoodSpottedBurton. They were 
engaging in the campaign and had thousands of followers. I’d never met them 
before, but they had an engagement in the campaign even though their readers 
weren’t necessarily Conservative supporters. It’s interesting - it all had a 
multiplier effect - my paid-for ads, my posts, being on SpottedBurton. 
If Facebook users have political content delivered to their News Feeds based on 
algorithms which only in part – despite what Facebook itself says - respond to their 
own activity, and if the overwhelming majority of content which could be relevant to 
a user does not make it into their News Feed, then the content that is delivered has 
“won” the opportunity to attract that user’s attention. Thus, companies and 
organisations – including news publishers – reliant on attracting attention to their 
content through social media have developed tools and processes as part of the 
‘attention economy’ (Lanham, 1997) - aimed at increasing the likelihood of their 
content “winning” a place in a target user’s News Feed.  
As Chris Moran (then Audience Editor for the Guardian) said in interview in 
2016: 
The simple scale you can get on Facebook is totally different to anywhere 
else. Facebook…have the most dynamically-changing algorithm in the world, 
much more so than Google, which is often criticised for the same thing at 
great length. [Facebook’s] recent changes to their news feed algorithm 
fascinates me because what it broadly says, and the notations are 
unmistakable, it says the emphasis is on you to create your own content. 
Five years ago, I was being asked in a conference why should we be relying 
just on one major technical giant, and isn't it dicey that we're tagging along on 




Of course, all of those concerns are correct, but at the very least, we now have 
… somebody who is actually challenging Google. 
Is it enough for Facebook to allow users (some) options to control their feeds in 
order to prioritise people they want to hear more from? Or should the architecture 
reflect, as Dahlgren suggests, an ecology which proactively enables interaction; that 
encourages deliberative democracy (2006: 268)? And how about paying to control 
News Feeds? How does the ability of individuals and organisations to Boost or 
Promote their posts, or to pay for adverts, impact on that democratic ecology? 
Facebook is a business. Like the traditional press, any role it might be able to play 
in mediating between people and state in the public sphere will always be tempered 
by the need to earn revenue. The tweaks that made it easier for users to control their 
News Feed had to be sold to the companies and organisations that were paying to be 
pushed into users’ feeds (“Pages still matter - a lot”192). 
The final data collection stage of this research project included, as previously 
outlined, directly intervening in a candidate’s relationship with their page visitors by 
both producing content and asking the site administrators to consider paying to 
‘boost’ some of the content in order to note the effect on visibility of and engagement 
with that boosted content. An example being the Post below and this excerpt from the 
Field Log for June 6th, 2017:  
Logged in but straight onto John Mckeirnan’s page, rather than my own. 
Mckeirnan is the candidate I’ve been working with on his campaign – 
including writing posts for his FB page, setting posts strategy and boosting 
 
192 In an open post to its Pages customers, in November 2014, set out Facebook’s argument for why 




posts. The post was written by me last night, set for timed release this 
morning (7.30am) and boosted for each for the key towns in the constituency. 
It’s interesting in terms of its reach (because of the boost but also because of 
the effectiveness of the SM strategy) and interesting because of the discussion 
going on.  
In the screenshots taken of the response to that Post (an attack post against the 
rival Conservative candidate that focused on his voting record in relation to benefits 
and social care issues) over 75 users engaged with the Post by Liking or selecting an 
emoticon, while 47 users shared the posts in the first few hours and it had gathered 14 
comments; all within hours of the Post being published. 
However, not all the Comments were positive and a fairly lively debate begins 
with multiple participants both defending Andrew Griffith’s record as the sitting MP 
and responding to his voting record.  
Note also how, in the posts from Sarah (Fig. 45) she addresses each contributor 
by name, as does Gareth who name tags Andrew Griffiths which means his 





Figure 45: Section of Comments on the attack Post 
 
The debate continues across multiple threads and with more participants joining 
in as the (Boosted) Post expands it reach organically through being seen by more 
people.  
A post written the day before the election (the rallying call mentioned on page 
198) picked up 33 Likes, 15 Shares and 15 Comments pre-Boost. While a similar 
rallying post published the following day (Appendix 5, Fig 62) this time both 
personalised to the candidate and boosted attracted 534 emoticon responses, 124 
Shares and 106 Comments. 
The Field Log for June 8th, 2017 (election day) noted that the two most active site 




and during election day answering every negative or question Comment and 
engaging in discussion and that “seemed to encourage more” interaction. This 
particular Post was one of the liveliest seen in terms of engagement – both positive 
and negative - and the Field Log for that day also notes: “Is it the boost that’s 
drawing them in, or knowing that someone is reading what they say (by responding 
to it)?” 
One final example of how paying to Boost or promote particular posts can 
positively affect political engagement is contained in the excerpt and screenshot 
below (Fig. 46), from an exchange that followed the creation and Boosting of a Post 
encouraging young people to vote. 
Jodie tells people she doesn’t normally vote but will from now on because she is 







Figure 46: Further example of result from Boosting a Post 
 
 
Her personal Facebook profile showed that she was a young mother, a local voter 
and working in a low-paid job, with no evidence of political affiliations or interests 
other than a couple of fundraising groups. She would have no reason to directly visit 
Mckiernan’s campaign page and therefore would most likely have seen the youth 
vote Post and/or Comments on the Post either through organic links between her and 
other commenters (for instance if one of the discussion participants was her Facebook 
friend), or as a result of the paid Boost pushing the post into her News Feed because 




It is unlikely that the Post itself had made her decide to vote this time around, but 
it is likely that seeing the Post, and perhaps other people’s engagement with it, 
encouraged her to feel able to comment publicly – to engage in the cultural work of 
making a political statement. 
For all the complexity of Facebook’s algorithms in determining whether or not a 
user may be interested in a particular Post from a particular Friend, the evidence from 
this final research stage suggests that by-and-large Facebook will prioritise content 
that is linked - directly or indirectly - to paid campaigns. 
 
5.6.3 The in-between years 
The influence of Facebook’s algorithms on political content was not the only 
issue that had become more relevant to this thesis in the years between the 2015 and 
2017 elections. In monitoring responses on candidate’s pages to the 2015 election 
result, the desire of people on the ‘losing’ side to seek out comfortable spaces in 
which to discuss the result had been noted. In particular, voters discussing the 
election result and the need for a unification of parties of opposition on Caroline 
Lucas’s Facebook page (as outlined on page 265). 
Subsequently, the “shock” Brexit vote saw a similar effect with the rapid growth 
of anti-Brexit group the 48% Group on Facebook (see page 267), and a shift in left-
leaning and young voters’ willingness to make their political position public through 
Facebook and to engage with political content. Chris Moran (then Audience Editor 
for the Guardian) interviewed in July 2016, explained how this desire to be part of 




Guardian’s website, with both average daily uniques193 and page views rocketing to 
record levels. He added: 
I think the single biggest thing in the last four weeks is the sheer scale of 
Brexit….Pre-Brexit, Paris attacks day two was our biggest. We didn't just 
beat that record; we almost doubled that. 
You are friends with your friends. That is the defining characteristic of 
Facebook. That’s not something that can ever possibly change. When I hear 
about people being disappointed that they haven’t seen more pro-Brexit or 
anti-Brexit stuff, what we’ve seen over the last six weeks is people sharing at 
vast scale pieces which help them clarify or state their own position. 
However, this was despite what Moran saw as Facebook’s inability to reflect that 
interest, with fluctuating algorithms that made it more difficult for publishers to reach 
an audience who may be interested in particular issues or stories: 
I think the thing that’s worried me most is watching the pre-Brexit [traffic], 
the decline of Facebook as a referrer, but also really a lot of the way in which 
it fluctuates so much. It concerns me.  
I understand why. They have to have a live response, but you can really see 
those numbers come back. Then when they came back with: “We’re also 
going to change our algorithm later,” that’s quite bothering. 
That bias built into Facebook’s algorithms – whether a bias paid for by advertisers 
or would-be influencers194, or a bias against some types of news or news 
 
193 The number of unduplicated (counted only once) visitors to a website in one 24-hour day – that is, 
the visit to the site is counted as one visit, regardless of how many different pages are looked at during 
the visit. 
194 The American Civil Liberties Union submitted a complaint to the US Equal Employment 




publishers195, or a bias in favour of gathering information Facebook as a company is 
interested in196 became an increasing concern during these in-between election years. 
In 2016, Mark Zuckerberg told his audience that Facebook is both a technology 
company and a media company – just not a traditional media company. He said: 
Facebook is a new kind of platform. It’s not a traditional technology 
company. It’s not a traditional media company… We don’t write the news 
that people read on the platform. But at the same time, we know we also 
know that we do a lot more than just distribute news, and we’re an important 
part of the public discourse.197 
Over 2017 and 2018, investigative journalism, particularly by the New York 
Times, The Guardian and Buzzfeed, revealed just what “doing a lot more than just 
distributing news” might mean to Facebook. Fake news farms run by secretive 
 
advertisers, targeted male users and did not appear to women. Source: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/sep/18/facebook-sued-gender-bias-male-targeted-job-
ads (accessed November 12, 2018). 
195 In January 2018, Facebook announced it would begin prioritising articles in its news feed based on 
how its users ranked the trustworthiness of individual publishers. Source: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/2018/01/19/facebook-to-prioritize-trustworthy-
publishers-in-news-feed/#2e977d7328de (accessed November 12, 2018). 
196 The company has been criticised for gathering data not only about Facebook’s users but also about 
people who do not use Facebook and have never signed up to the network – even sometimes targeting 
them with ads. Source: http://uk.businessinsider.com/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-collects-data-non-
users-for-security-2018-4 (accessed November 12, 2018). 
197 In a one-to-one video conference filmed with Facebook CEO Sheryl Sandberg and published to 




agencies198; mass harvesting of data by third parties for political ends199; political 
disintermediation in a series of “unexpected” election results – Brexit, the election of 
Donald Trump200. 
The investigations are ongoing (at the time of writing) and information continues 
to emerge on links between Russia and alt-right individuals and groups in the US and 
UK and, often, through third-party data provider Cambridge Analytica. It is too early 
to be able to say how much data has been mined; how many fake news stories have 
been published, who is involved and why, or what the political effect might have 
been of sending fake and partisan information to people who might be more likely to 
be influenced by it. Nor how much of that is still happening or will happen in the 
future.  
None-the-less, the arguments given in this thesis for studying Facebook as a 
political actor in its own right – its tremendous scale; the reach of its network; its 
 
198 Buzzfeed journalist Craig Silverman had written in 2015 about Macedonian teenagers pumping out 
fake, pro-Trump news stories ahead of the 2016 US election. Subsequently, Silverman with a team of 
journalists discovered that those news farms had links to American political players and possibly 
Russia: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/american-conservatives-fake-news-
macedonia-paris-wade-libert (accessed November 12, 2018). 
199 Cambridge Analytica - the UK-based data analytics firm that worked with Donald Trump’s election 
team and the winning Brexit campaign – was found to have harvested millions of Facebook profiles of 
voters to build a powerful software program to predict and influence choices at the ballot box. Source: 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election 
(accessed November 12, 2018). 
200 In February 2018, the US Justice Department charged 13 Russians and three companies for 
executing a scheme to subvert the 2016 election and support Donald J. Trump’s presidential campaign. 
In the indictment, officials detailed how the Russians used Facebook and its sub-company Instagram 
to sow discord among the electorate by creating Facebook groups, distributing divisive ads and posting 





corporate ecology of building ever more links between users (and, it seems, non-
users) in order to make money from those links, are the same reasons to be concerned 
by evidence of individuals and groups being able to ‘game’ Facebook to their own 
political ends. 
That so much of what has emerged thus far is linked to those two unexpected 
election results – Donald Trump becoming President of the US, and the UK voting to 
leave the European Union – is of particular concern if, as this thesis argues, Facebook 
is replacing the traditional public sphere with a global space in which political news 
and information is less likely to be debated.  
That lack of debate and political talk among users, coupled with users being 
served content which is largely controlled not by their preferences but by easily-
influenced algorithms, encourages political responses based on low information, 
partisanship, and/or cognitive bias. In an interview with The Guardian in 2018, 
Anthony Scaramucci, the former White House communications director for Donald 
Trump explained why each news story “crisis” that had hit the White House since the 
President’s inauguration had seemed to have no effect on Trump’s core supporters201.  
 
201 Also of note, is the decision by Trump in 2018 to hire Brad Pascale as his 2020 re-election 
campaign manager. Pascale was Trump’s digital media director for his 2016 campaign and (writes 
Julia Carrie Wong in The Guardian, 2018), claims his Facebook campaign won the election for Trump. 
Pascale focuses on micro-targeting – sending out tens of thousands of iterations of messages every 
day, targeted at tiny groups of voter types. That ability to send very specific, unregulated messages to 
individuals (unlike traditional advertising with its broader, public and more regulated messages), to 





They love this guy, they think this guy’s for them. These are low information 
emotional voters and they like what they see in the president. They think he’s 
working for them. 
Those “low information emotional voters” may be low information by choice – a 
deliberate avoidance of the cultural work of engaging with traditional media and 
potentially uncomfortable information; but they are also low information by design. 
A Facebook which prioritises paid-for content/information which is more likely to be 
partisan, more likely to engage by emotion, and more likely to be targeted at those 
particular voters is, by default, low information. 
Interviewed in 2016, Aron Pilhofer then Executive Editor of Digital for the 
Guardian202, saw the relationship between news publishers and Facebook as on 
balance positive at that stage. With Instant Articles203 in particular opening new 
revenue streams for publishers and providing a better experience for Facebook’s 
users. However, Facebook’s lack of interest in what content actually appeared on its 
site was a concern: 
I think you have to look at why Facebook [works with publishers], what are 
their motives? What do they want? They want attention. They want people to 
 
202 Interviewed by the author for the book ‘Future Journalism: Where we are and where we’re going’. 
Pilhofer was then both Interim Chief Digital Officer and Executive Editor of Digital at Guardian News 
and Media but about to leave and take up a professorship at Temple University School of Media and 
Communication, Philadelphia. 
203 A Facebook propriety application which enables publishers to repurpose news articles, complete 
with pictures, videos and/or links, through a templated system designed to load that article many times 
faster than standard posts. Facebook launched Instant Articles in 2015 and encouraged publishers to 
use it for articles they want to publish to Facebook, rather than publish their original version. It had 
had mixed responses from news publishers some of who were uncomfortable with the additional 
control it gave Facebook, while Facebook’s subsequent prioritising of video over text-led articles 
further reduced interest. Sources:  https://digiday.com/media/how-google-amp-won-over-facebook/ 




stay in Facebook. They don't really care what the content is, as long as it’s 
keeping them in, so if you’re making content that keeps people in Facebook, 
they will have every reason in the world, they are completely incentivised to 
keep this relationship as friendly for publishers as possible. 
That focus on keeping people “in” Facebook, where they can be tracked and that 
data sold or otherwise used, means delivering content that attracts that user’s 
attention. So, content that user agrees with or content that user is attracted to (a funny 
viral video, for example) will always be more useful to Facebook. Zuckerberg may 
say that he knows that his company does more than just distribute news, but he 
should also know that Facebook controls what news is sent to who. 
  Facebook – whether directly or by omission – is doing a great deal more than 
just distributing news. Facebook is not a traditional media company in that it doesn’t 
write the political narrative but, to yet unknown degrees, it may control it. 
 
5.7. Back to the public sphere future 
In 2012, Backstrom et al led Facebook’s Data Science team in a test of the entire 
network of Facebook users at that point (721 million) against Travers and Milgram’s 
(1969) “six degrees of separation” experiment. In that experiment, individuals routed 
a postcard by sending it person-to-person only via people they knew. The 
Travers/Milgram experiment concluded that a maximum of six people (4.4 to 5.7) 
intermediaries (degrees of separation) were needed. The 2012 experiment used 
algorithms to determine that – at least for Facebook users – it was closer to four 




It was an interesting test to determine the linked-ness of people on Facebook - the 
pathways between those individual walled gardens. A 2016 Facebook-led update on 
the experiment found that linked-ness had increased as Facebook had grown. There 
were now 1.59 billion active users and the researchers concluded each user was now 
linked to every other person on Facebook by an average of three-and-a half other 
people (3.57 intermediaries; 3.46 for US users), and concluded that collective 
“degrees of separation” had shrunk in the intervening five years:  
Now, with twice as many people using the site, we’ve grown more 
interconnected, thus shortening the distance between any two people in the 
world. (Facebook, 2016) 
While Facebook’s network effects are able to bring lots of people together 
quickly to march, fundraise, or lobby for change, it is not able to sustain that because 
people’s experience of Facebook is very local and personal – limited by their own 
connections to family, friends, jobs and domicile – and limited by the dominance of 
weak-tie connections in their network.  
The issue becomes whether that very local and personal experience can become a 
national or global citizenship one. Facebook’s transformational potential may in the 
end not be about its capacity to change the world, but it’s ability to provide a variety 
of small social spaces – analogous to those Habermasian coffeeshops perhaps – in 
which it is OK to talk politics. 
From Facebook’s point of view, the social network is global. It is 
unprecedentedly large in scale and reach. In that sense, it has the capacity for 
transformational change. However, lots of things are global in the sense that they are 




Walker whisky. Facebook’s mission to connect the world may simply be a 
marketeer’s desire to extend the reach of their product. 
The individual user does not access Facebook as a global entity, rather as a 
personal service delivering hyper-local heterogeneity. Users communicate on a 
regular basis with only a handful of people, frequently the same people they 
communicate with offline. To step out of their immediate Facebook space, their 
News Feed, and the normative restrictions imposed by engaging in political talk with 
friends, workmates or family, they need to consciously do so by joining a group or 
Liking a political Page, such as the candidate campaign pages that this research 
focused on.  
These two areas of their Facebook “life” may be kept separate by the user, 
Although, as this research has shown, how separate they remain is determined by 
Facebook and its algorithms. That lack of control over who will see a political 
Comment or Post a user might make means the user, even in the ‘safe’ space of the 
candidate’s page, has to judge the level of personal risk to them and their existing 
relationships on Facebook, in posting material. The cultural work of engaging in 
politics (Eliasoph, 1997) becomes that bit harder; they may want to talk, but dare they 
talk? 
As an avenue for future research, that link between favoured Facebook Friends 
and sharing of political views would be worth exploring further. If Facebook offered 
valid mechanisms to more effectively sort and prioritise friendship groups, such as 




the way, for instance, that it’s new business WhatsApp does204) then users may be 
more willing to engage in political talk. Miller referred to something similar as 
“scalable sociability” (2016) in which an individual will choose from different social 
media in order to communicate with different sized groups appropriate to the 
message they want to send (Facebooks’ one-to-many communication versus 
WhatsApp’s one to particular groups, for example).  
There is another issue, arising from Facebook’s scale and its connective 
architecture, which is whether it is contributing to the reduction in separation 
between individuals. While it may be experienced as a hyper-local network of 
individuals users mostly already know, the data studied in this research shows how, 
through membership of groups and the seeking out of discussion spaces, that may be 
changing with users becoming connected to more people they do not know but with 
who they share a common interest. Thus, users were seen to engage in political talk 
on or linked to Pages of candidates they could not vote for for reasons of geography 
but with whom they shared attitudes or interests 
At noted in the previous section, growing concerns have emerged around the 
influence of extreme right and left-wing political groups via viral sharing of content 
on Facebook. These concerns have resulted in a number of recent and current studies, 
investigations (governmental and journalistic) and increasingly the attention of law-
makers and legal institutions. While these ongoing investigations are outside the 
scope of this thesis, the 2017 Stage 4 case study does have relevance to looking at 
 




how political content material can be forcibly spread on Facebook to particular 
demographic groups.  
To return to the argument that, rather than be part of the public sphere Facebook 
has disintermediated it, one further argument for disintermediation is the 
representative role of the traditional public sphere. As discussed in section 2.7, a 
public sphere ‘test’ of Facebook should also consider its representational role as 
conduit of public opinion to political elites, analogous to traditional mass media.  
But some of the elections that have taken place during the period of this study – 
2015 to 2017 – suggest the converse; that Facebook is not a conduit of public opinion 
and that it has undermined that representational link from citizens to their 
government. What is said in Facebook largely stays on Facebook. No wonder 
Trump’s election and the Brexit decision were a “surprise” to political and media 
elites – they could not have known what information voters were exposed to in their 
Facebook News Feed, nor what discussions they may have engaged in. Facebook’s 
may not be a public media but its scale creates its own public. If governments want to 
know what the majority of citizens think about them, ahead of finding out at the 









Chapter 6: Conclusions 
Facebook is, as Zuckerberg has said, “a new kind of platform” (see page 323) 
and this thesis has focused on what that new kind of platform might mean for the 
public sphere. Something that had not existed before, something very new and 
something very much a platform in the non-technological sense of that word – that of 
a space and opportunity to voice views.  
The research made a unique contribution to theory around the public sphere by 
focusing on whether the social network site provides a new platform for political 
debate. The thesis posed two inter-related questions – is Facebook, as a 
phenomenally successful new communications medium, a new public space or new 
public sphere? And, as a commercial communications medium, is Facebook capable 
of delivering the civic interaction necessary to an effective public sphere? As 
discussed in chapter two, while other studies have considered Facebook’s 
contribution to political debate by studying the role of the internet or of social media 
generally, this project uniquely focused on Facebook arguing that its scale, reach and 
corporate ecology necessitated studying it as a political actor in its own right.  
Overall, the research delivered four concluding findings:  
1. Facebook’s architecture has multiple chilling effects on political talk, and 
on political debate in particular.  
2. Facebook’s corporate concerns drive content algorithms which tend 
towards the creation both of filter bubbles and of bias that can be bought by 




3. The likelihood of debate comes down to the positive actions of the “right 
people” (defined as visible leaders, supportive policers, aware producers, and 
engaged openers) vs the negative influence of Facebook’s architecture.  
4. Facebook is not a new public sphere, rather it has undermined or 
disintermediated the public sphere as it is largely understood. In particular, by 
bypassing the traditional media in the public sphere as opinion conduit. 
Facebook is a platform that is actively used by over two billion people each 
month to chat, share content, organise events, flag locations, post pictures, thoughts 
and opinions, and to interact with people they largely already know. It is, again in 
Zuckerberg’s words, not just a communications medium but a “transformational” 
communications medium, able to change the way society is organised and to “give 
everyone a voice.”205 But a voice to do what, and to be heard by who?  
Research conducted during the 2015 and 2017 UK General Elections underpins 
this thesis. The mixed methods research included surveys alongside online 
ethnographic study, and direct intervention via a case study. The methodology was 
influenced by a number of earlier studies; in particular the work of Dan Jackson and 
colleagues in their 2013 study of political talk in online forums, and danah boyd’s 
“deep watching” of teens’ talk on MySpace (2008). 
By focusing on online spaces (political candidates’ public Facebook pages) and a 
time period (the month preceding a general election) when political debate might be 
expected to happen, the study assessed whether Facebook’s architecture encouraged 
or discouraged such debate. It sought to explore whether these online spaces – 
candidate’s Facebook pages - offered a 21st century version of Habermas’s 18th 
 




century coffee house and salons as a place where debate is expected, sought out, and 
encouraged. 
The data gathered delivered a number of findings. Firstly, the 2015 surveys found 
respondents locked in a “want to talk, daren’t talk” relationship with expressing 
political views to their Facebook friends. Two-thirds of the young people surveyed 
said they were interested in socio-political issues and wanted to debate them, and yet 
would routinely avoid commenting on issues on Facebook, even when moved by a 
campaign or news story.  
The online ethnographic study, conducted in the run-up to and just after the 
General Election saw this reticence underpinned by strict rules of “netiquette”, with 
debate quality limited both by normative group behaviour and Facebook’s own 
architectural culture which creates a less safe space for debate.  
Thus, across the thousands of Posts and comments seen, and despite those posts 
being on political pages in the days before an election, and despite those posts largely 
coming from people who had shown interest in the election by choosing to visit a 
political page, there was actually very little political debate. Only 170 threads (five 
percent) of the material read showed evidence of reasoned debate. 
It should be understood that in order to explore the role of Facebook in the 
traditional Habermasian interpretation of the public sphere, the aim was not simply to 
look for political talk, but for political debate. Debate that, as Schudson argued 
(1997), was among people “acquainted by virtue of their citizenship… under norms 
of public reasonableness”, rather than simply social interaction. Habermas had seen 




the “world of letters” of coffeeshop clubs, salons and the press, public opinion would 
put the state in touch with the needs of society (1989). This research was about 
identifying Facebook’s relationship to the public sphere in its Habermasian sense, 
and therefore sought to identify political talk that was public, participatory and 
reasoned debate rather than oratory; that circulated ideas or information with the aim 
of helping form opinions.  
The five percent of reasoned debate that was seen, swamped as it was by oratory 
and simple messages of support for a candidate or idea, was a particularly low figure 
against comparison points such as the seven percent of explicitly or implicitly 
political online conversation seen by Jackson et al in their 2013 study, or the eight 
percent of everyday conversation noted by Almond and Verba in their seminal 1963 
work on civic culture, or the 15 percent of British voters and 13 percent of American 
voters claiming to discuss politics most days in Bennett et al’s multi-election research 
(1995, 2000), and the research gathered information from the surveys and, 
particularly, the online ethnographic stage, to explore reasons for this reduction. 
What was particularly interesting in the 2015 online ethnographic research, was 
how debate was conducted – the “public reasonableness” element, with group 
members using signaling language to encourage – or curtail – debate, to effectively 
say: “It’s ok - politics bit over now and nothing scary happened”. Thus, the debate 
that was observed tended to be reasonable, wrapped in ameliorating language and 
etiquette (or “netiquette”), but it was also short-lived and conversational threads 
tended towards the discursive rather than the deliberative. Facebook’s own 
architecture carries much of the blame for this by tending to split content across time 




person’s Facebook Page to a Friend’s News Feed, to a Group Page, and the 
discussion picked up again by new people several days later. The ability to continue 
conversations is thus impeded further by virtual geography and temporal dissonance. 
There is a multiplier effect at play in which normative behaviour offline in which 
people will normally avoid political talk206 is increased on Facebook because of the 
perceived risk to group equilibrium or individual reputations. And political debate 
that does happen is further truncated by Facebook’s architecture which favours 
expansion-to-most over creating a “safe” space for trusted person-to-person 
communication. 
What was also in evidence was people using Facebook to seek out spaces in 
which to see and join in political discussion with strangers. This willingness to 
engage in debate with strangers was particularly evident on Green Party MP Caroline 
Lucas’s Page, and even more so after the election result when Lucas’s Page seemed 
to act as a magnet for left-leaning voters, whether they voted Green or not and 
whether they lived in Brighton or not. Being there would validate their own thoughts 
on the election; offer new insights; and the opportunity to debate in a space more 
likely to be reasonable and comfortable. They were seeking debate with strangers, but 
with like-minded strangers. 
The 2017 data collection was focused around one candidate rather than watching 
what was going on in the four constituencies, with an interventionist case study 
designed to test the effect of particular content on the likelihood of debate. Among 
 
206  See (Bennett et al, 1995; Eliasoph, 1996, 1997; Bohman, 2004; Kahneman, 2011; Jackson et al, 




the issues that had emerged during the two years between the elections studied was 
greater awareness about how Facebook’s algorithms influenced what content, 
including political content, a user might see.  
Returning to Facebook for the first time in 2017, the platform appeared to know a 
great deal more about its users that it had in 2015, including being able to mine data 
from other websites and the social media networks Facebook had bought - WhatsApp 
and Instagram. While that is touched on in this thesis, along with the investigations 
into the “gaming” of Facebook’s algorithms by partisan political groups207, the 2017 
data collection focused on whether debate is affected by the content posted and by 
how far the candidate and their agents engaged in debate on their Page. 
The 2015 data had shown that, of the 27 candidates across the four constituencies 
studied, all of the winning candidates and three out of four of the second-placed 
candidates were also the ones who – personally or through their agents - were most 
active on Facebook. The issue of how far the level of personal involvement of a 
candidate in social media may affect voting patterns would be worth exploring 
further in future research, given that voters expressed a link between the visibility of 
the candidate on their social media and the perceived authenticity of that candidate208.  
The 2017 research sought to look at whether the nature of the involvement of the 
candidate (or their agent acting as the candidate) and their supporters on their 
 
207 See footnote 196, page 323. Note that much of this investigative work is ongoing and, at the time of 
writing, it is not clear the extent to which partisan political groups and underground governmental 
actors (particularly from Russia) may have – or may still be – influencing what content Facebook 
shows targeted users. 




Facebook Page affected debate. Further, to test whether paying to Boost Posts – the 
core of Facebook’s business model – would affect the visibility and reach of a Post 
and, in turn, engagement with it. However, while the case study showed that paying 
to Boost Posts had a positive effect on reach, it was not known how far increased 
reach alone had a positive effect on the likelihood of debate. Nor was it possible to 
determine how far paying to Boost some Posts caused Facebook’s algorithms to boost 
other, unpaid, Posts too. This could also be an area for future investigation. 
What was noted during the 2015 online ethnographic study and the 2017 
interventionist case study is that debate can be encouraged by the actions of the 
candidate and his/her agents and supporters. The five key enabling factors were: 
1) The visibility of the candidate or influencer on the Page (visible leaders);  
2) The visible management of debate (supportive policers);  
3) Type or quality of material (posts, videos, comments) produced to encourage 
debate (aware producers);  
4) More young, female visitors and/or liberal thinking participants on the Page 
or thread (engaged openers);  
5) The safety of conversing with like-minds (comfortable space). 
The conclusion is that the likelihood of debate comes down to the positive actions 
of particular types of individuals vs the chilling effect of Facebook’s architecture. 
 Whether debate happens depends on the right people being involved - Friends, 
candidates, Page managers, and like-minded strangers who are visible and exhibit the 
behaviour visitors want to see. The factors outlined above do not have to all be 
present for debate to happen, but any one of the factors being present made debate 





6.1. Publications and further research 
This discussion around who enables political debate and the ways in which they 
do so is a key finding in this project and part of the plan for publication from this 
PhD research. The role of women in particular in enabling and encouraging political 
talk on Facebook is of interest and it is intended that the first paper produced will 
focus on this area of the research findings – the roles played by the identified types of 
individuals and the ways in which women tended to play a part in civilising political 
talk and encouraging discussion on Facebook, even among people with opposing 
views. 
This area of the active civilising of debate will also be picked up in the next stage 
of this research project. Having looked at how people engaged in (or avoided) 
political discussion on candidate pages in both the 2015 and 2017 election, the 
intention is to continue that work with the next UK general election. As in 2015 and 
2017, the intention will be to focus on the five sample constituencies and to identify a 
particular area to investigate further. In 2017, the project focused on how the type of 
content and the actions of visible leaders and aware producers might affect the 
likelihood of debate, as a more focused exploration of the findings from the 2015 
online ethnography. At the next election, the intention is to focus on the roles of 
supportive policers and engaged openers to look at whether that tendency to civilised 
discussion seen in 2017 has survived the more polarised and personal politics of post-
Brexit-vote Britain expressed through Facebook. 
Finally, the intention is to also produce and publish papers from this research 
looking at the overall findings and the relationship of Facebook to the public sphere. 




Political Studies Association Annual Conference (2018) and the final results of the 
research are likely to be of interest to other academics working in the area of political 
talk and the public sphere; or researchers focusing on Facebook’s role in civic 
society; or on social media and politics; or looking at how people engage in pre-
political talk or deliberation.  
The conclusion of this thesis that Facebook has undermined the Habermasian 
public sphere, or disintermediated it, by bypassing the role of the traditional media as 
public opinion conduit, is an important contribution to academic debate around the 
public sphere in the online era. 
 
6.2 Facebook in the public sphere 
To return to the starting point for the research – is Facebook part of the 
Habermasian public sphere, or simply an additional public space in which political 
discussion may happen? Is reasonable and reasoned debate happening and does 
Facebook’s ecology and architecture make that debate more or less likely to happen? 
And, having happened, is that debate public and able to be seen by – or represented to 
– the State? The project considered key literature to define a public sphere “test” for 
Facebook (see pages 72-79) which would primarily assess the type and quality of 
political talk among Facebook users, but also that the SNS itself would have to pass 
structural tests in relation to its institutional, architectural and political ecology. 
This research found that Facebook met some of the parameters of the public 
sphere but not others. It is only sort-of public – its structure is a walled garden of 




unknown number of third parties. It links users with people they already know, their 
“trusted friends,” and yet encourages them to expand that network to a point where 
users no longer feel in control of who sees what they say, and therefore become less 
comfortable; less willing to debate.  
Facebook says its focus is on showing users material they seem to be interested 
in, from people or organisations they care most about, and yet the evidence is that its 
algorithms are easily subverted through paid-for campaigns and viral techniques to 
show users material they have not shown interest in or would not otherwise have 
come across. 
This thesis argues that the question is not therefore whether Facebook does or 
does not meet the public sphere test but posits that Facebook as political actor is so 
large, so influential, and so globally connected that it has subverted it. Further that 
Facebook has undermined the representational role of the public sphere by creating a 
space in which public opinion is contained within in its walled garden and within its 
own publics. The scale of those contained publics may make the conduit of their 
opinion to their governments irrelevant and only revealed at the ballot box.  
Thus, both the traditional media209 and governments are excluded from the 
discourse and “surprise” election results (see page 332) more likely. Further, at a 
period in history where trust in the media has been eroded by “fake news” 
accusations and weak or partisan reporting, and while Facebook continues to filter 
 
209 Back in 2003 – several years before the arrival of Facebook - Dahlgren had urged that, as the public 
sphere moved onto the growing Internet, it was important for civic culture that mainstream journalism 




and manage the news users see through its platform, the link between a healthy 
democracy and a healthy press is further undermined (see pages 96-98). 
The Habermasian public sphere assumes a flattened perspective: people – media – 
state. Facebook is a massively global networked business experienced as a local-to-
you space. Billions of bubble communities which influence each other, outside of 
state and media. Facebook’s sphere of influence is who each user knows – the 
personal to the personal. This is a new public sphere of political influence, but one 
that redefines the word “public”.  
Facebook is bypassing traditional media’s filtering role between public and state. 
This is a sphere which is not necessarily public but in which publics may be 
influenced. Able to be manipulated by unknown third parties and controlled by 
algorithms prioritising paid content. Whilst those things may be true of other media 
and social media, they are not Facebook; they are not a primary information source 
for two billion people and rising. 
Facebook’s corporate concerns drive content algorithms which tend towards the 
creation of filter bubbles, and bias that can be bought by third party influencers, while 
its architecture has multiple chilling effects on political talk, and on debate in 
particular. Facebook is not part of the Habermasian public sphere, rather it has 
undermined or disintermediated the public sphere as it has been largely understood. 
Set against that is a public sphere which has shifted and may be better understood 
as multiple spheres (Habermas, 1992; Dahlgren, 1995; McNair, 2000; Temple, 2006; 
Khan et al, 2012), or a constellation of spaces (Eliasoph, 1990; Dahlgren, 2005a) in 




become simultaneously global and personal; a fluid, protean state that has moved 
beyond the public – media – state triad to deliver hyper-personal viewpoints across 
globalised communications. The political consumerism of product boycotts; the 
global activism movements of Occupy or The Women’s March; the social media 
activism of #MeToo, these go beyond the nation-state political communications 
theory of the early Habermasians and the deliberationists.  
Politics today is about the personal and the social; it is about what the individual 
thinks, or more often feels, about an issue – influenced by the people they know and 
trust. It is inevitable that this more personal, more emotion-led and socially-driven 
political response would find its home on social media, and on Facebook in particular 
as the most effective social media actor. What is less clear is how far Facebook is 
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Appendix 1: Rejected surveys 
Among numerous drafts and rejected versions of surveys, the one below, aimed at 
politicians and worked on in the summer of 2014, came closest to being put into the 
field. It was rejected in the end because it was felt that the likelihood of being able to 
collect enough relevant data was low – not least because politicians would be 
unlikely to respond to such a complex question and in sufficient numbers to make the 




The survey did however form the starting point for the questions and structure 
of the final survey, in particular in seeking to ascertain users’ own perceptions of the 
likelihood of political debate happening on Facebook. 
1. Politician questionnaire (Draft) 
Section One (questions related to an MP’s current use of FB) 
A) Do you currently have a Facebook account?   Yes  No 
B) If no, why not? 
- Do not have regular computer access 
- Do not have time 
- Used to have one but stopped using it 
- Not interested 
C) If you used to use Facebook but have stopped using it, was it because 
- Took up too much time 
- Just got bored with it 
- Concerns about what people could read/see about me 
- Problems with one or more other users 
- Other (please say) 
D) If you have a Facebook account, is it a personal account or a work account?  
 Personal Work  I have both 
E) Do you mostly run your Facebook account yourself or is it handled by someone else? 
I do it 
A member of my staff team does it 
A member of my family does it 




(Answered “Yes” to question A, jump to D and E, then continue to Section Two. Answered 
“No” to question A jump to B and C, then jump to section Three) 
Section Two (questions related to Facebook use for MPs that do use it) 
1. On average, approximately how many minutes per day do you personally spend on 
Facebook? 
10 or less 10-30  31-60  1 to 2 hours More than two hours 
2. Who can see your Facebook profile? 
Only my Friends  All networks and Friends  Some networks/all 
friends  Don’t know   
3. Do you provide your email address on your Facebook profile?  Yes  No 
4. Do you provide a phone number on your Facebook profile? Yes  No 
5. How many of the following things would you frequently do on Facebook? (Tick all that 
apply) 
Post pictures of myself working 
Post pictures of myself with my family 
Post pictures of myself at public events 
Post pictures of myself at private events 
Tag myself in other people’s photos 
Add a comment on other people’s photos 
Add a comment on other people’s status updates 
Post on other people’s Timeline/Wall 
Post a link about a news story 




Send private Facebook messages 
6. How many of the following have you done on Facebook within the last year? (Tick all that 
apply) 
Created a Facebook Group 
Joined a Facebook Group 
Attended events coordinated on Facebook 
Created a Facebook event 
Changed my privacy settings to limit who can see some of my Facebook content  
Asked someone not to tag me in a photo or video 
Used the Block facility to prevent some people accessing my content  
7. Do you tend to use the following: 
Instagram?  Yes – often  Yes - occasionally No - never 
WhatsApp  Yes – often  Yes - occasionally No – never 
Please say how much you agree or disagree with the following statements 
Facebook is part of my everyday activity 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I am proud to tell people I’m on Facebook 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I dedicate a part of my daily schedule to Facebook 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I feel out of touch when I haven’t logged into Facebook for a while 




Facebook helps me keep in touch with friends and family 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
Facebook helps me keep in touch with colleagues and party workers 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
Facebook helps me keep in touch with people in my constituency 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
Facebook helps me find out what people think about how I’m doing as an MP 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
Facebook helps me find out what people think about issues in the news 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
Facebook helps me to project who I am and what I have to say about issues 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
If people ask questions on Facebook about political or serious issues, I will usually reply 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
When I’m angry or upset about something in the news, I’ll usually say something about it on 
Facebook 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I am usually more careful in commenting on a news issue in an interview with a journalist 
than I would be on Facebook  
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
If people comment on Facebook about politics or issues, I will usually comment back 




I find that Facebook is a useful communication tool 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I use Facebook less now than I did a year ago 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I expect to use Facebook less over the next year or so 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I would be sad if Facebook shut down 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
Section Three (questions related to an MP’s attitude towards mass media) 
As the circulations of newspapers fall, so does their power to influence politicians 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think most of my constituents find out what’s going on in the world from TV news 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
Most under-30s get their news from websites and social media nowadays 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
Under-30-year-olds are most likely to find out what’s going on in the world from their 
friends and work colleagues 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think the traditional mass media puts too much emphasis on telling people what to think 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree  
I read opinion (op-ed) columns in newspapers frequently 




There are certain columnists or commentators whose opinion I sit up and take notice of  
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I’m less bothered by what the mainstream media has to say than I was when I first became an 
MP 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think the mainstream media has “dumbed down” its coverage of serious issues in the time 
since I became an MP 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think most politicians worry too much about what the mainstream media has to say about 
the job they’re doing 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think how an MP comes across on TV matters more to voters than what they have to say 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
Section Four (questions related to MPs’ attitudes to Facebook - users and non-users) 
I think we underestimate the importance of Facebook in its users sharing information about 
what’s happening in the world 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think Facebook helps its users to be more informed about what’s happening in the world 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
People don’t talk enough on Facebook about serious issues happening in our world 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think it’s important to encourage Facebook users who make good points about serious 




Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
It frustrates me that so much of the content on social media is banal chatter 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I’m more likely to comment about a serious issue on Twitter than on Facebook 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I’m not really interested in what people are saying on Facebook 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I pay more attention to what people are saying on social media about me as an MP than I did 
a year ago 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think Facebook has enormous potential as a tool for starting mass protests 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think protests on Facebook usually grow quickly and fade just as fast 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I’m usually aware of what people are saying on Facebook about issues in the news 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
What people are saying on Facebook about political and civic issues matters to me 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
What people are saying on Facebook about political and civic issues influences me 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think Facebook encourages users to give an instant response to issues rather than think 




Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
There’s too much chatter on Facebook to be able to filter out what people are actually saying 
about political and civic issues 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think people are more likely to discuss serious issues on Facebook because they are talking 
to people they know 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think people are more likely to discuss politics on Facebook because they are talking with 
people they know 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think Facebook weakens democracy by encouraging polarised responses to issues 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
I think Facebook has changed the way people engage with politics and serious issues 
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral  Agree  Strongly agree 
Personal details 
How many years have you been an MP (total years served if elected more than once)? 
Less than five years  5-10years  10-15years  15-20years  More than 20 years 
Which political party do you currently represent? 
The next stage of the research would involve follow-up interviews with some of the MPs. If 
you would be willing to answer some further questions (by telephone or face-to-face) that 
would be enormously helpful to my research. 
I would be interested in taking part further in the research:  Yes   No  






Appendix 2: Final Facebook users’ survey 
Q1 Hello 
Facebook 
This survey is about if - and how - you use Facebook and will be used as part of my PhD research. It 
should take you 5 to 10 minutes to complete. 
Your answers will be anonymised and your data will only be used as part of my research project. 
If you have any questions about the survey, please email me at s.greenwood@staffs.ac.uk 





Q2 Do you have a Facebook account? 
- Yes  (1)  
- No  (2)  
Q3 Have you ever had a Facebook account? 
- Yes  (1)  
- No  (2)  
Q4 On average, approximately how many minutes per day do you spend on Facebook? 
- 10 minutes or less  (1)  
- 10 to 30  (2)  
- 31 to 60  (3)  
- 1 to 2 hours  (4)  
- 2 to three hours  (5)  
- 3+ hours  (6)  















part of my 
everyday 
activity (1)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
I am proud to 
tell people I'm 
on Facebook 
(2)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
I dedicate a 




-  -  -  -  
-  
I feel out of 
touch when I 
haven't logged 
on to 
Facebook for a 
while (4)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
I feel I am part 
of the 
Facebook 
community (5)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
I would be sad 
if Facebook 
shut down (6)  




















I think it's 
important to 
stay on top of 
your Facebook 
privacy 
settings (1)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
Facebook is 
too useful to 
me to worry 
about what it 
does with my 
data (2)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
I read pretty 
much 
everything that 
appears in my 
timeline (3)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
I don't always 
read everything 
in my timeline 
but I always 
look at pictures 
(4)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
There are 
certain people I 
look out for - 
when they post 
something I 
always read it 
(5)  










who might see 
it (6)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
It worries me 
that Facebook 
doesn't control 
who uses it - 
terrorists, 
paedophiles, 
etc. (7)  




Q7 Do you think you use Facebook  
- Less often than you did a year ago  (1)  
- About the same as a year ago  (2)  







Q8 If you use Facebook less often, or have stopped using it altogether, please choose your main 
reasons 
• Intrusive advertising  (1)  
• Concerns about privacy  (2)  
• Too busy  (3)  
• Friends using it less often  (4)  
• Don't like the new layout  (5)  
• Bored with it  (8)  
• Prefer to use Twitter  (6)  
• Other reason (please say)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q9 What prompted you to join Facebook in the first place? 
- My best friend at the time was using it  (1)  
- Most of the people I knew were using it  (2)  
- To stay in touch with family who were using it  (3)  
- I'd heard or read about it  (4)  
- It was recommended it to me  (5)  
 
 
Q10 What do you mainly use Facebook for? (Or if you've stopped using it, what did you mostly use it 
for?) You can choose more than one reason. 
• Keeping up with what people I know are doing  (1)  
• Chatting with people I know  (2)  
• Looking at photographs  (3)  
• Finding out what's going on around me  (4)  
• Searching for people I know  (5)  
• Keeping up with groups or campaigns  (6)  



















I get upset 
about some of 
things that are 
happening in 
the world. (1)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
The main way 
I find out 
about what's 
in the news is 
through 
friends and 
people I know 
(2)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
If the news 
comes on TV, 
I usually find 
myself 
watching it (3)  









-  -  -  -  
-  
I don't feel 
that what the 
politicians say 
has anything 
to do with me 
(5)  





I usually join 
in when I hear 
people 
debating 
politics (6)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
I really enjoy 
taking part in 
a good debate 
about serious 
issues (7)  




Q12 At present, are you intending to vote in the May 2015 General Election? 
- Yes  (1)  
- Not sure  (2)  





Q13 Do you already know who you will be voting for in the General Election? 
- Yes  (1)  
- Not sure  (2)  
- No  (3)  
Q14 I intend to vote 
- Labour  (1)  
- Conservative  (2)  
- Liberal Democrat  (3)  
- SNP  (4)  
- Green Party  (5)  
- UKIP  (6)  
- Other (please say)  (7) 
 















angry or upset 
about 
something in 
the news, I'll 
usually say 
something 
about it on 
Facebook (1)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
If a friend 
makes a good 
point on 
Facebook 
about a serious 
issue, I usually 
Like it or reply 
(2)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
I think it's 
important to 
respond when 





the news (3)  
-  -  -  -  
-  




things that are 
happening in 
the world (4)  











Facebook (5)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
I often feel I 
need to "dumb 
down" when I 
write stuff or 
comment on 
Facebook (6)  
-  -  -  -  
-  
I find out about 
what's going 
on in the world 
mostly through 
friends on 
Facebook (7)  




Q17 How many Facebook Groups do you belong to? 
- None  (1)  
- 5 or less  (2)  
- 6 to 10  (3)  
- 11 to 20  (4)  
- 20 to 30  (5)  





Q18 How many Facebook Groups or Pages have you created 
- None  (1)  
- 5 or less  (2)  
- 6 to 10  (3)  
- 11 to 20  (4)  
- 20+  (5)  
 
Q19 What is your gender? 
- Male  (1)  
- Female  (2)  
 
Q20 How old are you? 
- 15-24  (1)  
- 25-34  (2)  
- 35-44  (3)  
- 45-54  (4)  
- 55-64  (5)  
- 65+  (6)  
 
Q21 Are you 
- A student  (1)  
- Unemployed  (2)  
- In paid work  (3)  
 
Q22 Would you be willing to take part in follow-up research related to Facebook? 
- Yes  (1)  
- Maybe  (2)  





Q25 Thank you for saying you might be interested in helping with follow-up research. Please let me 
have your email address so I can contact you 
________________________________________________________________ 
Q26 Thank you for being interested in maybe helping out further. If you'd like me to get in touch again 




Appendix 3: Additional comparative survey results 
 
Q5 In this question, please select your answer according to how much you agree or disagree with each 
statement 
 





Figure 48: Control Group (CG) answers 
 
 
Q6 In this question, please select your answer according to how much you agree or disagree with each 
statement. 
 





Figure 50: CG answers 
 
Q7 Do you think you use Facebook  
 





Figure 52: CG answers 
Q9 What prompted you to join Facebook in the first place? 
 





Figure 54: CG answers 
Q10 What do you mainly use Facebook for? (Or if you've stopped using it, what did you mostly use it 
for?) You can choose more than one reason. 
 











Q11 In this question, please select your answer according to how much you agree or disagree with 
each statement. 
 






Figure 58: CG answers 
 
 
Q14 I intend to vote 
 





Figure 60: CG answers 
Appendix 4: 2015 candidate lists and information file 
Burton (control/conservative) 
Profile: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000610 
Mike Green: UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
Email: mikegreenukip@hotmail.co.uk 
https://www.facebook.com/mikegreenUKIP2 (followed) 
Andrew Griffiths: Conservative Party (2010 winner) 
Email: andrew@voteandrew.co.uk 
https://www.facebook.com/andrew.griffiths.3139?fref=ts (personal profile) (friended) 
https://www.facebook.com/voteandrewgriffiths?fref=ts (campaign page) (followed) 





Facebook: (sent email 27/4) https://www.facebook.com/pages/Burton-and-Uttoxeter-East-
Staffordshire-Liberal-Democrats/111953162170257 (campaign) (Liked, Following) 
@DJMac1986 
Agent: Hugh Warner: https://www.facebook.com/hugh.warner.79 (personal) 
https://www.facebook.com/Dave.J.MacDonald?fref=tl_fr_box&pnref=lhc.friends (persona) 
Samantha Patrone: Green Party 
Email: sam.patrone@greenparty.org.uk 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/greenpartysampatrone (Liked) 
@sampatrone 
Jon Wheale: Labour Party 
Email: jon.burtonlabour@gmail.com 
Facebook: https://facebook.com/Jon4Burton2015 (personal profile) (Liked, Followed) 
(Griffiths emailed re interview and MacDonald/Warner, Patrone, Green, Wheale emailed re 
follow-up questions) 
Stoke-on-Trent Central (control/university constituency/Labour) 
Profile: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000972 
Dr Zulfiqar Ali: Liberal Democrats 
Email: drzulfiali@yahoo.co.uk 
Facebook: (emailed 27/4) 
Liam Ascough: Conservative Party 
Email: Liam@stokeconservatives.com 





https://www.facebook.com/liam.marshallascough  (personal page) (Friend request) 
Mark Breeze: Independent 
Email: unitedstrength@hotmail.co.uk 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/215480605235472/ (Group he put on his 
candidate literature) (Joined) 
Mick Harold: UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
Email: mick.harold@ukiplocal.org 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/mick.harold?fref=ts  (Friend request) 
https://www.facebook.com/ukipstokeontrent?fref=ts (local campaign) (Liked, Followed) 
Dr Tristram Hunt: Labour Party (2010 winner) 
Email: t.hunt@qmul.ac.uk 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/LabourTristram (party) (following) 
https://www.facebook.com/tristram.hunt.5?fref=ts (personal) (friend request sent) 
@TristramHuntMP 
Ali Majid: Cannabis is Safer than Alcohol 
Email: i.a.majid@hotmail.co.uk 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ali.j.majid (personal profile) (Friended) 
https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100009380130802&fref=ts (campaign page) 
Paul Toussaint: Ubuntu Party 
Email: 




Jan Zablocki: Green Party 
Email: jan.northmidscwu@btconnect.com 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100004211385869&fref=ts (following) 
https://www.facebook.com/NorthStaffordshireGreenParty (campaign) 
@ZablockiJan 
(Hunt, Ascough and Harold emailed re follow-up questions) 
Bristol West (Student vote – HEPI research/Lib Dem) 
Profile: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000602 
Thangam Debbonaire: Labour Party 
Email: thangam.debbonaire@gmail.com 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Thangam-Debbonaire-for-Bristol-
West/443769478976015 (personal profile) (following) 
Darren Hall: Green Party 
Email: darren.hall@bristolgreenparty.org.uk 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/DarrenHall2015 (personal profile) (liked) 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/667285320024360/ (campaign page/group) (sent request 
to join) 
Claire Hiscott: Conservative Party 
Email: claire4bristolwest@gmail.com 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/bristolwestconservatives (campaign page) (liked) 





Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/dawnyparry (message sent 6 May) 
@DawnParry 
Paul Turner: UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
Email: paul.turner@ukiplocal.org 
Facebook: (emailed 27/4) 
https://twitter.com/paulturner2012 (unverified) @BristolUkip 
Stewart Weston: Left Unity 
Email: bathnesom@leftunity.org 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/stewart.weston.35?fref=ts (Friended, Following) 
@BristolLU 
Stephen Williams: Liberal Democrats (2010 winner) 
Email: stephen.williams.mp@parliament.uk  
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/stephen.williams.mp (personal profile) (Friend request 
sent) 
https://www.facebook.com/BristolLibDems (campaign page) 
Brighton Pavilion (younger/Green) 
Profile: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/constituencies/E14000598 
Chris Bowers: Liberal Democrats 
Email: chris.bowers@liberalbrighton.org (personal email cbowers@gn.apc.org) 
Facebook: (emailed 27/4) (replied) 
@chris1bowers 




Nigel Carter: UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
Email: nigelcarter2@virginmedia.com 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/nigel.carter.9?fref=ts (personal profile) (Followed) 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/UKIP-Brighton-Hove/519062224812831?fref=ts 
(campaign page) (Followed) 
Dr Caroline Lucas: Green Party (2010 winner) 
Email: caroline.lucas@brightonandhovegreenparty.org.uk 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/carolinelucas.page (personal profile) 
Clarence Mitchell: Conservative Party 
Email: clarence@clarence4pavilion.com 




Howard Pilott: The Socialist Party of Great Britain 
Email: brightonpavilion@worldsocialism.org 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/socialistpartyofgreatbritain (party) (Following) 
https://www.facebook.com/howard.pilott (unverified) 
http://www.worldsocialism.org/spgb/author-speaker/howard-pilott 
Purna Sen: Labour Party 
Email: PurnaSenBrightonLabour@gmail.com 




Nick Yeomans Independent 
Email: nicholasyeomans7@hotmail.com 



















Appendix 5: 2017 case study: selected posts  
1: Griffiths “attack” Post, from page 196-7 
 
The Post in full: 
Andrew Griffiths is a hard-working MP – on behalf of a few people in Burton 
and Uttoxeter. Here’s what he really thinks of the many. 
His voting record shows that he backed the Tories’ unfair bedroom tax 15 
times. He voted against increasing benefits in line with inflation 5 times, and 
15 times voted against benefit rises for disabled people. Nine times he voted 
against spending public money on jobs for young people who had been out of 
work for a long time, and 4 times voted to reduce the amount spent on advice 
services for people struggling to pay their council tax. He voted to reduce 
government spending on welfare and benefits a shocking 52 times.  
The United Nations published a critical report into the Tory government’s 
austerity strategy, denouncing it as a “systematic violation” of disabled 
people’s rights. Andrew Griffith isn’t a nice bloke who happened to be a 




every opportunity, voted to reduce support for those in Burton and Uttoxeter 
who needed it most. 
#votelabour for the many, not the few  
#makeitmckeirnan 
2. Final, Henry V-style Post published the day before voting opened (page 202) 
 
Figure 61: Screenshot of final intervention Post 
 
The Post was written to encourage interaction. Note the unfinished sentence about 
the Torys and Corbyn to encourage readers to click through to read the whole Post, 




When Theresa May called this snap election 7 weeks ago she wasn’t just 
expecting to walk over the Labour Party, she wanted to destroy us. To turn the 
UK into a one-party state with her as its president. Unchallenged, 
unquestioned, and with a majority that would let her and her Tory friends do 
whatever they like. 
She hadn’t reckoned on the Labour Party fighting back hard. She hadn’t 
reckoned on Corbyn’s amazing campaign of hope. She hadn’t reckoned on 
our manifesto for real change; for a better Britain.  
Nor had her Tory media pals - and they’ve hit Corbyn with everything they 
could dream up (13 pages in the Daily Mail today!). For all of us who’ve been 
out door knocking voters, or talking to the people around us, we know how 
much the drip, drip of Tory lies has stuck. This has been a tough fight and it 
isn’t over. 
I’m calling on every one of you to do EVERYTHING you can in these last 
few hours to get the message out that only Labour is a vote for a better, caring 
Britain. 
We saw what that looks like in the hours after the Manchester and London 
terrorist attacks – when doctors and nurses ran towards danger to help the 
injured; taxi drivers worked through the night to get people to safety; a 
homeless man cradles a women as she dies210. The Tories are the nasty party, 
but Britain is a country of compassion and fairness. 
So, I’m asking you, my colleagues and friends in Burton and Uttoxeter 
Labour Party to do anything and everything you can in these last few hours to 
get out the Labour vote. Post leaflets, chip in on the phone bank, drive a 
 
210 The Post was written long before the homeless man referred to, Chris Parker, was discovered to 
have stolen from victims: https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-




neighbour to a polling station, Facebook friends, workmates, children, parents 
and ask them to vote tomorrow for the Britain we need.  
And please, please watch and SHARE the video below.  
 
 
Figure 62:  Post written about (and as if from) the candidate to build authenticity (see footnote 
181, page 291)  
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